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Abstract
Recent advances in embedded systems, energy storage, and communication in-
terfaces, accompanied by the falling prices of WLAN routers and a considerable
increase in the throughput of a WLAN (IEEE 802.11), have facilitated the pro-
liferation of WLAN Mesh Network (WMN) applications. In addition to their
current deployments in less dynamic community networks, WMNs have become
a key solution in various highly dynamic scenarios. For instance, WMNs are in-
tended to interconnect self-organized, cooperative, and small Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) in a wide range of applications, such as emergency response, en-
vironmental monitoring, and ad-hoc network provisioning. Nevertheless, WMNs
still face major security challenges as they are prone to routing attacks. Conse-
quently, the network can be sabotaged and, in the case of UAV-WMN-supported
missions, the attacker might manipulate payload data or even hijack UAVs.
Contemporary security standards, such as the IEEE 802.11i and the security
mechanisms of the IEEE 802.11s mesh standard, are vulnerable to routing at-
tacks, as experimentally shown in this research. Therefore, a secure routing
protocol is indispensable for making feasible the deployment of WMNs in criti-
cal scenarios, such as UAV-WMN-assisted applications. As far as the author of
this thesis knows, none of the existing research approaches for secure routing in
WMNs have gained acceptance in practice due to their high overhead or strong
assumptions.
In this research, a new approach, which is called Position-Aware, Secure, and
Efficient mesh Routing (PASER), is proposed. This new proposal defeats more
attacks than the IEEE 802.11s/i security mechanisms and the well-known, secure
routing protocol Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN), without
making restrictive assumptions. It is shown that PASER achieves —in realistic
UAV-WMN scenarios— similar performance results as the well-established, non-
secure routing protocols Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP) combined with
the IEEE 802.11s security mechanisms. Two representative scenarios are consid-
ered: (1) on-demand ubiquitous network access and (2) efficient exploration of
sizable areas in disaster relief. The performance evaluation results are produced
using an experimentally validated simulation model of WMNs, realistic mobility
patterns of UAVs, and an experimentally derived channel model for the air-to-air
WMN link between UAVs. The findings of this evaluation are justified by the
route discovery delay and the message overhead of the considered solutions.
This research’s main aim is to support the broad deployment of a secure routing
protocol in highly dynamic WMNs, and the PASER features, presented here, are
a major step towards achieving this goal.
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Kurzfassung
Der technologische Fortschritt in verschiedenen Bereichen wie eingebetteten Sys-
temen, Energiespeicherung sowie Kommunikationsschnittstellen und -protokollen,
hat, unterstu¨tzt von sinkenden Preisen fu¨r WLAN-Hardware und dem deutlichen
Anstieg der U¨bertragungsraten von WLAN-Technologien (IEEE 802.11), den
Grundstein gelegt fu¨r die zunehmende Anzahl an Anwendungen von WLAN-
Mesh-Netzen (WMNs). Diese haben sich neben der gegenwa¨rtigen Verbreitung
quasistatischer, Community-gestu¨tzter Funknetze vor allem zu einer Schlu¨ssel-
technologie fu¨r hochdynamische Anwendungen entwickelt. Eine solche hoch-
dynamische Anwendung ist beispielsweise die WMN-gestu¨tzte Kommunikation
selbstorganisierender, miteinander kooperierender unbemannter Kleinflugko¨rper
(UAVs) mit einer grossen Spanne an Einsatzbereichen, wie Bergungs- und Ret-
tungseinsa¨tze, Umweltu¨berwachung, Pra¨zisionslandwirtschaft oder der Ad-hoc-
Bereitstellung mobiler WLAN- und Mobilfunknetze. Mit zunehmendem Einsatz
in solch kritischen Bereichen wachsen auch die Anforderungen an die Sicherheit.
Gegenwa¨rtige WMN-Technologien stehen hierbei noch vor grossen Sicherheit-
sherausforderungen, da diese keinen Schutz gegen Routing-Angriffe gewa¨hren.
Mithin besteht das Risiko, dass Angreifer Netze sabotieren und im Falle von
UAV-Einsa¨tzen Nutzdaten der UAVs manipulieren oder sogar die gesamte Kon-
trolle u¨ber einzelne UAVs u¨bernehmen ko¨nnen.
Wie in dieser Dissertation gezeigt wird, sind derzeitige Sicherheitsstandards wie
IEEE 802.11i oder auch die Sicherheitsmechanismen des Mesh-Standards IEEE
802.11s anfa¨llig fu¨r Routingangriffe. Um einen sicheren Einsatz von WMNs im
sensiblen und kritischen Umfeld wie den erwa¨hnten UAV-WMN-basierten An-
wendungsszenarien zu gewa¨hrleisten, muss auch das eingesetzte Routingprotokoll
entsprechend sicher sein. Soweit dem Autor bekannt, konnte sich unter diesem
Gesichtspunkt keine der existierenden Lo¨sungen in der Praxis durchsetzen, da
entweder der Overhead der verschiedenen Ansa¨tze zu hoch oder aber die getroffe-
nen Annahmen in Sinne der Sicherheit zu stark und damit in der Praxis lediglich
begrenzt umsetzbar sind.
In dieser Arbeit wird ein alternativer, umfassender Ansatz namens Position-
Aware, Secure and Efficient mesh Routing (PASER) vorgestellt. Dieses neue
Routingverfahren bietet eine ho¨here Sicherheit gegen Routingattacken als die
bestehenden IEEE 802.11s/i-Sicherheitsmechanismen und sogar als das sichere
Routingprotokoll Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN), wobei
allerdings im Hinblick auf die praktische Einsetzbarkeit auf starke Annahmen
verzichtet wird. Es wird gezeigt, dass PASER in realistischen UAV-WMN Szenar-
ien eine vergleichbar hohe Performanz erreicht, wie sie mit dem derzeit weit
verbreiteten, aber unsicheren Routingprotokoll Hybrid Wireless Mesh Proto-
col (HWMP) in Kombination mit den IEEE 802.11s Sicherheitsmechanismen
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mo¨glich ist. Zwei repra¨sentative Szenarien werden hierfu¨r betrachtet: (1) ubiq-
uita¨rer ad-hoc Netzzugriff und (2) die effiziente Erkundung gro¨sserer Gebiete
im Katastrophenschutz. Zur Leistungsbewertung werden ein durch Experimente
validiertes OMNeT++-basiertes WMN-Modell mit wirklichkeitsgetreuen UAV-
Mobilita¨tsmustern und eben falls ein aus Experimenten abgeleitetes Kanalmod-
ell fu¨r die direkte Funkverbindung zwischen UAVs herangezogen. Bei der Analyse
der Ergebnisse werden auch die Verzo¨gerungen der Routenfindung und der Nachri-
chten-Overhead der Protokolle beru¨cksichtigt.
Diese Arbeit und das in diesem Rahmen erforschte PASER-Verfahren sollen
einen wesentlichen Beitrag leisten auf dem Weg zur Entwicklung sicherer, prax-
istauglicher Routingprotokolle mit dem Ziel einer mo¨glichst hohen Verbreitung
eines solchen Protokolls in hochdynamischen WMNs.
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Introduction
Contents of this Chapter
1.1 Background for Conventional WLAN Mesh Net-
works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Need for Highly Dynamic WLAN Mesh Net-
works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Problem Statement: Routing Security Issues . . . . 6
1.4 Thesis Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Thesis Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
In this chapter, the background for conventional, less dynamic WLAN mesh
networks is given, followed by the motivation for the need for highly dynamic
WLAN mesh networks. The necessity of secure routing in highly dynamic net-
works is then discussed. Afterwards, the main contributions of this research are
elaborated, and the organization of the thesis is presented.
1.1 Background for Conventional WLAN Mesh Networks
Over the last decade, multi-hop wireless communication networks have received
increased attention due the growing demand for low-cost and high-performance
ubiquitous networking. In the late 1970s, the first generation of Mobile Ad-hoc
NETworks (MANETs) was proposed [Kah78], and by the early 1990s, MANETs
had become a key solution for military applications and emergency operations
[Mac98]. MANETs are infrastructureless and non-hierarchical multi-hop wireless
networks consisting solely of mobile nodes. That is, in a MANET, the mobile
nodes set up and maintain a network on demand without any support from an
existing infrastructure. In this way, all the nodes have identical responsibilities,
including the routing and forwarding of data. MANETs have the advantages
of being self-forming, auto-configuring, and self-healing (automatic configuration
1
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Figure 1.1: Architecture of a conventional WLAN mesh network.
and routing). Despite these advantages, MANETs have not gained wide accep-
tance in civilian applications. One primary reason could be the low incentive
of users to forward the data of others using their power-constrained mobile de-
vices. According to [Wan09], two other reasons are concerns about security and
about the limited throughput of a MANET. In the early 2000s, Wireless Local
Area Network (WLAN) mesh networks (WMNs) emerged [Aky05] to address
the limitations of MANETs and to offer a more promising multi-hop wireless
communication solution for civilian applications. Figure 1.1 illustrates the ar-
chitecture of a conventional WLAN mesh network. As the figure shows, WMNs
have, in contrast to MANETs, a hierarchical structure. The nodes have differ-
ent functionalities rather than being equal peers. WMNs are mainly composed
of legacy mobile clients (WLAN or Long Term Evolution (LTE) clients or oth-
ers) and the mesh backbone. The latter is dedicated to network configuration
and routing. It offers, on demand, network coverage to the clients, and it deals
with the transparent delivery of their data. The mesh backbone comprises mesh
routers, mesh access points, and mesh gateways. Mesh routers are wireless relays
which run a routing protocol to dynamically set up and maintain routes in the
network. Mesh access points are mesh routers that also provide network access
to clients. Mesh gateways are mesh routers that connect the network to the In-
ternet. That is, in contrast to MANETs, WMNs rely on existing infrastructures
to offer Internet connectivity to clients. Besides, in a conventional WMN, the
mesh backbone has no mobility [IEE11, Wan09, Aky05]. The mesh backbone
2
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Table 1.1: Main differences between conventional WMNs and MANETs.
WMNs MANETs
Hierarchical network Flat network
Rely on infrastructure No infrastructure
Less dynamic topology Highly dynamic topology
(No mobility in mesh backbone) (Mobile nodes)
Grid-connected mesh backbone nodes Power-constrained nodes
Multiple radios and multiple channels Single radio and single channel
Main traffic: user↔gateway User↔user traffic
nodes are placed in fixed positions (e.g., the roof of a building). These are also
not power-constrained, as are the mobile devices in MANETs. They are gener-
ally grid-connected. In addition, the nodes in the mesh backbone might comprise
multiple radio interfaces and can operate using multiple orthogonal channels. For
instance, mesh access points typically have one radio interface to perform rout-
ing between the backbone nodes, and another radio interface to offer network
access for clients. Another characteristic of WMNs is that most of the traffic is
destined for the gateway (Internet), while the traffic in MANETs is mainly be-
tween temporary node pairs. Table 1.1 illustrates the main differences between
conventional WMNs and MANETs.
Due to the inherent advantages of WMNs, such as high throughput per link (up
to 800 Mbit/s in the case of 2x2 Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) and
channel bundling (40 MHz) [IEE13a]), improved network capacity in the case of
multiple orthogonal channels over multiple interfaces, coverage of sizable areas,
Internet connectivity, and cost-efficient and flexible deployment [Aky05], WMNs
are witnessing increased deployments in a wide range of applications. Example
applications include community networks, such as Freifunk Berlin [FRE] and
MIT Roofnet [Bic05a], network provisioning in large areas, such as Google WiFi
[GOO] and VillageNet [Dut07], smart metering [Lic10], and emergency opera-
tions [Wol12].
Having the aforementioned applications in mind, the majority of existing research
on WMNs have focused on a less dynamic mesh backbone, which is a typical
characteristic in those applications. Less dynamic means that the topology of
the backbone only changes due to the addition or removal of a node or due to
changes in the network environment. In contrast, in this thesis, highly dynamic
mesh backbones are addressed. Here, the topology also changes due to the mobility
of the nodes. The motivation for tackling this evolving kind of network is covered
in the next section.
3
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1.2 The Need for Highly Dynamic WLAN Mesh Networks
In recent years, small, low-altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have be-
come available on the market at affordable prices [Aus10]. With a weight of less
than 1 kg, UAVs can be equipped with a variety of sensors, wireless transceivers,
and positioning capabilities. They can be used for the cooperative exploration
of dangerous scenarios to avoid risking the health and lives of personnel. With
a diameter below 1 m, they can be deployed in terrain that is difficult to reach
with conventional vehicles. Supporting an autonomous behavior and speeds up
to 20 m/s, they have the ability to complete missions in shorter periods of time
than classical means. In addition, they can be used as communication hotspots
or relays to assist (or replace) existing networks. This has rendered the deploy-
ment of cooperative UAVs in a wide range of applications very attractive. UAV-
assisted applications include, but are not limited to, delivering Internet to the
third-world [FAC], coverage extension or densification [Abd12, Roh13], disaster
relief [Dan09], polar weather monitoring [Cur04], and precision farming [Tec08].
Nevertheless, for such applications to become a reality, a reliable, auto-configuring,
and self-healing wireless backbone network is needed to interconnect the UAVs
and to provide a connection to their ground control station, the cellular core
network, or/and the Internet. WMNs are a good candidate, as they have the
aforementioned characteristics [Aky05], and they offer a physical air-to-air link
for a direct communication between the UAVs. Hereafter, such a network is
referred to as an UAV-WMN. As a significant difference from the ground-based
WMNs that are less dynamic, i.e., the topology of the backbone only changes
due to the addition or removal of a node or due to changes in the network en-
vironment, the topology of an UAV-WMN also changes due to mobility. The
UAV-WMN nodes feature relative speeds between 15 and 26 m/s [Asa13] lead-
ing to high topology change rates, up to 0.1 Hz [Sbe15]. That is, the topology
of an UAV-WMN is highly dynamic. However, the non-inherent mobility of
nodes is not random and non-deterministic. It is rather a controlled mobility
that enables establishing highly efficient network topologies. Moreover, by ap-
plying communication-aware mobility to the UAVs, it becomes possible to react
to time varying channel conditions and topology changes in real time [Wie14].
Hence, self-organization capabilities like node and relay placement, connectivity
restoration, RF-signal outage protection and compensation can be exploited to
establish reliable UAV-WMN in highly dynamic and complex environments.
In this thesis, the focus lies on UAV-WMN-assisted disaster relief as a reference
scenario. In this context, the recent United Nations’ global assessment report
on disaster risk reduction [UN] reveals an increase in the number of disasters
in the last years that resulted in severe humanitarian disasters and economic
damage. The report indicates that one of the top concerns in disaster areas is
the disruption of telecommunications. Sugino [Sug12] reports, in a summary of
4
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Figure 1.2: Example of a deployment scenario of UAV-WMN and two routing
attacks in disaster relief [Sbe15].
the damages of the great east Japan earthquake and tsunami in March 2011,
that 1.9 million fixed telephone lines and 29,000 cellular base stations were dam-
aged. He also reveals that emergency restoration of communication networks
took one month, while a full restoration took 11 months. These facts empha-
size the increasing importance of portable communication networks in disaster
areas. Moreover, these figures point out that a communication network that
can be deployed in a substantially short period (e.g., one hour) is indispensable
to efficiently cope with large scale crises. UAVs connected via a WMN (UAV-
WMN) and acting as WLAN or LTE aerial hotspots meet these requirements
[FAC, Roh13]. In addition, an UAV-WMN is indispensable in such scenarios to
efficiently explore areas where uncontrolled emissions of liquid or gaseous con-
taminants exist [God12a, Dan09]. Figure 1.2 illustrates how an airborne mesh
network consisting of UAVs connected via a WMN can be used to assist disas-
ter relief operations. As the figure shows, UAVs build a portable wireless mesh
backbone. This backbone offers, on demand, network coverage to legacy mobile
WLAN/LTE clients (rescue fighters’ devices), and it deals with the transparent
delivery of their data. Besides, the UAV-WMN backbone is used to transmit the
sensor information of a group of UAVs performing exploration tasks.
From a routing point of view, highly dynamic WMNs frequently lead to broken
links, to which a routing protocol should quickly react. From a security point of
view, (re-)authentication occurs very often, thus, this step should be efficiently
managed. Besides, the consistent reachability of a central security server is very
challenging in highly dynamic WMNs, thus, a security scheme should avoid rely-
ing on that.
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1.3 Problem Statement: Routing Security Issues
While the WMN capability for auto-configuration and self-healing significantly
reduces the complexity of network deployment and maintenance, it makes the
WMN backbone prone to routing attacks, which include the blackhole and worm-
hole attacks [Kan07]. As a result, the attacker can, with little cost and effort,
redirect the traffic and drop the data packets even if the wireless backbone links
are encrypted. In UAV-WMN-assisted disaster relief situations, this can sabo-
tage the communication between rescue fighters. In addition, the command and
control data exchanged between the UAVs and their ground station will get dis-
rupted. This issue makes the use of WMNs (or any wireless multi-hop solution
relying an a routing protocol to dynamically set up routes) problematic for the
command and control of UAVs in practice, as flight regulations impose that it
should be always possible to remotely pilot the UAVs [FAA]. Because the UAVs
are highly dynamic, relying on the exchange of information for autonomous co-
operative positioning [God12a], the attacker might also alter their flight paths by
selectively dropping packets. In case the attacker is able to compromise network
credentials and as long as there is no efficient way to refresh those credentials, the
attacker might manipulate payload data or even inject corrupted control infor-
mation that could lead to the highjacking of an UAV. For instance, the attacker
might impersonate an UAV and propagate corrupted position information, ex-
ploiting the UAVs’ collision avoidance mechanisms to indirectly steer UAVs to
areas controlled by the attacker. Since the disruption of communications and the
violation of the flight security of UAVs can lead to fatal consequences (e.g., near
airports), it is vital to deploy a secure UAV-WMN backbone. Two approaches
to secure the communication between mesh backbone nodes exist:
1. Combining well-established, non-secure routing protocols with standard-
ized security mechanisms, such as those of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) association: The IEEE 802.11i [IEE04] secu-
rity standard or the recent IEEE 802.11s [IEE11] mesh standard. However,
as shown in this research, these standards are vulnerable to the blackhole
and wormhole attacks.
2. Use of a secure mesh routing protocol. Many secure routing research ap-
proaches have been proposed in the last decade [Sen13, Sgo13, Abu08,
Hu04], but none of them has been deployed in practice. The high overhead
of the security mechanisms of these protocols or the strong assumptions
made during their design (e.g., the existence of an efficient symmetric key
management scheme) have rendered their deployment in real life applica-
tions infeasible.
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Although there are already practical projects involving wireless mesh networks
[Ulu12], their security has been, in practice, given only marginal attention. It has
been considered as a challenge for the next-generation of wireless mesh networks
[Sen13].
1.4 Thesis Contributions
A considerable amount of ongoing research dealing with crisis management op-
timization has been focusing on the development of a deployable secure mesh
routing protocol [AIR, ANC, Bu¨s14]. This thesis makes the following notewor-
thy contributions:
• The Position-Aware Secure and Efficient mesh Routing approach (PASER)
is presented. PASER uses a hybrid cryptosystem to address the overhead
problem of approaches based on asymmetric cryptosystems. Besides, to
tackle the dependency of symmetric cryptosystem-based proposals on a key
distribution method, which in turn requires either secure routes or secure
out-of-band channels, PASER incorporates an in-band key management
scheme. This allows for rapid response to security breaches, and resolves a
major issue in current deployments [Leb12].
• An accurate (close to reality) implementation of PASER in the discrete
event-based network simulator OMNeT++ [Var08] is provided. This im-
plementation has been integrated in the official INETMANET framework
[PAS] as a first reference implementation for secure mesh routing proto-
cols. The INETMANET framework comprises comprehensive simulations
models of MANETs, WMNs, and standard network protocols.
• The feasibility of PASER is proven by contributing a Linux-based imple-
mentation of PASER in a WMN testbed. This implementation is composed
of a novel Linux kernel framework designed for reactive routing protocols
in general and a PASER-specific Linux user space implementation.
A website about PASER (www.paser.info) has been released. The PASER
codes in simulation and in Linux, and a thorough documentation of these
codes, are posted as open sources on this website. Reusing these codes
should ease the development and evaluation of new routing protocols. Be-
sides, these codes provide a reference for the comparison of secure routing
protocols, which is currently missing in both in simulation and in practice.
• A security analysis as well as an extensive performance evaluation of PASER
and the following three representative alternate solutions are provided:
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1. ARAN: The well-known, reactive, and secure routing protocol Authen-
ticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN) [San05].
2. HWMPS: A combination of the security mechanisms of the IEEE 802.11s
mesh standard and the Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP),
which is specified in the mentioned standard.
3. BATMANS: A combination of the IEEE 802.11i security mechanisms
and the Better Approach To Mobile Ad-hoc Networking (BATMAN)
proactive routing protocol [BATa], which is widely deployed in com-
munity networks [BATc].
– It is shown, in a WMN testbed, that the IEEE 802.11 security frame-
works are vulnerable to the blackhole and wormhole attacks, and that
PASER mitigates these attacks. Besides, based on a theoretical anal-
ysis, the results show that PASER mitigates —in UAV-WMN— more
attacks than the three alternatives.
– The route discovery delays of PASER and the three alternate solutions
are analyzed in theory and in simulation. Lower bound equations for
these delays are derived as they constitute along with the routing
overhead, for which asymptotic expressions are provided, the main
impact on the overall network performance. The results show that
PASER (also HWMP) has a more efficient and robust route discovery
process than ARAN and BATMANS, and it is scalable with respect
to network size and traffic load.
– Using the network simulator OMNeT++, realistic UAV-mobility pat-
terns, and an experimentally derived channel model for the air-to-air
UAV-WMN links, the performance of the protocols is investigated in
different UAV-WMN scenarios under multiple traffic types and vari-
ous scenario sizes. The results show that PASER achieves —in the
investigated scenarios— performance comparable to that of HWMPS.
This combination of values in PASER (security and performance) is
deemed to be necessary by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
keying and authentication for routing protocols group [IETa] to drive
a broad deployment of a secure routing protocol.
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Figure 1.3: Research methodology of this thesis.
1.5 Thesis Methodology
The research methodology applied in this thesis is depicted in Figure 1.3.
First, the following steps have been taken to identify the performance and
security issues of (UAV-)WMNs, including the secure routing problem:
– The experiences and recommendations of WMN stakeholders, such as
in [AIR, Roh10, Sˇub10], regarding the white spots and performance
bottlenecks of (UAV-)WMNs.
– A literature survey (e.g., books, journals, papers) on (UAV-)WMNs
and their current issues.
– Lessons learned from a (UAV-)WMN testbed developed at the Com-
munication Networks Institute (CNI) of the TU Dortmund University.
Having identified several (UAV-)WMNs challenges, such as efficient rate
selection algorithms, interference-resilient channel medium access, and se-
cure routing, the focus in this thesis lies on the last, as secure routing is
a fundamental need to make feasible the deployment of WMNs. To fill
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the existing secure routing gap in UAV-WMN, PASER is proposed in this
research, after having accomplished the following steps:
– Determining the advantages and drawbacks of existing secure routing
solutions based on an extensive literature survey (e.g., books, journals,
papers, IETF documents).
– Eliciting end-user requirements within several interdisciplinary research
projects, such as SecInCoRe [SEC], AIRBEAM [AIR], AVIGLE [Roh10],
and SPIDER [Sˇub10]. The contacted end-users include, but are not
limited to, the fire brigades of Gelsenkirchen, the German Red Cross,
and the police of the North Rhine-Westphalia.
For an extensive performance evaluation of the proposed solution, PASER
is implemented in an experimentally-validated OMNeT++-based UAV-
WMN simulation model. In addition, as it is striven for a deployable solu-
tion in this research, the feasibility of PASER is proved using a Linux-based
real implementation. The corresponding scientific results have been pub-
lished in peer-reviewed conference proceedings and a journal submission.
The comments of reviewers as well as the results of fruitful discussions with
the audience have led to further optimizations of the proposed approach.
More than 12 peer-reviewed scientific publications and one patent appli-
cation show the positive response to the applied methodology. Solutions
based on PASER were presented as live demonstrations in several events
and workshops, among others, the Vodafone innovation days in Du¨sseldorf,
Germany in November 2014 [Sbe14a] and the SecInCoRe end-user work-
shop in Manchester, England in December 2014 [Kuh15]. The feedback
of the demonstrations always emphasized the added value of the proposed
approach.
1.6 Thesis Outline
An overview of the organization of this thesis and the core publications of this
research are depicted in Figure 1.4. The rest of this thesis is structured as
follows:
• Chapter 2 gives an introduction to the different routing classes in wireless
multi-hop networks and covers the most-established (non-secure) routing
protocols of each class, that are relevant for highly dynamic WMNs. These
protocols are used as references to evaluate the performance overhead of
the secure routing approach proposed in this thesis.
• Chapter 3 explores the shortcomings of the IEEE 802.11 s/i security mech-
anisms to secure the backbone of highly dynamic WMNs. The chapter also
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reviews existing secure routing research proposals and elaborates their de-
ployment impediments in highly dynamic WMNs. The chapter closes with
an outline of the improvements of the proposed approach.
• Chapter 4 describes the simulation of WMNs in the discrete event-based
network simulator OMNeT++ and its INETMANET framework, including
some remarks on the credibility of the results with respect to practice. In
addition, the simulation methodology applied in this research to draw valid
conclusions is presented.
• Chapter 5 gives an account of the novel proposed solution approach, PASER.
The assumptions, secure routing goals, and building blocks of PASER are
described. The costs of the PASER security operations are presented.
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• Chapter 7 covers the modular implementation design of PASER in OM-
NeT++, the cross-layer implementation of PASER in Linux, and selected
feasibility demonstrations of PASER.
• Chapter 8 explores, based on experimental tests, the vulnerability of the
IEEE 802.11s/i security mechanisms against WMNs routing attacks. Be-
sides, a comprehensive theoretical security comparison of PASER, ARAN,
HWMPS, and BATMANS is given. This chapter emphasizes the necessity
of a secure routing protocol combined with a dynamic key management
scheme, such as is provided by PASER, to establish secure WMNs.
• Chapter 9 deals with the performance evaluation of PASER and its counter-
parts (ARAN, HWMPS and BATMANS) in two representative scenarios
for highly dynamic WMNs: (1) on-demand ubiquitous network access and
(2) efficient exploration of sizable areas in disaster relief using UAV-WMN.
Variable network sizes and node densities are investigated based on the
network simulator OMNeT++, realistic mobility patterns of UAVs, and
an experimentally derived channel model. An analysis of the route discov-
ery delay and the message overhead is also provided in this chapter.
The remaining chapters are a recapitulation of the main conclusions of this thesis
and directions for new avenues to explore.
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In this chapter, the three routing philosophy classes of wireless multi-hop net-
works are explored, namely, proactive, reactive, and hybrid. The most-established
routing protocols of each class are described, and these are discussed in light of
the characteristics of highly dynamic WMNs.
2.1 Introduction to Routing in Highly Dynamic WMNs
The routing in highly dynamic WMNs is a critical building block that strongly
influences the performance and reliability of the network. Although the adapta-
tion of approaches used in wired networks has guided the first steps for routing
in wireless multi-hop networks, routing protocols designed and applied in wired
networks are not suitable in those networks, see [Adj03, Bak03, Wol94]. Due
to the unique characteristics of wireless multi-hop networks in general and of
highly dynamic WMNs in particular, there is a need for novel routing solutions.
Table 2.1 illustrates the main differences between highly dynamic WMNs and
wired networks with respect to routing. In contrast to interference-free wired
networks, where nodes are mainly static, links are symmetric, and the through-
put per link is fixed, highly dynamic WMNs are envisioned to have the following
properties:
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Table 2.1: Main routing differences between highly dynamic WMNs and wired
networks.
Highly dynamic WMNs Wired networks
Frequent connectivity changes Infrequent connectivity changes
(mobile nodes, wireless propagation
phenomena)
(static nodes, wired links)
Interference-prone links Interference-free links
Symmetric and asymmetric links Symmetric links
Variable link throughput Fixed link throughput
Broadcast/multicast at low PHY
data rates
Broadcast/multicast at high PHY
data rates
• Highly dynamic WMNs have rapidly-changing connectivity due to the mo-
bility of the nodes and due to radio propagation dynamics (e.g., fading).
As a result, node pairs are intermittently connected and network links often
break.
• Links in (highly dynamic) WMNs might be asymmetric, i.e., if a node A
successfully receives a routing message from node B, this does not imply
that node B can successfully receive the routing messages of node A.
• The throughput per link in (highly dynamic) WMNs varies depending on
the received signal strength, which is subject to radio propagation dynamics
and changes in the environment.
• In (highly dynamic) WMNs, routing messages are prone to collisions (due
to interference) and channel errors. That is, the successful reception of
routing messages is not guaranteed.
• Broadcast routing messages in (highly dynamic) WMNs are sent using low
PHY data rates, because according to IEEE 802.11 (see clause 9.7.5.3 in
[IEE11]), broadcast frames must be transmitted using a basic rate at which
any receiver must be able to decode them (Differential Binary Phase Shift
Keying (DBPSK) + Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) is gener-
ally used in practice to support legacy IEEE 802.11 devices —1Mbit/s).
This specification also increases the robustness of broadcast frames against
channel errors as IEEE 802.11 does not implement any mechanism that
enables the sender to detect whether the broadcast frames are successfully
received. This requirement makes broadcast routing messages capacity-
consuming in the shared medium of (highly dynamic) WMNs. Moreover,
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because the transmission ranges of the broadcast frames are likely to over-
lap, classical broadcasting by flooding can lead to a broadcast storm due
to redundancy, contention, and collision [Ni99].
Given these facts, a routing protocol in a highly dynamic WMN needs to maintain
a consistent and stable network topology. It should dynamically adapt to variable
conditions in the network, and it should feature relatively low routing overhead.
There are mainly two possibilities to perform routing in highly dynamic WMNs:
1. Using or adapting routing algorithms derived for MANETs as highly dy-
namic WMNs have many features in common with these networks. For
instance, the characteristics listed in Table 2.1 also hold in MANETs.
2. Designing new routing protocols specifically tailored for highly dynamic
WMNs (or adapting existing WMN protocols), which exploit the unique
properties of these networks (see Table 1.1) and take into consideration the
mobility of the backbone nodes.
In this regard, the different implementation designs and philosophies of the rout-
ing protocols in MANET and WMNs, that are relevant for highly dynamic
WMNs, are covered and discussed next.
2.2 Routing Implementation Designs in Highly Dynamic
WMNs
There are mainly two approaches to implement routing protocols in highly dy-
namic WMNs, namely, Internet Protocol (IP)-based or Media Access Control
(MAC)-based. In the former approach, IP addresses are used to route data pack-
ets, and UDP routing messages are typically exchanged to establish the routes.
The latter approach is based on MAC addresses, and MAC frames are utilized
to build the routes.
Using appropriate IP addressing schemes, IP-based routing allows setting up
hierarchical networks, to divide the network into clusters, and to differentiate
between locally and globally relevant routing information, thus increasing the
scalability of the network. In contrast, MAC-based routing is flat, and so scal-
ability poses a big challenge. Thereby, solutions that use MAC-based routing
such as the IEEE 802.11s mesh standard mainly addresses small and medium
networks (up to 32 forwarding nodes) [Aok06]. IP-based routing protocols also
feature easier implementation and a more portable code than MAC-based rout-
ing protocols. The routing logic in the former case can be implemented in user
space. In the latter case, all protocol functionalities reside in the kernel space,
which requires a deep understanding of kernel internals, and this makes the pro-
tocol implementation kernel-dependent.
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On the flip side, IP-based routing cannot catch variations in link conditions with-
out relying on indirect measurements provided by the MAC layer [Per13], which
requires the definition of an interface between both layers that is difficult to
standardize or realize in existing products. Using MAC-based routing, the in-
formation provided by the MAC layer and to some extent by the physical layer
can be used to improve routing decisions. Besides, the common functionalities
(synergies) of routing and MAC protocols can be exploited (e.g., using beacons
for link sensing). Moreover, MAC-based routing is not bound to a specific net-
work layer addressing scheme. Thus, a migration from IPv4 to IPv6 would be
straightforward. In addition, using MAC-based routing, the WMN forms a single
broadcast domain supporting a transparent delivery of broadcast data frames to
all nodes in the network.
Examples of IP-based routing in highly dynamic WMNs include all protocols
designed by the IETF MANET group [IETb], such as the Optimized Link State
Routing (OLSR) [Cla03] and Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector protocol
(AODV) [Per13]. A prominent example of MAC-based routing is the HWMP
protocol specified in the mesh standard IEEE 802.11s [IEE11].
2.3 Routing Philosophy Classes in Highly Dynamic WMNs
Classification criteria of routing protocols in highly dynamic WMNs include, but
are not limited to, routing philosophy, network organization (i.e., hierarchical or
flat), location awareness, and mobility management, see [Wah06]. According to
the first criterion, routing philosophy, WMNs’ routing protocols can be divided
intro three classes as illustrated in Figure 2.1, namely, proactive, reactive, and
hybrid. In the case of proactive protocols, the nodes periodically send routing
messages throughout the entire network, regardless of the network traffic, and
each node has the routing information of all other reachable nodes in the network.
In contrast, reactive protocols are traffic-aware and their overhead is strongly re-
lated to the traffic load in the network. Nodes only exchange routing information
when a route to an unknown destination is required and only information about
active routes is maintained. Hybrid protocols are a combination of both previ-
ous routing classes. Typically, only nodes having a superior role, e.g., gateways,
periodically broadcast messages throughout the network. A profusion of routing
protocols of each class has been proposed in the last decade [Abo04]. In this
section, the different routing philosophies and well-established protocols corre-
sponding to each philosophy are presented in detail, and these are discussed in
light of the characteristics of highly dynamic WMNs.
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Figure 2.1: Routing philosophy classes and example protocols in WMNs.
2.3.1 Proactive Routing
Proactive routing protocols maintain routing tables that include information
about all reachable nodes in the network. Every node propagates routing infor-
mation throughout the network at periodic time intervals (and/or conditionally,
if a change in the topology occurs). The difference between routing protocols of
this class exist in the strategies used to update the routing tables, the number of
tables maintained, and the type of information kept in the tables [Abo04]. Using
shortest path algorithms such as Dijkstra, a node can find the best route to the
destination with negligible delay, as it has a complete knowledge of the network
topology, thus, the route to any reachable destination is always available. This
class of protocols has, however, a large control overhead due to the periodic ex-
change of routing information. Besides, there is a convergence time whenever a
change in the topology occurs or when the network is first set up. This is the
time needed to synchronize the tables of all nodes. OLSR [Cla03] and BATMAN
[BATa] belong to the best known protocols of this class.
Proactive protocols are envisioned to be suitable for less dynamic mesh backbones
with sporadic traffic, high traffic load, and long routes between communication
pairs [Xu10, Huh04]. The scalability of this routing class is constrained by the size
of the routing tables and the overhead of the routing update messages [Abo04].
2.3.1.1 Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)
OLSR [Cla03] is an IETF experimental IP-based proactive routing protocol tai-
lored for wireless multi-hop networks. It received attention in community WLAN
mesh networks such as Freifunk Berlin [FRE], Guifi.net [GUI] and the Athens
wireless metropolitan network [AWM]. It is an optimization of classical link state
17
2 Review of Routing in Highly Dynamic WLAN Mesh Networks
Multipoint Relay 
Two-Hop Neighbours 
Reference Node 
Wireless Range 
Figure 2.2: Example of the multipoint relay optimization in OLSR.
routing protocols [Per99]. In a link state routing protocol, nodes typically take
the following steps:
1. Detect all local connections (also known as link sensing or neighbor discov-
ery);
2. Flood the network with a link state message that includes, among others,
information about all links (i.e., direct neighbors and connection metrics);
3. Build a map of the network with all received advertisements;
4. Calculate the shortest path to destinations, e.g., using Dijkstra.
In OLSR, this approach is optimized by introducing a novel concept termed
MultiPoint Relays (MPRs). Rather than advertising all links of all nodes, only
MPRs generate link state messages, and they only declare the set of neighbor-
links that have selected them as MPRs. Besides, only MPRs forward link state
messages. As result, the size of the routing messages is squeezed, and the number
of broadcast retransmissions is reduced.
MultiPoint Relay (MPR) Selection Approach. The MPRs of a node are defined
as the minimal subset of one-hop neighbors, the union of which provides links
to all two-hop neighbors, see Figure 2.2. To select its MPR, a node uses mainly
hello messages and takes the following steps:
• It exchanges periodically hello messages with one-hop neighbors to sense
direct links;
• It includes a list of one-hop neighbors in its hello messages. In this way,
the information about the two-hop neighbors is exchanged, thereby, each
node gets knowledge about its one and two-hop neighbor sets;
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ogy control messages in OLSR.
• It selects MPRs which cover all its two-hop neighbors and signals this set
via hello messages to its one-hop neighbors, see an example of MPRs in
Figure 2.2.
In this example, four broadcasts are transmitted in case of OLSR to diffuse
the information about reference node to its two-hop neighbors. In the case of
a classical link state routing protocol, nine broadcast messages were needed:
one broadcast message of the reference node and 8 retransmissions by the
one-hop neighbors.
Link State Advertisements. To advertise link states, Topology Control (TC)
messages issued by MPRs are disseminated in the network. An MPR generates
TC messages advertising only those nodes in its MPR selector list. This list
comprises the one-hop neighbors that have selected the node as their MPR. All
nodes in the network process the TC messages, but a node only forwards TC
messages if the sender is in its MPR selector set. Figure 2.3 illustrates an example
of a network setup and the corresponding MPRs and MPR selector lists. In this
example, only A, B and C are MPRs, thus, only these generate TC messages.
When C generates a TC message, it reports only about its links with B and D,
its MPR selectors. Only B retransmits this message, as only B has C in its MPR
selector set. Analogously, A and C should retransmit the TC received from B.
However, as C is the originator of this message, only A forwards it. As Figure 2.3
shows, the TC message of C reaches all nodes in the network, S will know about
D from this message and about X from the TC messages of B. That is, due to
the fact that the MPRs are selected in such a way that all nodes in the network
are covered, the routing information is distributed throughout the whole network
despite having limited the number of retransmissions and reduced the amount of
information included in the routing messages.
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Table 2.2: Performance-crucial parameters of OLSR.
Parameter Description & refresh conditions
Hello-Interval [s] Hello messages are necessary to establish and
refresh links between one- and two-hop neigh-
bors.
TC-Interval [s] TC messages are necessary to establish and
refresh routes between nodes.
Neighbor-Hold-Time [s] When this timeout is triggered, the corre-
sponding neighbor entry is set as invalid (or
deleted). All the route entries for which this
neighbor has been next-hop are also set as in-
valid (or deleted). The timer is refreshed only
in case of receiving routing messages from the
corresponding neighbor.
Route-Hold-Time [s] When this timeout is triggered, the corre-
sponding route entry is set as invalid (or
deleted) in the routing table. The timer is re-
freshed only in case of receiving corresponding
TC messages.
LinkQualityLevel This sets the level to which ETX is used. 0
disables ETX. 1 enables ETX for MPR selec-
tion. 2 uses ETX to select MPR and calculate
the routing table.
The most performance-crucial parameters of OLSR are described in Table 2.2.
Routing Metric. To find the best route to a destination, OSLR uses a short-
est path algorithm applied to a weighted graph of the network topology. To
weight the edges of this graph (i.e., the network links), OLSR uses the Expected
Transmission Count (ETX) metric [DeC05]. The ETX of a link estimates the
number of transmissions (including retransmissions) required to successfully de-
liver a packet over that link. The ETX of a route is the sum of the ETXs on all
links. The route with the lowest ETX is chosen as the best route, as it offers the
highest goodput (i.e., received bits per second at the destination).
According to IEEE 802.11, a unicast data frame is successfully sent over a link
if it is successfully received by the one-hop neighbor and the sender gets an ac-
knowledgment as a response. That is, a retransmission only occurs if one these
two conditions is violated. Let each node sends a probe message every α [s]
seconds (e.g., hello messages every hello-Interval). Let β [s] be the period of
seconds to calculate ETX with β > α. Let the number of successfully received
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probe messages during β seconds be nβ . The delivery ratio of sending a probe
message can be calculated as nβ/
β
α
. Let the Link Quality (LQ) be the delivery
ratio of sending a probe message from the one-hop neighbor to the probing node,
and the Neighbour Link Quality (NLQ) the quality of the link in the opposite di-
rection. The probability for a successful packet transmission is then (NLQ ·LQ).
Thus, ETX can be calculated according to Equation 2.1.
ETX =
1
NLQ · LQ
(2.1)
To enable the calculation of the ETX of a link, hello messages are extended to
include the NLQ values of the one-hop neighbors. To calculate the ETX of a
route, the required knowledge of the ETXs of non-direct links that build the
route is acquired through information disseminated in TC messages.
While the ETX captures the packet loss in both directions of a link, and detects
interference among the links of the same route, ETX probe messages have a fixed
size and they experience different packet loss ratios than unicast data packets,
because broadcast messages use more robust modulation and coding schemes,
and thus have low transmission rates. That is, the loss rate of broadcast messages
may not be the same as that of the data packets.
While the MPR concept has been proven to optimize link state routing in theory,
the deployment of OLSR in community networks has led to miserable performance.
Nodes have selected non-reliable links to build a minimal set of MPR. Due to link
impairments in WMNs [Mil07], this resulted in inconsistent routing tables and,
thereby, routing loops occurred. It was also observed that routing tables broke in
only a short time (e.g., due to interference) but took a long time to build (the need
to sense neighbors, to select MPRs, afterwards, topology control messages are first
advertised). For more details about the limitations of OLSR in practice, see the
OLSR.org story and the references therein [OLS]. To address these limitations,
the BATMAN protocol was proposed [BATa, Neu08].
2.3.1.2 Better Approach To Mobile Ad-hoc Networking (BATMAN)
The BATMAN routing protocol was developed to address the problems associ-
ated with OLSR in practice [Joh08, Bar09]. It is a proactive WMNs’ routing
protocol, by which nodes do not require a complete knowledge of the network as
they do in OLSR (or other proactive link state protocols). In contrast, the nodes
are only concerned to determine the best next-hop towards each destination. In
this way, the inefficiency inherited in link-state algorithms in WMNs due to stale
topology-graphs and inconsistent routing tables is avoided.
To find the best next-hop towards a destination, BATMAN nodes periodically
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Figure 2.4: Example of finding the bext next-hop towards a destination in BAT-
MAN.
flood the network with OriGinator messages (OGMs). On the one hand, they
announce their existence to the network. On the other hand, the reception or loss
of these messages is used to indicate the quality of the routes: the best one-hop
neighbor towards a destination is the next-hop that forwards the most of that
destination’s OGMs within a sliding window. Thus, lost OGMs due to link im-
pairments do not lead to inconsistencies in the network, they are rather used for
better routing decisions. OGMs are relatively small messages (52 Bytes). They
contain a limited amount of information:
• IP addresses of originator and of forwarder
• A time to live value (to constraint flooding)
• Sequence number (to avoid reprocessing of an OGM that has been already
received).
OGMs sequence numbers are also a key piece of information for selecting the
best next-hop towards a destination. BATMAN uses a sliding window to record
the most recently received sequence numbers. The amount of sequence numbers
recorded in the sliding window is used as a metric for the route quality. Fig-
ure 2.4 illustrates an example by which node D receives within a sliding window
70 OGMs of S via node X and 60 OGMs of S via node C. As a result, D chooses
node C as the best next-hop towards S.
The most crucial parameters of BATMAN with respect to performance are de-
scribed in Table 2.3.
The BATMAN approach is shown to be reliable and loop-free in practice [Abo09,
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Table 2.3: Performance-crucial parameters of BATMAN.
Parameter Description & refresh conditions
OGM-Interval [s] OriGinator Messages (OGM) are necessary to
establish and refresh routes between nodes.
Route-Hold-Time [s] When this timeout is triggered, the corre-
sponding route entry is set as invalid (or
deleted). Timer is refreshed only in case of
receiving the corresponding routing message.
Mur10], and it offers better scalability than OLSR [Joh08, Bar09]. The author
of this thesis shows in [Sbe14c, Poj11] that BATMAN performs better than
OLSR in selected highly dynamic WMNs. Currently, BATMAN is deployed in
different community networks, which include Freifunk Berlin [FRE], Guifi.net
[GUI] and the Athens wireless metropolitan network [AWM]. Noteworthy with
respect to the implementation of BATMAN are the different branches [BATb]
that have evolved over time, such as BATMAN-adv (MAC-based) and BMX6
(IPv6-based), with BATMAN referring to the IPv4-based implementation. In
the rest of this thesis, BATMAN is used as a representative of proactive WMNs’
routing protocols.
2.3.2 Reactive Routing
Reactive routing protocols attempt to reduce the control overhead associated
with proactive routing at the expense of a delay in finding routes. They operate
on-demand, i.e., routes are only looked up when needed (e.g., when a node re-
quires to send data to an unknown destination), and they maintain only active
routes, i.e., a node only updates information about routes currently in use (thus,
the routing tables are smaller than in proactive protocols). To find routes, a
route discovery process composed of two steps is taken.
1. Flooding a Route REQuest (RREQ) issued by the source in the network.
In the meantime, the data packets get buffered by the source.
2. Sending back a Route REPly (RREP) issued by the destination or by an
intermediate node that has a route to the destination. The reverse route
is used to send back the RREP using bidirectional links. In the presence
of a unidirectional link, mechanisms such as BlackListing, hello messages,
and ReversePathSearch are used, see [Mar02].
A well-known reactive routing approach is the AODV protocol [Per13].
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Figure 2.5: Example of the route discovery in AODV.
Reactive protocols are expected to perform better than proactive protocols in highly
dynamic mesh backbones with static traffic and moderate route lengths between
communication pairs [Sbe14c, Poj11, Lew10, Hsu04, Joh99], see also [AR12] and
the references therein. The scalability of this routing class is mainly constrained
by the flooding overhead of route discoveries [Abo04] and the number of route
breaks (i.e., traffic load and route length) [Vie04].
2.3.2.1 Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector protocol (AODV)
AODV [Per13] is an IETF experimental IP-based reactive routing protocol. It
builds the basis for the routing framework of the IEEE 802.11s mesh standard
[IEE11]. It uses periodic hello messages to sense neighbor-links. It uses the clas-
sical reactive request–reply mechanism to discover routes. The distance (number
of hops) to reach a destination, the hop count, is used as a route metric. Fig-
ure 2.5 illustrates an example of the route discovery in AODV. Hereby, S starts
a route discovery towards D. As the figure shows, the intermediate nodes always
store the reverse paths towards the nodes that triggered the route discovery, and
they always increment the hop count by one when forwarding the route discovery
messages. For instance, node B creates a route entry for S upon processing its
route request. This route entry is used to send back the route reply. B incre-
ments the hop count before retransmitting the message. AODV also supports
intermediate replies, i.e., intermediate nodes can reply on behalf of the destina-
tion if they already know the route to that destination. After establishing the
route, the data packets are forwarded hop-by-hop towards the destination. That
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Table 2.4: Performance-crucial parameters of AODV.
Parameter Description & refresh conditions
Hello-Interval [s] Hello messages are necessary to establish and
refresh links between one-hop neighbors.
Neighbor-Hold-Time [s] When this timeout is triggered, the corre-
sponding neighbor entry is set as invalid (or
deleted). All the route entries for which this
neighbor has been next-hop are also set as in-
valid (or deleted). Timer is refreshed upon
receiving a hello message of the one-hop neigh-
bor.
Route-Hold-Time [s] When this timeout is triggered, the corre-
sponding route entry is set as invalid (or
deleted). Timer is refreshed every time a node
sends or receives an IP-packet over the route.
is, each intermediate node itself decides, based on its routing information, how
to optimally forward the data packet.
The most crucial parameters of AODV with respect to performance are described
in Table 2.4.
To detect broken links, a necessity for route maintenance, AODV uses two mech-
anisms, as illustrated in Figure 2.6 (top).
1. It uses periodic hello messages between one-hop neighbors. If a node does
not receive a hello menage from its one-hop neighbor within a given interval,
typically 3·hello-Interval, the link is considered broken.
2. It uses a link layer feedback mechanism to enable a fast reaction to route
breaks in the case of active data transfer. If a node does not receive an
acknowledgment for an unicast frame sent to the next-hop towards a des-
tination, even after seven retransmissions, which is the default number for
data-frame retransmissions according to IEEE 802.11, the link is considered
broken.
After detecting a broken link, a forwarding node broadcasts a Route ERRor
(RERR) message in the network. This message includes information about the
unreachable next-hop as well as a list of all the nodes for which the unreachable
node was the next hop, if available. When a node receives a RERR message,
it checks whether the sender of the RERR is the next-hop to the unreachable
node(s). In that case, the route is marked as invalid and the node rebroadcasts
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Figure 2.6: Detection of route breaks in AODV.
the route error message. Figure 2.6 (bottom) shows an example in which a node
X loses the route to the gateway. As this figure shows, X generates a RERR
message, and only W and S rebroadcast this message, since only those nodes
have X and W respectively as next hops towards G. This RERR propagation
mechanism enables more efficient network topology awareness than does a simple
flooding. Note that AODV also supports local route repair, i.e., after detecting
the link failure, X might try to rediscover the route towards G before generating
the RERR (e.g., if the distance between X and the destination is smaller than
that between X and the source).
To avoid routing loops and a consequent counting to infinity problem in the face
of anomalous delivery of routing messages, AODV uses destination sequence
numbers to make sure that only the latest information is considered. Hereby,
a destination sequence number is maintained for each destination in the AODV
routing table. This number is a monotonically increasing number, and the origi-
nating nodes include it in each routing message.
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2.3.3 Hybrid Routing
This class of routing combines reactive and proactive routing protocols to exploit
their advantages and mitigate their limitations. There are mainly two philoso-
phies of hybrid routing:
1. Dividing the network into regions or zones. Applying proactive routing
within each zone and reactive routing between zones. This should reduce
the route discovery overhead between nodes in close proximity.
2. Running reactive routing on all nodes and additionally a proactive tree rout-
ing on special nodes, e.g., gateway or common destinations. This should
minimize the route discovery delay and the number of route discoveries.
In this thesis, the focus lies on the second philosophy, as it is used in the stan-
dardized mesh routing protocol HWMP [IEE11].
Hybrid protocols are anticipated to be more scalable and suitable for a wider
variety of mesh networks than reactive and proactive protocols [IEE11].
2.3.3.1 Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP)
In this sub-section, an overview of the key features of the IEEE 802.11s mesh
standard [IEE11] is given. Then, the functionality of HWMP, which is the default
routing protocol specified in the IEEE 802.11s standard, is elaborated.
Key Features of IEEE 802.11s. This paragraph summarizes the key features of
the IEEE 802.11s mesh standard. The reader is referred to [Hie10, Hie11, IEE11]
for detailed information.
• Interworking with IEEE 802 Networks: The mesh standard specifies
a set of mechanisms for interoperability with IEEE 802 networks: A mesh
network appears as a single Ethernet segment to external networks. It
implements a single broadcast domain supporting a transparent delivery of
uni-, multi-, and broadcast frames to destinations inside and outside the
mesh network. To inform the mesh backbone nodes about the existence
of external networks, the mesh gateway nodes periodically broadcast the
appropriate announcements.
• Mesh Self-Formation: To discover peers in proximity (one-hop neigh-
bors), mesh nodes perform a passive scanning (by observing periodic bea-
cons) or an active scanning (using probe messages). Candidate neighbors
are identified based on new information elements included in beacons and
probe response frames (e.g., mesh ID and mesh configuration element).
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Once such a candidate peer is identified, a mesh node applies a mesh peer-
ing protocol to establish a link with that neighbor.
• Medium Access Control (MAC) Enhancements: The IEEE 802.11s
defines a mesh coordination function for medium access control. The mesh
coordination function specifies a mandatory and an optional scheme. The
mandatory scheme is based on the Enhanced Distributed Channel Access
(EDCA) of the IEEE 802.11e standard. This scheme enhances the legacy
IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) to support Quality
Of Service (QoS) by introducing priorities into the data transmitted over
the network. Note however that the EDCA does not guarantee QoS, it
only makes it more probable. The optional scheme is referred to as Mesh
Coordination Controlled Channel Access (MCCA). It is a contention-free
distributed channel access reservation protocol. Nodes reserve transmis-
sion time in the future to avoid frame collisions. Hereby, beacon frames
are used to disseminate the reserved transmission time of a node to its
two-hop neighbors. However, this scheme requires a tight synchronization
of the mesh nodes.
• Generic IEEE 802.11 Physical Interface: The IEEE 802.11s supports
multiple channels and multiple radios. It might run on top of any IEEE
802.11 physical interface, which includes, but is not limited to, IEEE 802.11
a/b/g/n/ac/ax.
• Security of Peers: With IEEE 802.11s, nodes do not have static security
roles, e.g., supplicant or authenticator as in legacy IEEE 802.11 networks
where the IEEE 802.11i security mechanisms are applied. In a mesh net-
work, a mesh node is a supplicant when it joins the network, and it is an
authenticator when a new neighbor-node joins the network. Thereby, in
IEEE 802.11s, the security architecture of IEEE 802.11i has been extended
to meet the specifics of WMN. The heart of the IEEE 802.11s security ar-
chitecture is the dictionary attack-resilient Simultaneous Authentication of
Equals (SAE) algorithm.
• Path Selection and Radio-Aware Metric: Routing is called path se-
lection in IEEE 802.11s, as this mechanism is implemented at the MAC
layer. In this regard, IEEE 802.11s specifies an extensible path selection
framework. This framework includes multiple path selection protocols and
metrics for flexibility, and new proposals could be developed. A mandatory
protocol is HWMP and a mandatory metric is the airtime link metric.
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Figure 2.7: HWMP modes of operation.
Functionality of HWMP. While the IEEE 802.11s standard supports the use
of other routing protocols, it specifies HWMP as mandatory for compatibility
purposes. In contrast to traditional routing schemes which are IP-based, HWMP
operates at the MAC layer and uses MAC addresses to forward packets. Hence, it
is called a ‘path selection’ algorithm instead of a ‘routing’ algorithm. It is a hybrid
path selection protocol that combines the flexibility of on-demand path discovery
in highly dynamic networks and the efficiency of proactive path selection for low
mobility mesh gateways. The different modes of operation of HWMP, depending
on its configuration, are illustrated in Figure 2.7.
Reactive path selection is a mandatory functionality in HWMP. It is based an a
Radio Metric (RM)-AODV, which, by default, uses a metric called airtime link
for path selection, instead of using the hop count. The goal of this metric is to
save network capacity by estimating the time consumed to transmit a test frame,
taking into account the PHY data rate at which the frame is transmitted, the
overhead posed by the PHY implementation in use, and also the probability of
retransmission, which is related to the link error rate. Consequently, the path
having the minimum airtime cost is the best. The airtime link metric, Ca, is
defined in Equation 2.2. The parameters used in this equation are described in
Table 2.5.
Ca =
[
O +
Bt
r
]
1
1− ef
(2.2)
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Table 2.5: Airtime link metric parameters.
Parameter Description
O [s] Constant channel access overhead (latency) that depends on
the PHY layer configurations.
Bt [bit] Length of the test frame (constant).
r [Mbit/s] Transmission data rate for sending Bt based on current con-
ditions. Its estimation is dependent on local implementation
of rate adaptation mechanisms.
ef Test frame error rate for Bt. Its estimation is a local im-
plementation choice [Car11]. In the open802.11s implemen-
tation [OPE], each node maintain a fail-avg. parameter for
each link, a moving percentage of failed unicast frames. This
information is mainly used to calculate ef .
Proactive path selection of HWMP is an extension, which is enabled when a
node is configured as a root element, as illustrated in Figure 2.7. A root element
supports the following two exclusive modes of operation (see [IEE11, Bah07] for
more details):
1. Proactive PREQ mechanism: This mode uses the proactive Path REQuest
mechanism (PREQ), i.e., the root element periodically propagates a proac-
tive PREQ in the network. The processing of the proactive PREQ depends
on the Path RESponse (PREP) flag field as follows.
• Without PREP Flag: If the PREP flag is not set, each node records
the metric and hop count to the root in its HWMP routing table,
updates these fields in the PREQ, and retransmits the message. In
this way, the presence of a root node and information about the paths
towards this node is disseminated in the whole network. No PREP is
sent in response to the reception of a proactive PREQ if the PREP
flag is not set.
• With PREP Flag: If the PREP flag is set, nodes must send a PREP in
response to the reception of a proactive PREQ. In this way, all nodes
maintain the path to the root node and the latter keeps track of paths
to all nodes. As a benefit, in case a source wants to send data to a
destination but has no path to that destination, the path through the
root node can be used until a more efficient path is discovered by the
reactive part of HWMP.
2. Proactive RANN mechanism: In this mode, the path information (e.g.,
metric and distance) towards the root node are maintained by periodically
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Table 2.6: Performance-crucial parameters of HWMP.
Parameter Description & refresh conditions
RootMode A value of 0 indicates that the node is not a
root element. A value of 1 activates the RANN
announcements. A value of 2 corresponds
to proactive PREQ without PREP flag. A
value of 3 means proactive PREQ with PREP
flag. If applicable, RANN-Interval and PREQ-
Interval are relevant parameters that deter-
mine the interval of sending proactive frames.
Neighbor-Hold-Time [s] When this timeout is triggered, the corre-
sponding neighbor entry is set as invalid (or
deleted). All the route entries for which this
neighbor has been next-hop are also set as in-
valid (or deleted). Timer is refreshed upon
sending or receiving a frame to or from the
neighbor.
Route-Hold-Time [s] When this timeout is triggered, the corre-
sponding route entry is set as invalid (or
deleted). Timer is refreshed every time a node
sends or receives a frame over the route.
broadcasting Root ANNouncement (RANN) messages by this node into
the network. The RANN mechanism does not establish a path. If a node
wants to create a path to the root node, unicast PREQ-RREP are sent.
The most crucial parameters of HWMP with respect to performance are de-
scribed in Table 2.6.
Having the specifics of highly dynamic WMNs in mind, the question that arises
when aiming to design an efficient secure routing protocol: What routing philoso-
phy class is mostly suitable in highly dynamic WMNs? As aforementioned in this
chapter, it is shown in [Sbe14c, Poj11, Xu10, Lew10, Hsu04, Joh99] that reactive
protocols perform better than proactive protocols in case of highly dynamic back-
bone nodes, fixed source-destination pairs, and moderate route lengths. That is,
reactive protocols are better suited for small scale UAV applications where most
of the traffic is destined from the UAVs to the ground control station. Thereby,
the secure routing protocol proposed in this thesis is based on the reactive routing
philosophy. This philosophy might be easily modified in the future to implement
a hybrid approach, if necessary.
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In recent years, experimental research has focused on different IEEE 802.11 mesh
network approaches to realize an UAV-WMN. For instance, in the UAVNet air-
borne network [Mor12], IEEE 802.11s is used to interconnect the aerial nodes.
It is shown that such an UAV-WMN strongly increases the network capacity in
comparison to a ground-WMN. Another implementation of UAV-IEEE 802.11s
is analyzed in [Pat13], where the impact of the radio signal strength on the auto-
configuration of two UAVs and a ground station is investigated. The results
prove that IEEE 802.11s is a promising WMN solution for collaborative UAV
applications. In [JP12], a different approach is considered. A combination of
IEEE 802.11a/g/n and IP-based routing protocols is used to establish a dynamic
small scale aerial network. It is demonstrated that such a combination is also
an option for successfully deploying an UAV-WMN. Yet, an open issue, which
has not been thoroughly considered yet, is the security of UAV-WMN —it is
supposed that the mechanisms deployed in WMN can be adopted.
The surveys in [Sgo13, Sen13, Nav08] present a comprehensive analysis of the
security in WMNs. They point out that several attacks are common in wire-
less networks such as jamming at the PHY layer, and these can be mitigated
by conventional security mechanisms, while some attacks are specific to WMNs.
The latter mainly includes attacks on the core service of the mesh backbone (i.e.,
routing), such as the blackhole and wormhole attacks, and user-related attacks,
such as attacks on the user privacy with respect to data content, traffic flows,
33
3 Secure Routing Issues in Highly Dynamic WLAN Mesh Networks
and location. In this research, the focus lies on the security of the routing func-
tionality in the UAV-WMN mesh backbone. For privacy preservation and other
user-related security services in WMNs, several approaches have been proposed
in [Lin12, Ren10, Wu08, Wu06, Zha06], which can be applied in combination
with secure routing, if necessary. For instance, in disaster scenarios, end-to-end
security mechanisms are already used to ensure the privacy of the data of rescue
fighters [Bal14, Sˇub10], while the privacy of their traffic flows (source, destination)
and their location are not really a concern as these information are predefined in
their public regulations.
To secure the routing process in the backbone of (UAV-)WMN, two methods
mainly exist:
Method 1: Combining well-established, non-secure routing protocols with stan-
dardized security mechanisms (for confidentiality and integrity), such as
those of the IEEE 802.11i security standard [IEE04] or the IEEE 802.11s
mesh standard [IEE11]. This method is applied as a contemporary solution
in many commercial mesh routers, such as [FIR, TRO, RAJ, MES].
The limitations of this method with respect to routing attacks are de-
scribed in Section 3.1, using the standardized security mechanisms of IEEE
802.11s/i as a reference.
Method 2: Use of a secure mesh routing protocol. This method is striven for
in practice. Many secure routing protocols have been proposed in the last
decade [Sgo13, Sen13, Abu08], yet, none of them has been deployed. The
high overhead of the security mechanisms of these protocols or the strong
Table 3.1: Main characteristics of symmetric-key and public-key cryptographic
algorithms.
Characteristic Symmetric-key Public-key
Key type One secret key (or sev-
eral secret keys easily de-
rived from each other)
A pair of keys, one secret
and one public, which
cannot be derived from
each other
Key length Relatively short (e.g.,
128 bit AES)
Relatively long (e.g., ≥
1024 bit RSA)
Main shortcom-
ings
Key distribution Computationally inten-
sive
Main application
goals
Mutual authentication,
data confidentiality and
integrity
Mutual authentication,
non-repudiation, and
key establishment
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assumptions taken during their design (e.g., the existence of an efficient
symmetric key management scheme) have rendered their deployment in
real life applications infeasible.
A review of selected secure routing proposals is given in Section 3.2, and
their deployment impediments are elaborated in more detail.
For the sake of completeness, a brief introduction to cryptography is provided in
Appendix A. It covers the definition of the main security goals of cryptography as
well as relevant cryptographic algorithms, which are used in the aforementioned
methods as well as in the secure routing protocol proposed in this thesis. These
algorithms are typically divided into two classes: symmetric-key and public-key
algorithms. Table 3.1 depicts an overview of their main characteristics. For
a rigorous presentation of cryptography, the reader is referred to [Paa09] and
[Men96].
3.1 Limitations of the IEEE 802.11 Security Frameworks
The IEEE 802.11i security standard [IEE04] and the IEEE 802.11s mesh standard
[IEE11] specify security frameworks that ensure secure links (one hop communi-
cation) between WMN nodes.
The IEEE 802.11i standard was released in 2004. The standard addresses the
weaknesses of the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) mechanism defined in the
base standard, IEEE Std. 802.11 1999. Detailed information about these weak-
nesses are provided in [Edn03]. IEEE 802.11i specifies enhanced security services
and mechanisms to resolve the loophole of WEP and to build a Robust Secure
Network (RSN). One major enhancement in an RSN is to use the Counter Mode
with the Cipher block Chaining Message authentication code Protocol (CCMP)
to achieve the confidentiality and integrity of the frames. This protocol is based
on the secure block cipher AES. An obstacle to using AES back then was that it
was not backward compatible with the existing WEP hardware (e.g., the WLAN
network interfaces), as AES requires the existence of a new, more powerful hard-
ware engine. To allay industry concerns for already deployed systems, the Wi-Fi
alliance (an alliance of major 802.11 vendors aiming to ensure product interop-
erability) took a subset of IEEE 802.11i and created the Wi-Fi Protected Access
(WPA). WPA uses the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) for the confiden-
tially and integrity of frames. This protocol does not require a hardware upgrade,
as it is based on the same stream cipher as WEP, namely, Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4).
While WPA solves the security problems of WEP, it has been found to be vul-
nerable to several attacks related to the RC4 cipher, see [Tew09]. This issue was
resolved after the release of the IEEE 802.11i standard. The Wi-Fi alliance has
adopted the standardized long term security solution based on CCMP, and it
has termed this solution Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2). Hereafter, the term
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Supplicant (802.11i)
Peer (802.11s)
Authenticator (802.11i)
Peer (802.11s)
Authentication
Server
Personal Mode
Enterprise Mode
Figure 3.1: Modes of operation of the IEEE 802.11 security frameworks.
IEEE 802.11i is used to refer to WPA2.
The IEEE 802.11s standard was released in 2011. Its security framework is based
on the IEEE 802.11i while taking the specifics of WMNs into consideration. For
instance, in contrast to traditional WLANs, which typically consist of access
points and clients, and where the access point includes an authenticator, and
each associated client includes a supplicant, in the backbone of a WMN, there
is no strict security hierarchy: all nodes are peers. For this reason, the authenti-
cation mechanism in IEEE 802.11s was changed to support peer roles. This and
other relevant differences between IEEE 802.11i and IEEE 802.11s are elaborated
throughout this section.
3.1.1 Security Goals and Modes of Operation
Implementing the IEEE 802.11 security frameworks mainly guarantee the follow-
ing security goals:
• Frame authentication;
– Authentication of nodes,
– Integrity of frames,
• Freshness of frames;
• Confidentiality of frames.
The authentication and freshness of the frames prevent unauthorized network
access and hinder an external attacker from injecting and modifying frames, or
replaying frames at a later time in the network. Thus, an external attacker is dis-
abled from mounting internal routing attacks or time-based replay attacks. The
confidentiality of the frames is less relevant for the routing functionality [Egn10],
it is rather necessary for data forwarding to prevent unauthorized nodes from
eavesdropping on the data traffic.
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The IEEE 802.11 security frameworks support two modes of operation, as illus-
trated in Figure 3.1. These are defined as follows:
• Enterprise mode: Three parties are always involved to establish a secure
link: the two communicating parties and an authentication server. The
authentication server is used to determine whether a node is authorized to
access the network by examining the node’s credentials (e.g., public key).
This mode is not applicable in highly dynamic WMNs for the following
reasons:
– As this mode is designed for enterprise applications (i.e., static net-
works with typically a wired link to the authentication server), it has
been shown in [Egn12, Zha08, Che06] that the enterprise mode is not
suitable for dynamic and mobile WMNs, due to the high authenti-
cation delay values (multi-hop), and because there is no permanent
reliable link to the authentication server in such environments. For
instance, it is shown in [Egn12] that the authentication in this mode
lasts for 650ms in case of three hops. This does not satisfy the qual-
ity of user experience of multimedia streaming, where according to
[Abo03] the delay should be below 150ms.
– In contrast to a WLAN with a secured wired link between the access
point and the authentication server, in WMNs, a trustworthy wire-
less multi-hop route to the authentication server cannot be assumed
[Wan08]. That is, there is an interdependency cycle of this mode with
a secure routing protocol [Zha13b, Bob03].
Apart from that, the enterprise mode uses the same protocol to ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of the frames as the personal mode, and this
protocol has security caveats with respect to routing in the mesh backbone,
as shown in the next sub-section.
• Personal mode: This mode is based on a pre-shared key (password) to
access the network. Here, no authentication server is required: the com-
municating parties can establish a secure link between each other without
relying on a third party. Hence, this mode is applicable in highly dynamic
WMNs. Thus, the focus lies on this mode in the rest of this thesis. Next,
its security limitations in the backbone are elaborated.
3.1.2 Establishing Secure Link—Personal Mode
To establish a secure link in the personal mode, nodes go through the following
four phases. These are depicted in Figure 3.2.
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Phase 1: Discovery
IEEE802.11i/s: Beacons or Probe Frames
Authenticator (802.11i)
Peer (802.11s)
Phase 3: Key Derivation
IEEE 802.11i: 2 x Four-Way Handshake
IEEE 802.11s: Authenticated Mesh Peering Exchange
Phase 4: Protected Data Transfer
IEEE802.11i/s: Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining MAC Protocol
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Figure 3.2: Steps to establish a secure link in the personal mode of the IEEE
802.11 security frameworks.
1. Discovery: In both security frameworks, IEEE 802.11s/i, each node adver-
tises its security policy in probe frames (active scanning) or periodic bea-
cons (passive scanning). Other nodes receiving these frames get to learn
the security policy of the advertising node.
2. Authentication: According to IEEE 802.11i, a four-way handshake is launched
twice to mutually authenticate two communicating parties in a WLAN
multi-hop network. Here, each node performs once as authenticator and
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Figure 3.3: Overview of the output of CCMP.
once as supplicant. Prior to the handshake, both communicating parties de-
rive a master key from a pre-shared password using a static non-interactive
method. During the handshake, each party proves their knowledge of the
master key and thus of the pre-shared password, see [Joh10], [Liu08], or
[IEE04]. In the case of IEEE 802.11s, the SAE protocol is used for the
mutual authentication of nodes. It is a password-based authentication pro-
tocol that considers the involved parties as peers, see [Egn10, Har08]. SAE
does not assume a knowledge of a master key. In contrast, the output of the
protocol is the master key. Here, the communicating parties prove their
knowledge of a pre-shared password and interactively derive the master
key using a zero knowledge protocol, i.e., without revealing any informa-
tion about the key or the password. Consequently, SAE is more resilient to
oﬄine dictionary attacks than the handshake mechanism in IEEE 802.11i,
see [IEE11].
3. Key Derivation: This phase is accomplished as part of the four-way hand-
shakes that occur with IEEE 802.11i. In the case of IEEE 802.11s, the
Authenticated Mesh Peering Exchange protocol (AMPE) is used. In both
cases, a common pairwise key for unicast frames and two group keys (one
for each communicating party) for broadcast frames are derived. In both
cases, eight messages are exchanged in total.
Security limitation in the mesh backbone. Both frameworks are
based on static passwords, without supporting a dynamic refresh of the
password. Only the derived keys might be refreshed on the fly. Hence,
once the attacker compromises the password, which is the essential security
credential, the attacker is able mount all kinds of internal routing attacks.
It is shown in Section 7.2 how the attacker can exploit this issue to launch
a blackhole attack.
4. Protected Data transfer: This is the most relevant phase with respect to
external routing attacks. Both frameworks use the CCMP protocol for the
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confidentiality and integrity of the frames. The output of CCMP (i.e., the
cipher text) is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Security limitation in the mesh backbone. The MAC header is au-
thenticated but not encrypted. This means that an external attacker cannot
change the header but can read it. Consequently, an external attacker can
successfully replay a frame at another location by manipulating its own
MAC address to match that of the frame. This issue can be misused to
implement the wormhole attack, as shown in Section 7.2.
3.2 Deployment Impediments of Secure Routing Proposals
In the last decade, a profusion of approaches have been proposed to secure the
routing process in WMNs [Sgo13, Sen13, Abu08, Hu04]. However, none of the
existing proposals has gained acceptance in practice, and so, research in this
area is still very active. In this section, the most well-known and recent pro-
posals are reviewed (see Table 3.2), and the main reasons that have burdened
their deployment are elaborated. Here, individual shortcomings and vulnerabil-
ities related to specific scenarios and security goals are not covered in details
(as in [Sen13, Abu08]), the focus rather lies on common feasibility-related limita-
tions. As Table 3.2 shows, the existing secure routing approaches can be mainly
divided into two classes: being based on symmetric-key or on asymmetric-key
cryptosystems. Surprisingly, to the best of the knowledge of the author of this
thesis, none of the existing approaches implements a hybrid security scheme, even
though some approaches support both cryptosystems.
3.2.1 Asymmetric-Key-Based Secure Routing Proposals
In asymmetric-key-based secure routing proposals, such as ARAN, Secure Opti-
mized Link State Routing (SOLSR) [Hon05], Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance
Vector (SAODV) [Zap02], and Secure Wireless Mesh Protocol (SWMP) [Mat14],
a Public key Infrastructure (PKI) is assumed, with each node having a key pair
and a certificate. In UAV-WMN, this assumption is feasible as it can be real-
ized by the network operator implementing the certification authority. In IBC-
HWMP [BO13] and IBC-Radio Aware OLSR (RAOLSR) [SB14], Identity Based
Cryptography (IBC) is proposed to avoid the need for a PKI. However many
issues in IBC are still unsolved [Zha12], besides, IBC schemes are typically based
on Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC), which is also used in Elliptic Curve Dig-
ital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)-RAOLSR [SB14], and the information leaked
in 2013 by Edward Snowden revealed that standardized ECC-based algorithms
were influenced to include backdoors [Ber14b]. Apart from that, due to the
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complexity of ECC, well known cryptographers have implementation concerns,
which could make the system vulnerable despite the security of the algorithm
[Tan15, Eme15]. Moreover, some cryptographic operations are still faster using
RSA than using ECC, cf. signature verification in [Wol03].
To provide origin authentication, message freshness, and message authentication,
asymmetric-key-based secure routing proposals use nonces (random values or
counters) and digital signatures. For instance, let O be the originator, I1 the
first intermediate node, I2 the second one, and D the destination. Let RREQ
denotes relevant fields of a route request, and addr be an IP or a MAC address.
If O wants to discover a route to the destination, it broadcasts the following:
RREQO := (addrO, addrD, nonceO)sigkprivO
When I1 receives the message, it makes sure, based on the certificate, that the
key used to sign the message is that of O (i.e., origin authentication), it checks
if the nonce is fresh (i.e., message freshness), and it verifies the signature of
the message (i.e., message authentication). Afterwards, I1 signs the message,
appends its certificate to it, and rebroadcasts it.
RREQO := (((addrO, addrD, nonceO)sigkprivO
)sigkprivI1
, certO, certI1)
When I2 receives the message, it verifies the freshness of the message, and the
identity and signature of both the originator and the sender (i.e., the previous
hop I1). It then replaces the signature and certificate of the previous hop I1 with
its own, and it resends the message.
RREQO := (((addrO, addrD, nonceO)sigkprivO
)sigkprivI2
, certO, certI2)
Each following intermediate node along the route repeats the same steps as I2.
To guarantee neighbor authentication, SOLSR also uses packet leashes, which are
proposed in [Hu03b] to combat the wormhole attack. Packet leashes are either
geographical or temporal.
• Geographical leashes: Position information is included in the routing mes-
sages so that the receiver can make sure, based on the distance, that the
sender is within its transmission range. This approach only works well in
environments where there are no physical obstacles preventing the commu-
nication between nodes, e.g., in UAV-WMN.
• Temporal leashes: Timestamps are included in the routing messages, and
if the transmission time of a message exceeds a threshold, the message is
dropped (e.g., SOLSR is based on such a scheme). When implementing this
approach, all nodes must be accurately synchronized with respect to time
in terms of microseconds, which is not straightforward in practice. Besides,
the scheme does not take into account the channel access delay at the
42
3.2 Deployment Impediments of Secure Routing Proposals
Non-Changeable Fields
Original Control Packet:
TTL Hop
Count
Seed := Random Number
Top Hash :=
SignatureOriginator (Non-Changeable
Fields)
Extension Fields:
)(Seedhash
TTL
Hash Chain Initialization
Verification:
Hop Count += 1
Seed =
Incrementation:
)(Seedhash
Hop Count
Verification & Incrementation
TopHashSeedhash
HopCountTTL
!
)( =-
Yes
No
Verification
Failed
Changeable FieldsTTL: Initial Time To Live (Network Diameter)
Figure 3.4: Overview of the hop authenticator method for securing the hop count.
MAC/PHY layers, resulting from Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA).
To react to the compromise of a key or node, ARAN supports dynamic key revo-
cation, i.e., revoking the corresponding certificate and flooding it in the network.
However, the effectiveness of this approach is limited, as it does not take into
account unsuccessful receptions of the revocation message due to collisions or
because some nodes are instantly disconnected.
To minimize the harm that can be done by an internal attacker, a couple of ap-
proaches (e.g., SAODV, SOLSR) include a hop authenticator in the routing mes-
sages, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. They use a hash chain to prevent a malicious
intermediate node from decrementing the hop count in order to persuade other
nodes that the route that goes through the malicious node is the shortest one. A
hash chain is a sequence of hash values computed by iteratively calling a crypto-
graphic hash functionH to an initial value v0, i.e., vi+1 = H(vi) = H
i+1(v0). For
example, v4 = H
4(v0) = H(H(H(H(v0)))). Since a cryptographic hash function
is a one way function, a malicious intermediate node that is n hops away from the
message originator will only be aware of the nth element in the hash chain, but
not of any element that comes before. Thus, the attacker cannot decrease the
hop count, otherwise the verification in Figure 3.4 fails. However, this scheme
is only effective to a small extent, because it can only be used in coordination
with the hop count, i.e., it is, unfortunately, useless in case other metrics such as
the airtime link metric [IEE11] are implemented. Besides, the attacker can still
forward the message without increasing the hop count.
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To detect internal malicious nodes, IBC-HWMP proposes to monitor the behav-
ior of the neighbors. This requires an extra interface in monitor mode, which
is very critical in UAV-WMN due to the limited size and weight of the UAVs.
Additional limitations of neighbor monitoring are provided in [Abu08].
Deployment impediment of asymmetric-key-based secure routing proposals. In
this class of proposals, every node (i.e., originator or intermediate) must sign ev-
ery message. This provides a high level of security, but it has a high computation
time in UAV-WMN, where embedded systems are used [Kno13, Wol03]. For in-
stance, digital signature operations using RSA-1024 and EDCSA-160 take longer
than 26ms on the Roboard RB110 [ROB] (x86, 1 GHz, 256 MByte DRAM). This
holds for 30 measurements executed using ftrace [Bir09]. Thus, in case of a route
with five intermediate hops, the delay is higher than 156ms. This does not sat-
isfy the quality of user experience of multimedia streaming, where according to
[Abo03] the delay should be below 150ms —relying on graphical processing units
to address this issue does not solve the problem as the parallelism of one digital
signature operation comes with the disadvantages of thread synchronization and
data exchange overhead [Sch14].
3.2.2 Symmetric-Key-Based Secure Routing Proposals
In contrast to the high processing time of asymmetric-key-based secure rout-
ing messages (especially due to digital signatures), that of secure routing mes-
sages based on symmetric cryptosystems is relatively low, e.g., as in the se-
cure on-demand routing protocol Ariadne [Hu05], Continuously Adapting Se-
cure Topology-Oblivious Routing (CASTOR) [Gal10], Secure Efficient Ad-hoc
Distance vector (SEAD) [Hu03a], Security Enhanced AODV (SEAODV) [Li11],
and Secure HWMP (SHWMP) [Isl09]. These proposals mainly use cryptographic
hash-function based techniques to secure the routing messages. The cost of SHA-
256 is below 0.15ms, based on 30 measurements using ftrace and 1500 random
bytes. The cost of running 20 iterative calls of the hash function is below 0.20ms.
That is, iteratively calling the hash function only causes a relatively slight in-
crease in the time cost as the instructions and data are already in the processor
cache and because the hash function operates efficiently. The cryptographic hash
function-based techniques used by this class of routing proposals include MAC,
hash chains, and Merkle trees. To avoid ambiguity,MAC (in italics) always refers
to a message authentication code while MAC denotes medium access control.
Based on the assumption that the nodes share pairwise secret keys, all the pro-
posals useMAC for message authentication, either in an end-to-end fashion, such
as in Ariadne [Hu05] and Castor [Gal10], or in a hop-by-hop fashion, such as in
SEAD [Hu03a], SWHMP [Isl09], and SEAODV [Li11]. MAC can be seen as the
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Figure 3.5: Example of a Merkle tree with four leafs.
pendant of digital signature for symmetric-key based secure routing proposals.
It is typically used with nonces to ensure message freshness.
To minimize the harm that can be done by an internal attacker, e.g., to prevent
manipulating the list of forwarding nodes, hash chains are used. For instance, let
I1, I2, and I3 be successive intermediate nodes between O and D. When these
nodes forward RREQO, they append their identity to the message, and they
build a hash chain on it to prevent an attacker from manipulating or removing
this information. As an example, I3 will forward RREQO as follows:
RREQO := (addrO, addrD, nonceO)MACkOD , (I1, I2, I3), v3)
v3 = H(I3, H(I2, H(I1,MACkOD (addrO, addrD, nonceO))))
It has been shown that the security of this mechanism is limited, as it is vulner-
able to manipulation, especially in dense networks where the attacker receives
RREQO via different routes and thus can know different hash elements in the
hash chain [Bur07].
To further minimize the harm that can be done by an internal attacker, Merkle
trees are used. A Merkle tree is a perfect binary tree composed of 2n leafs with
n ∈ N, where each internal node in the tree is a hash of its two child nodes.
Figure 3.5 illustrates an example of a Merkle tree consisting of four leafs. Merkle
tree is employed differently in different proposals. In SEAD, Merkle trees are
integrated into the hash chains to prevent the attacker from forwarding the mes-
sages without adding its identity or incrementing the hop count (e.g., when using
a hop authenticator). Briefly, the idea can be described as follows: let vi and
vi+1 be two successive elements in the hash chain. Usually, a node that receives
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vi in a routing message computes and forwards vi+1 by hashing vi with some
information. In SEAD, each element in the hash chain (e.g., vi or vi+1) is a root
of a Merkle tree, see Figure 3.5 for an example of a Merkle tree. Here, the leafs of
the tree are computed based on the previous element in the hash chain and the
identity of the nodes in the network. For instance, the leafs of the Merkle tree
having vi+1 as root are l1 = H(vi||IDnode1),..., ln = H(vi||IDnoden) with n being
the number of nodes in the network. When using this scheme, the nodes do not
forward the hash element, i.e., vi+1, but they forward the leaf corresponding to
their identity and some additional information in the tree needed to compute the
root. Now assume that node1 forwards l1 and the corresponding tree information
to compute vi+1. An attacker that receives this message cannot just pass the
message to the next-hop because l1 does not match its identity, and it cannot
generate a leaf other than l1 as it does not have knowledge of vi. Thus, the
attacker has to include new information to forward the message. As a matter of
fact, this scheme is only effective (from the security point of view) if the attacker
cannot fake the identity of other nodes.
Merkle trees are used in CASTOR in another context. The protocol not only
deals with secure route discovery, but also with secure data forwarding (i.e., with
the evaluation of the routes), and it uses the packet delivery ratio at the network
layer as a security metric. To this end, for each packet sent from source to des-
tination, the destination sends back a secure ACK via the reverse route. The
forwarding nodes monitor the PDR for each flow and decide, based on this met-
ric, whether the routes are reliable or not. Thus, nodes need to securely identify
which packets belong to which flow to derive reliable decisions. Here, Merkle
trees are used. The source of each flow pre-generates a large number of random
values. These random values build the leafs of the Merkle tree, and they are
kept secret. The root of the tree becomes the flow identifier, and it is announced
during the route discovery. Whenever the source sends a data packet belonging
to the flow, it includes the flow identifier, one of the random values, and some
tree information to validate that the random value has been used to compute the
flow identifier. In this way, the intermediate nodes can always securely match
the packets to a flow identifier, as only the source has knowledge of the random
values. While this scheme is effective from the security point of view, it is ques-
tionable whether it is efficient from the performance point of view in terms of tree
generation and storage, i.e., the number of trees and number of random values.
In SHWMP, Merkle trees are used in combination withMAC and the key scheme
of IEEE 802.11s to authenticate the mutable fields in a routing message, in a
hop-by-hop fashion. In the authors’ opinion, this combination does not improve
the security of the protocol as using MAC and the key scheme of IEEE 802.11s
already leads to one-hop message authentication.
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Deployment impediment of symmetric-key-based secure routing proposals. This
class of proposals requires that for every route discovery, the source and desti-
nation (and neighbors) must have a security association between them. That
is, the existence of a real-time key distribution method is assumed. This is not
straightforward in WMN [Cha05b]. In turn, to dynamically distribute or revoke
symmetric keys, reliable routes between the nodes are required [Zha13b, Leb13].
In other words, there is an interdependency cycle problem [Bob03].
In comparison to the first secure routing method, which relies on the IEEE
802.11s/i security frameworks, the proposed solution in this thesis (PASER) pro-
vides better routing security in UAV-WMN. In comparison to existing secure
routing proposals in the literature, PASER implements a hybrid security scheme
that takes the specifics of the target network (i.e., UAV-WMN) into consideration,
and it incorporates a key distribution method. Hence, it is more efficient than
asymmetric-key-based proposals, and it is not based on unrealistic assumptions,
as opposed to the symmetric-key-based proposals.
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This chapter discusses the credibility of evaluating the performance of WLAN
mesh routing protocols in the discrete event-based network simulator OMNeT++
and its INETMANET framework. In this regard, the simulation methodology
applied in this research to draw valid conclusions is elaborated.
A brief introduction to OMNeT++ is given in Appendix B. This tool is used in
this research for the following reasons:
• It is released under an open source license for academic use, allowing for
extending existing models and adding new protocols at no charge.
• It implements a hierarchical architecture to build the simulation model (e.g.,
interface–nodes–networks). It has a modular concept, i.e., simple modules
are nested inside each other to form a complex module that defines a com-
ponent of the simulation model, e.g., a node. These characteristics enable
a straightforward development and integration of new protocols without
requiring a precise knowledge of the whole system.
• It uses an easy to learn text-based language to define the modules that build
the simulation model, and the behavior of these modules is implemented
in the well-known C++ language. This enables using OMNeT++ without
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needing to learn complex languages, and this increases the portability of
the simulation code.
• It features a friendly yet advanced graphical user interface. This interface
allows debugging simulations during runtime with very high granularity,
which speeds up the development and analysis of new research approaches.
• It runs on Unix-based systems and on Windows. It is well-documented,
constantly maintained, widely supported, and it includes the INETMANET
framework, which implements all standards and routing protocols that are
relevant to accomplish this thesis.
A profusion of simulation models that use OMNeT++ have been developed so far.
This has led to the formation of various frameworks that cater to domain-specific
models, see [Var10]. Examples of well-known OMNeT++ simulation frameworks
are:
• INET Framework [INEa]: It is one of the largest OMNeT++ network
simulation frameworks. It contains models for various wired and wireless
networking protocols such as UDP, TCP, SCTP, IP, IPv6, Ethernet, OSPF,
IEEE 802.11, and others.
• INETMANET Framework [INEb]: It is a fork of the INET Framework with
special focus on the simulation of wireless multi-hop networks. Example
models of INETMANET include propagation models, wireless link layer
protocols, and WLAN mesh routing protocols such as OLSR, BATMAN,
AODV, and HWMP.
In this research, INETMANET is used as the main platform to investigate the
performance of (secure) routing protocols in highly dynamic WMNs. An overview
of modeling WMNs in INETMANET is given in Appendix C.
4.1 Credibility of Simulating WMNs in OMNeT++
Simulation provides an attractive method of evaluating communication networks,
due its high degree of controllability and repeatability. Simulation studies are
flexible to construct, and the associated costs are typically low. This is especially
advantageous when studying UAV-WMN, as deploying such a network entails
high operational costs, and because UAVs in practice are currently subject to
restrictions by regulations and civil security concerns. Besides, the results of test
beds are not always reproducible.
In comparison to mathematical models that do not cover UAV-WMN as a whole
but just parts of it, due to the complexity of combining the different aspects
of UAV-WMN, e.g., radio propagation, interference, protocol interactions and
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others, various comprehensive frameworks of WMNs such as INEMANET exist
in simulation.
Nevertheless, simulation studies are fraught with pitfalls. Without a clear defini-
tion of the goals of the simulation, a deep knowledge of the simulation model used,
and a validation of the abstractions implemented in the model with respect to
the defined goals, simulation studies might lead to the wrong conclusions. They
could produce misleading results that do not reflect the reality. In the following,
common simulation errors are listed, and the procedure to generate valid and
credible results in this research is elaborated.
Common Flaws of Simulation Studies. According to the surveys in [And06,
Kur05] on the credibility of simulation studies on wireless multi-hop networks,
common shortfalls are the following:
• Non-repeatable simulations due to the absence of significant information,
such as the code of the model, important simulation settings (e.g., simula-
tion time, relevant protocol parametrization), the version of the simulation
tool and framework in use, and others.
• Lack of model validation because simulated models (or enhancements of
existing models) are rarely validated against either the corresponding ex-
perimental implementations or through analytical methods.
• Unrealistic scenario design in terms of the channel model (e.g., just using
free-space), traffic types, node mobility, transmission ranges, size of the
simulation area, and others.
• lack of rigor by generalizing results produced by one single scenario or by
using the default parameters of the simulation model, where many of them
have been configured to meet generic requirements.
• Improper output analysis due to the absence of independent simulation runs
and confidence intervals. Besides, simulation assumptions and results are
hardly justified.
4.2 Applied Simulation Methodology
To overcome the simulation shortfalls presented in Section 4.1, the following
steps are applied in this thesis to study highly dynamic WMNs in simulation
using INETMANET.
1. Identification of the limitations (i.e., deviations from practice) of the WMN
model in INETMANET. The most relevant deviations are:
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Table 4.2: IEEE 802.11 frame types.
Type Relevant example frames
Data Data
Control
Request-To-Send (RTS)
Clear-To-Send (CTS)
Acknowledgment (ACK)
Management Beacon
• INETMANET does not include a model of recent WLAN standards
such as IEEE 802.11n [IEE11] or IEEE 802.11ac [IEE13a], which of-
fer PHY data rates up to 800 Mbit/s in the case of 2x2 MIMO and
channel bundling (40 MHz), see Table 4.1. It rather implements the
IEEE 802.11a/b/g standards, which have maximum PHY data rates of
54 Mbit/s, as depicted in Table 4.1. Thus, INETMANET should not
be used to evaluate the capacity-related issues of WMNs. For instance,
it should not be used to investigate the maximum sustainable network
throughput (i.e., saturation throughput) for a given scenario in prac-
tice. Besides, special care should be given to the parametrization of
the modeled network (e.g., application data rates) in order to not al-
ways have an overload situation. Here, according to the IEEE 802.11g
standard [IEE03], the nodes responding to a received frame shall trans-
mit their control response frame (e.g., ACK) at the highest rate in the
set of the mandatory PHY data rates (i.e., 1, 2, 5.5, 6, 11, 12, and
24Mbit/s) that is less than or equal to the rate of the received frame
and that is of the same modulation class as the latter, see Table 4.2 for
an overview of the different frame types. While this statement holds
in practice, in INETMANET, control frames (e.g., ACK) are always
transmitted with a static PHY data rate of, e.g., 1 Mbit/s. This leads
to different saturation throughputs in simulation from those in prac-
tice. Validating the simulation results in practice only makes sense
when properly calculating and considering the different throughputs;
more details about this point are provided in Sub-section 4.3.1.
• INETMANET does not implement the WLAN rate control algorithms
that are currently used in practice, such as Minstrel [MIN]. It imple-
ments the Auto Rate Fallback (ARF) and the Adaptive Auto Rate
Fallback (AARF) mechanisms [Lac04]. ARF was the first rate adapta-
tion published for WLAN, in 1997. AARF is an optimization of ARF,
proposed in 2004 to reduce unnecessary back-and-forth rate switches.
Both mechanisms are early solutions and are no longer supported in
practice, see [Xia13, Xia12]. Besides, while PHY data rates are sender-
53
4 On the Credibility of Simulating Highly Dynamic WLAN Mesh Networks
receiver specific in practice, in INETMANET they are only related to
the sender. That is, a sender uses only one PHY data rate to send
its frames, regardless of the receiver of the frame and the channel
characteristics of the latter. Thus, for the analysis of WMNs’ routing
protocols in INETMANET, it is more reasonable to set a static PHY
data rate to avoid generating ambiguous results influenced by a rate
control algorithm that is not valid and has no relevance in practice.
The reader is referred to [Bic05b] for information about the impact
of rate adaptation mechanisms on the performance of wireless mesh
networks.
• Verification of the WLAN model in INETMANET.
Several papers exist on the validation of different aspects of the WLAN
model in INETMANET. These include the validation of throughput
(IEEE 802.11 DCF behavior in case of a variable number of contend-
ing clients) [Bre09], the impact of the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) on
the throughput and frame error rate in the case of a static PHY data
rate of 12 Mbit/s [Chl12], handover delay (a WLAN client moving
between two access points) [Woo03], and radio propagation models
[Kun08]. While all these papers attest to the validity of the analyzed
aspects of the WLAN model in INETMANET, especially in the case
of long observation times and on-average behavior, the authors of
[Bre09] observe that the distribution of inter-transmissions in the case
of three and four contending stations differs from that of the measure-
ments in a testbed. They conclude that the packet scheduling differs
between the testbed and the simulation. To cope with this discrep-
ancy and to verify whether changes made in the new INETMANET
version (2.0) are still valid, the IEEE 802.11 code in the framework
were crosschecked, and its conformity with the IEEE 802.11 standard
was verified. Different simple scenarios were analyzed (e.g., through-
put in the case of two or three nodes having different distances, PHY
data rates, and application data rates) and the results were compared
with those of an own MATLAB [MAT11] implementation of the corre-
sponding functions of the IEEE 802.11 standard, see Sub-section 4.3.1.
The author of this thesis was fortunate to find the bug that caused
the aforementioned discrepancy as well as another crucial error, see
[BUG13a] and [BUG13b], respectively.
• Close-to-reality parametrization of the INETMANET-WMN model and
testbed-based validation of relevant routing protocols models.
A WMN testbed based on IEEE 802.11g was set up for validation
purposes, see Sub-section 4.3.2. The parameters of the WLAN model
in INETMANET were changed to match those of the IEEE 802.11g
standard (e.g., frequency, slot duration, contention window size, etc.).
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The WLAN interface settings were adjusted to reflect the capabilities
of the WLAN device used in the WMN testbed. The code of relevant
routing protocol models (i.e., message size, processing time of impor-
tant functions, behavior) was reviewed to match that of real protocols
in the testbed, see Chapter 8. Besides, the routing protocols were
configured to have a similar performance to that of the real protocols
in the testbed, see Sub-section 4.3.3.
• Formulation of simulation goals that consider the limitations of INET-
MANET while addressing realistic scenarios to generate valid results.
The main purpose of simulation in this thesis is to compare the per-
formance of a proposed secure routing protocol for highly dynamic
WMNs with that of well-established routing protocols. Here, the fo-
cus lies on the comparative analysis of the impact of UAV mobility
on the analyzed solutions as well as the relative scalability of these
solutions in terms of node density and route length. To achieve this
goal, the PHY layer of IEEE 802.11g is used as a reference technology,
and realistic mobility patterns of UAVs [God12a, God14, Beh13] and a
valid air-to-air radio propagation model are considered, see Chapter 8.
• Running multiple runs using a Mersenne Twister Pseudo Random
Number Generator (PRNG) and different seeds to generate indepen-
dent and identically distributed results.
For evaluating the performance of the routing protocols, at least five
simulation runs and up to twenty runs were executed to generate
the results, and a confidence interval of 97.5 % using Student’s t-
distribution (unless differently stated) is used to interpret the results.
For analyzing the behavior of the protocol, however, only selected re-
sults of the packet delivery ratio versus time are considered, as the
purpose in this case is to depict the impact of a given aspect on the
behavior of the protocols.
• Published extensions added to INETMANET including the code of the
proposed secure routing protocol.
To ensure the repeatability of the simulation studies in this thesis,
the code of the models used (i.e., the new models and the extensions
of existing models), the corresponding parameterizations, and further
relevant information are either integrated in the official INETMANET
framework or/and are published on wwww.paser.info.
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4.3 Validation of WLAN Mesh Routing Models in OMNeT++
In this section, the models of the routing protocols HWMPS and BATMANS in
OMNeT++-INETMANET and the underlying WMN model are validated with
respect to performance as these are used to assess the efficiency of the secure
routing approach proposed in this thesis. In this regard, the link throughput
and the network saturation throughput are calculated in theory in case of two
hops (no collision), and it is verified whether the simulation results equal the
theoretical ones. A perfect matching is obtained, as shown in [Sbe14c]. As a
further step, the network saturation throughput is estimated in case of five hops
(collision), and simulation and experimental measurements are performed using
the estimated network saturation throughput as the traffic load. A comparison
of the results, discussed in this section, show a high similarity between simulation
and experiments.
4.3.1 Theoretical Estimation of Network Saturation Throughput
In this sub-section, the link capacity and the network saturation throughput of
WMNs are analytically estimated —for an accurate analysis of the performance
results and for a fair simulation configurations.
The network saturation throughput is defined as the maximum sustainable through-
put [Bia98]. It is the maximum load that the network can carry in stable con-
ditions. According to [Ng07], operating WLAN muli-hop networks under this
throughput prevents instability problems, such as throughput oscillations and
link-failure triggered re-routing. The authors of [Ng07] prove this fact based
on a quantitative analysis. They also provide a closed-form analytical solu-
tion to calculate this throughput, assuming the knowledge of hard-to-compute,
non-measurable parameters, such as the collision probability for a transmission.
Bearing in mind that the saturation throughput of a WMN corresponds to the
throughput of the bottleneck link in the network topology [Zha13a], a simplistic
method is used in this sub-section to estimate this throughput by only relying on
easy-to-get measurable information, such as the network topology and the links
PHY data rate. Here, the following two steps are carried out:
1. The throughput of each WMN link is calculated under the assumption that
no other links exist in the network (no collision);
2. The bottleneck link in the network is determined based on the link through-
put information and a contention graph of the network, cf. [Che05].
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Table 4.3: Notations used in IEEE 802.11 throughput equations.
Notation Description Notation Description
ACK Acknowledgment
frame
Min Minimum
Bcst Broadcast Ohd Overhead
CTS Clear-To-Send PHY Physical layer
CW Contention Window RTS Request-To-Send
DR Date Rate SIFS Short InterFrame
Space
DIFS Distributed coordina-
tion function Inter-
frame Space
T Time
Hdr Header TCP Transmission Con-
trol Protocol
IP Internet Protocol Thr Throughput
MAC Media Access Con-
trol
Ucst Unicast
Mdt Mandatory rate UDP User Datagram Pro-
tocol
4.3.1.1 Calculation of the Link Throughput
The link throughput corresponds to the link capacity. It is the number of sent
bits per second at the PHY layer. The throughput of an IEEE 802.11 link can
be calculated according to Equation 4.1 (see Table 4.3 for the definition of the
notations).
Thr [ bit/s] =
SizeFrame
TTXFrame
(4.1)
According to the standard [IEE13b], this throughput depends on the following
factors:
• Frame size: The size of a frame is calculated according to Equation 4.2.
SizeFrame [ bit] = SizePayload + SizeHdrUDP/TCP
+SizeHdrIP + SizeOhdMAC
(4.2)
• Transmission time of the frame: This time varies mainly based on:
– The carrier sense mechanism
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– The destination type of data frames (unicast or broadcast)
– The PHY data rate.
In IEEE 802.11, two mechanisms are defined for carrier sensing of the shared
wireless medium.
1. The first mechanism uses physical carrier sensing to ensure that the medium
is free. Using this mechanism, only nodes that are in the carrier sense range
of the sender detect its transmission, but those that are outside this range,
yet inside the range of the receiver, will not be aware that the channel is
busy. This could lead to collisions at the receiver in the case of simultaneous
transmissions.
2. The second mechanism additionally uses virtual carrier sensing to indicate
an idle channel. The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies the Request-To-Send
(RTS)/Clear-To-Send (CTS) mechanism for virtual carrier sensing [Phi90].
The goal of this mechanism is to mitigate the hidden station problem,
which is defined as the interference caused by simultaneous transmissions
of hidden nodes because one receiver is in the range of at least two senders
[Ful97]. To achieve this goal, an RTS/CTS frames handshake is completed
between the sender and the receiver before starting the data exchange. This
handshake informs nodes that are in the proximity of both the sender and
the receiver that the channel is busy. It also gives them information about
the time to hold off from accessing the medium until the transmission is
finished. The RTS/CTS mechanism is only applied to unicast data frames.
In the case of broadcast frames, only the basic mechanism is used, as there
is no specific frame destination necessary for the exchange of RTS/CTS.
According to the EDCA mechanism [IEE13b], the average transmission time of a
unicast data frame using either physical carrier sensing (termed hereafter Basic)
or virtual carrier sensing (termed hereafter CTS) are provided in Equation 4.3
and Equation 4.4, respectively.
TTXUcstBasic [ s] = AIFS +
(CWmin − 1) · TSlot
2
+ TDataUcst + SIFS + TACK
(4.3)
TTXUcstCTS [ s] = AIFS +
(CWmin − 1) · TSlot
2
+ TRTS + SIFS+
TCTS + SIFS + TDataUcst + SIFS + TACK
(4.4)
Broadcast frames have transmission times that are different from those of unicast
frames. This time is calculated using Equation 4.5: According to the standard,
unicast frames are acknowledged, and they shall be transmitted at the high-
est supported PHY data rate that is suitable to the link characteristics (e.g.,
58
4.3 Validation of WLAN Mesh Routing Models in OMNeT++
Table 4.4: Relevant IEEE 802.11g configurations.
TSlot SIFS AIFS CWmin
ERP-OFDM: 9 µs
DSSS: 20 µs
10 µs 3 · TSlot + SIFS
(best effort*)
31
OhdMAC HdrPHY ACK RTS
320 bit ERP-OFDM: 20 bit
DSSS: 192 bit
112 bit 160 bit
CTS DRPHYData DRPHYMdt DRPHYBcst
112 bit ERP-OFDM:
6, 9, 12, 18, 24,
36, 48, 54 Mbit/s
DSSS:
1, 2, 5.5, 11 Mbit/s
f(DRPHY ) 1Mbit/s (de-
fault value)
*: EDCA best effort is the default priority class in practice.
48 Mbit/s, 54 Mbit/s in IEEE 802.11g). In contrast, broadcast frames are not
acknowledged, and they are transmitted with one of the mandatory rates that
are supported by all WLAN devices (e.g. , min. 1 Mbit/s, max. 24 Mbit/s
in IEEE 802.11g). In case of IEEE 802.11g in practice and in most simulation
configurations, these frames are typically transmitted with 1 Mbit/s.
TTXBcst [ s] = AIFS +
(CWmin − 1) · TSlot
2
+ TDataBcst (4.5)
The impact of the PHY data rate on the transmission time of unicast, broadcast,
and control frames, is reflected in Equation 4.6, Equation 4.7, and Equation 4.8,
respectively. In the case of unicast data frames, the highest suitable data rate
is used. In the case of broadcast frames, a fixed low data rate (robust against
channel errors) is used. In the case of control frames (ACK, RTS and CTS), the
mandatory PHY data rates are used.
TDataUcst [ s] =
HdrPHY
1 · 106 bit/s
+
SizeFrame
DRPHY
(4.6)
TDataBcst [ s] =
HdrPHY
1 · 106 bit/s
+
SizeFrame
DRPHYBcst
(4.7)
TACK/RTS/CTS [ s] =
HdrPHY
1 · 106 bit/s
+
SizeACK/RTS/CTS
DRPHYMdt
(4.8)
f(DRPHY ) [Mbit/s] =


DRPHY , IFDRPHY ∈ {1, 2, 5.5, 11}
6, IFDRPHY ∈ {6, 9}
12, IFDRPHY ∈ {12, 18}
24, IFDRPHY ≥ 24
(4.9)
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Table 4.5: Calculated IEEE 802.11g throughputs in case of 1460 Byte payload.
PHY data rate (data) [Mbit/s]
1 2 5.5 11 6 9 12 18 24 36 48 54
PHY data rate (control) [Mbit/s]
1 2 5.5 11 6 12 24
PHY data rate (broadcast) [Mbit/s]
1
Link Throughput [Mbit/s], Basic, Unicast
0.89 1.69 3.92 6.29 5.17 7.38 9.45 13.0 16.1 21.0 24.8 26.4
Link Throughput [Mbit/s], CTS, Unicast
0.85 1.57 3.40 5.10 4.93 6.91 8.85 11.9 14.6 18.6 21.5 22.7
Link Throughput [Mbit/s], Broadcast
0.91
Using the parameter values illustrated in Table 4.4, the throughput of an IEEE
802.11g link is calculated in the case of different carrier sense mechanisms and
frame destination types, and a 1460 Byte packet size at the application layer
(HdrUDP = 8 Byte and HdrIP = 20 Byte). The results are depicted in Table
4.5. The table sheds light on two points. First, IEEE 802.11 has a poor support
for broadcast applications. Second, the use of RTS/CTS for carrier sensing
causes a non-negligible drop in throughput in comparison to the basic mechanism,
especially in the case of high PHY data rates. This raises the question on whether
it pays off to use this mechanism in wireless multi-hop networks (refer to Sub-
section 4.3.3 for more information).
It should be noted that in OMNeT++-INETMANET the mandatory PHY data
rate used to send control frames is not defined by Equation 4.9, it is rather fixed
(1 Mbit/s, per default). Hence, discrepancy between simulation and practice
might arise at high PHY data rates, even though, this discrepancy is compensated
in multi-hop networks as the bottleneck link only achieves a small portion of the
link throughput. Nevertheless, to compare the simulation results with those of a
testbed, either the same conditions should be forced, or the differences in the PHY
data rate should be taken into consideration.
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1 2 43 5
Source Destination
RTX RI RCS
Mesh Node WLAN Link
Legend:
: Transmission Range
: Interference Range
: Carrier Sense Range
RTX
RI
RCS
Figure 4.1: Setup of a static chain topology consisting of five nodes.
4.3.1.2 Determining the Bottleneck Link
To determine the bottleneck link in the network, the transmission probability
PTX of all network links is determined by using the contention graph method
proposed in [Che05]. The contention graph accounts for medium access con-
tention and for hidden nodes-based interference (i.e., interference between links).
The resulting information aggregated with the link throughput information Thr
reveals the bottleneck link.
Definition 1. Let L be the set of links in the network: the bottleneck link is the
link with the lowest value of PTXi · Thri, ∀i ∈ L.
For example, in case of a single flow consisting of two hops, i ∈ {1, 2}, it is PTXi =
1
2
, and the saturation throughput is 1
2
· min(Thri). The analysis in [Sbe14c]
shows that the WMN model in OMNeT++-INETMANET produces a matching
result in this straightforward scenario, in which no collision occurs as there is
no hidden nodes. The estimation of the network saturation throughput becomes
more complicated in case of hidden nodes, such as in the chain network of five
nodes, which is depicted in Figure 4.1. The wireless links in that figure depict the
transmission links of the nodes (all links are active as there is only one route to
transmit the traffic flow between source and destination). The links also reflect
the carrier sense range of the nodes (i.e., only Node 2 is in the carrier sense range
of Node 1; this range ends between Node 2 and Node 3). To calculate PTXi in
this network, it is necessary to translate the network topology and the traffic flow
into a contention graph. The first step in this respect is depicted in Figure 4.2
(top), in which a connection between two nodes indicates that the nodes can
sense each other, and a label below a connection reflects an active link. Based on
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Figure 4.2: Contention graph of the chain network of five nodes.
this information, the contention graph is drawn as shown in Figure 4.2 (bottom).
Each vertex in this graph represents an active link, and an edge between two
vertices denotes either a contention or an interference between the corresponding
links. Two links contend with each other and cannot be active at the same time if
the sender of one link is in the carrier sense range of the other. Two links interfere
with each other and should not be active at the same time if the receiver of one
link is within the carrier sense range of the other. For example Links 1 and 2 are
contending links because Node 1 (the sender of Link 1) and Node 2 (the sender of
Link 2) are in the carrier sense range of each other. Links 1 and 3 are interfering
links because Node 2 (the receiver of Link 1) is in the carrier sense range of Node
3 (the sender of Link 3 and a hidden node for the sender of Link 1). Assuming
that all network links have the same link throughput, Figure 4.2 (bottom) shows
that Links 2 and 3 are the most connected in the contention graph, thus, they
are the bottleneck links in the network as these can only offer 1/4 of the link
throughput, i.e., PTX2 = PTX3 =
1
4
. Consequently, given low channel error
rates, the maximum sustainable throughput in this network (i.e., the saturation
throughput) is approximately 1
4
·Thr. That is it is expected that the chain of five
nodes should deliver nearly 100 % PDR in case the traffic load is up to 1
4
·Thr. In
case of higher loads, for instance 1
3
· Thr, where only the spatial channel re-use
(due to the carrier-sensing mechanism) is considered but not the interference,
the PDR should considerably drop. In the following, the static chain of five
nodes and the aforementioned throughputs are used as traffic loads to investigate
the validity of HWMPS and BATMANS in OMNeT++-INETMANET. That
is, using those traffic loads the performance of both protocols is compared in
simulation and in practice.
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Figure 4.3: Selected photos of the WLAN mesh nodes prototypes.
4.3.2 Reference Testbed for WMNs
To run experimental tests on WMNs and to validate the simulation models used
in this thesis, the mesh nodes illustrated in Figure 4.3 (middle) are primarily
used. These mainly incorporate the following components:
• A RoBoard RB-110 embedded system [ROB]. This board builds the heart
of the units. It is based on a VortexX86 32 bit CPU running at 1000MHz,
and a 256MB DRAM. It provides a miniPCI slot, two USB ports, and
one serial and one Ethernet interfaces. The miniPCI slot is used to inte-
grate the WLAN mesh interface while the USB ports are needed to mount
additional wireless cards, e.g., a WLAN access point card on mesh access
points or an LTE dongle on mesh gateways. The serial port is used for
debugging purposes. The Ethernet interface is used for the configuration
and monitoring of the measurements.
• A Wistron DNMA92 miniPCI card, which is integrated in the RB-100 and
is used as a WLAN mesh interface. It implements the IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n
standards and has support for two bands (2.4 GHz and 5GHz). It includes
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a 2x2 MIMO, thus offering data rates up to 300Mbit/s in the case of IEEE
802.11n and channel bundling (40 GHz).
• A lithium polymer battery (SLS APL 5000 mAh 2S1P 7.4 V 20C+/40C)
for mobility purposes—in addition to the static power supply.
To ease the deployment of specific topologies in different environments, each mesh
node has a corresponding tripod, as illustrated in Figure 4.3, in order to appro-
priately adjust the heights. For UAV-specific measurements, e.g., the air-to-air
channel characteristics of UAV-WMN, a flying prototype of the mesh nodes is
built [God12b], cf. Figure 4.3 (right).
As for the software configuration of the units, Debian Wheezy based on Linux
kernel 3.4.4 is installed. The IEEE 802.11s implementation is included in the
kernel and is supported by the ath9k driver used by the DNMA92 WLAN
card (backports-3.10.19-1). In addition, the routing protocols BATMAN 0.3.2,
BATMAN-adv 2011.1.0 (a MAC-based kernel module implementation of BAT-
MAN), and OLSRd 0.6.1 are installed. For WPA2 pre-shared key, the implemen-
tation of IEEE 802.11i personal mode, hostapd-2012.09.10 is deployed. For the
IEEE 802.11s security mechanisms, the cozybit authsae-2013.06.05 implementa-
tion is used. Various scripts are developed for the semi-automatic configuration,
monitoring, and debugging of the measurements, and the Iperf tool is used for
traffic generation and performance evaluation.
4.3.3 Performance Evaluation in OMNeT++ and in the Testbed
To validate the OMNeT++-INETMANET models of HWMPS (HWMP + IEEE
802.11s security) and BATMANS (BATMAN + IEEE 802.11i), the performance
of both protocols is evaluated in simulation and in practice in the static chain of
five nodes, see Figure 4.1. The maximum sustainable throughput, i.e., 1
4
·Thr (see
Sub-section 4.3.1), is offered as traffic load, and both IEEE 802.11 carrier sense
mechanisms basic and CTS are considered. Moreover, a traffic load of 1
3
· Thr
in case of the basic carrier sense mechanism is additionally investigated to verify
whether the PDR drops, as expected in Sub-section 4.3.1, or whether it remains
sustainable. In all measurements IEEE 802.11g is applied, all PHY data rates
(for data, control, and broadcast frames) are set to 11Mbit/s, and a packet size
of 1460Byte is used. Hence, according to Table 4.5, ThrBasic = 6.92 Mbit/s and
ThrCTS = 5.10 Mbit/s (the overhead of IEEE 802.11s/i is negligible). Thereby,
the investigated traffic loads are:
• 1
4
· 6.92 = 1.57Mbit/s, using the the basic carrier sense mechanism.
• 1
3
· 6.92 = 2.09Mbit/s, using the the basic carrier sense mechanism.
• 1
4
· 5.10 = 1.27Mbit/s, using the CTS carrier sense mechanism.
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Table 4.6: Relevant measurement configurations.
Network configuration
Parameter Value
Carrier sense range [m] 341.8 (simulation)
Interference range [m] 277 (simulation)
Transmission range [m] 267.1 (simulation)
PHY data rate [Mbit/s] 11
Basic PHY data rate [Mbit/s] 11
MAC layer IEEE 802.11g
Carrier sense mechanism Basic, CTS
Channel model Free-space (simulation)
Traffic model CBR-UDP (Iperf, experimental)
Traffic load [Mbit/s] 1.57 (Basic), 2.09 (Basic),
1.27(CTS)
Packet size [Byte] 1460
Simulation time [s] 300
Routing protocol configuration
Parameter Protocol Value
OGM-Interval BATMANS 0.5s
RootMode HWMPS 3 - hybrid
Neighbor-Hold-Time HWMPS 12s
Route-Hold-Time BATMANS 5, 200s
Route-Hold-Time HWMPS 15s
Table 8.4 depicts all relevant configurations. The configuration of the routing
protocols is based on the findings in [Sbe14c, Hiy13]. In case of the Route-Hold-
Time parameter of BATMANS, an additional value of 200s is considered, even
though not relevant for highly dynamic WMN, to validate the impact of different
parameterizations on the performance. Fifteen Repetitions for each measurement
are performed. The arithmetic mean and 97.5 % confidence interval of the Packet
Delivery Ratio (PDR) are depicted in Figure 4.4. The PDR is the ratio of the
number of received packets at the destination at the application layer to the
number of sent packets by all corresponding sources. Figure 4.4 sheds light on
four observations:
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Figure 4.4: Experimental validation of the performance of HWMPS and BAT-
MANS in simulation.
• HWMPS and BATMANS performs very similar in simulation and in prac-
tice —in the investigated network. The differences in the PDR results
between simulation and practice are mostly below 5 %. This reflects the
validity of the OMNeT++-INETMANET models of HWMPS and BAT-
MANS, as well as the validity of the underlying WMN model.
• The results are inline with the theoretical analysis with respect to the maxi-
mum sustainable throughput. As Figure 4.4 shows, a PDR of 100 % can be
achieved in case the traffic load is 1.57Mbit/s, and this PDR significantly
drops in case the traffic load is 2.09Mbit/s. The nearly identical PDR drop
in simulation and practice points out again the validity of the WMN model
in OMNeT++-INETMANET (i.e., channel access, queuing behavior, etc.).
• The relative performance of the protocols is credible. HWMPS performs
better than BATMANS in case the Route-Hold-Time of the latter is set to
5 s, as expected. In that case, BATMANS triggers a route timeout every
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successive missing of Route−Hold−Time
OGM−Interval
= 10 OGMs (due to collision or
channel errors, see [Sbe14c]). Consequently, the data packets are dropped
until the route is restored. In case the Route-Hold-Time parameter is set
to 200 s, the route does not get deleted, thus, the PDR increases in this
network. A comparison of the performance of HWMPS and BATMANS in
case of 2.09Mbit/s traffic load shows, as expected, that in case the network
is over-saturated the message overhead of BATMANS has a non-negligible
impact on the performance. That is, Figure 4.4 stresses the validity of
the impact of different routing philosophies and parameterizations on the
performance in simulation.
• The use of RTS/CTS (1.27 Mbit/s traffic load) does not lead to an increase
in the PDR in comparison to the basis carrier sense mechanism (1.57Mbit/s
traffic load). For instance, in case of BATMANS collision-based route
breaks still occur (OGM collides with RTS, CTS, and ACK frames, see
also [Sbe14c]). That is, the use of RTS/CTS is not effective in multi-hop
scenarios as it does not solve the hidden-node problem, and it leads to a
decrease in the maximum sustainable throughput. Additional arguments
on the ineffectiveness of RTS/CTS can be found in [Cha12, Cha04, Xu03].
Thereby, in the rest of this thesis, only the basic carrier sense mechanism
is considered.
The credibility of the simulation methodology applied in this research to evaluate
the efficiency of the proposed secure routing approach is shown in this chapter.
Additional validation steps of the route discovery time of the evaluated routing
protocols are performed in Chapter 8.
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In this chapter, the novel secure reactive routing approach PASER is presented.
With PASER, the author strives for a deployable secure routing solution in highly
dynamic WMNs in general, in UAV-WMN in particular. Thus, the main goals
of PASER are feasibility, efficiency, and resiliency to the relevant routing attacks
in the target network.
Publications. Parts of this chapter have been presented in [Sbe15],
[Sbe12b], and [Sbe11b].
69
5 PASER: Position-Aware, Secure, and Efficient Mesh Routing
5.1 PASER Assumptions
The PASER approach assumes the following network and attacker models.
5.1.1 Network Model
As a target network of PASER, A wireless mesh backbone composed of mobile
(e.g., UAV) nodes and static (e.g., ground station) nodes is assumed. The net-
work is operated by one organization (e.g., fire brigades), and the network access
is restricted. The legitimate operator nodes conform to the system protocols,
while malicious nodes might deviate from them. A public key infrastructure is
assumed, with the network operator playing the role of the certification authority.
The legitimate nodes have a certificate with integrated roles (i.e., gateway, access
point, or router). The network operator also runs a secure Key Distribution Cen-
ter (KDC) that is responsible to dynamically manage network credentials. All
nodes know the public key of the KDC. At anytime, mesh gateways (typically
the static nodes such as the ground station) can establish a reliable connection
to the KDC and vice versa. It is assumed that the legitimate nodes incorpo-
rate a positioning device that runs a secure navigation service, e.g., by using the
Galileo Public Regulated Service [PRS] or by running a secure position verifica-
tion scheme, such as in [Lei06]. That is, the target scenario is assumed to be
outdoor and to have low obstacles, as in UAV-WMN.
5.1.2 Attacker Model
This research focuses on attacks that target the security of routing. The main ob-
jective of the attacker is to manipulate the routes either to sabotage the network
or to mount advanced attacks violating the flight security of the UAVs. The
attacker is assumed to control a number of external nodes, which might have
more power and better communication range than the legitimate nodes. The at-
tacker might also compromise legitimate nodes or network credentials, by means
of social engineering, physical attacks, cryptanalysis, and others. Thereby, the
attacker can appear in the network as legitimate nodes by utilizing the compro-
mised identities and keys. Nodes under the control of the attacker might arbi-
trarily deviate from the protocol behavior. In particular, they can drop, modify,
or generate corrupted data packets or routing messages. Attacker nodes can also
act in coordination, and they can communicate across large distances using addi-
tional fast communication channels. The attacker is, however, computationally
bounded and cannot break cryptographic primitives. In the following, the most
relevant attacks with respect to this attacker model are listed. A distinction is
made between external attacks and internal attacks.
70
5.1 PASER Assumptions
• External attacks: The attacker has no access to the network. The attacker
can neither generate nor modify routing messages.
– Time-based replay
Recording routing messages of legitimated nodes and resending these
at later times.
Consequences: Building suboptimal routes or route loops.
– Position-based replay
Recording the routing messages of legitimate nodes and resending
them at another location.
Consequences: Building suboptimal routes or route loops.
– Media Access Control (MAC) address impersonation*
Faking the identity of legitimate nodes using MAC spoofing. *: This
is not a routing attack but it is used as part of a compound routing
attack (see the wormhole attack).
Consequences: Successful processing of frames forwarded by the at-
tacker as legitimate frames in the case of wireless link encryption.
– Wormhole
This is a compound attack that combines position-based replay &
MAC impersonation. A pair of attackers, linked via a fast transmission
path (tunnel), forward routing messages between two distant nodes,
making them believe they are direct neighbors.
Consequences: Building routes that go through the attacker. This leads
to selective dropping of packets, sabotage of the network, and flight se-
curity violation.
• Internal attacks: The attacker has access to the network. The attacks are
mounted after compromising network or node credentials.
– Flooding
Continuous broadcast of route requests towards non-existing destina-
tions.
Consequences: Consuming network resources such as bandwidth lead-
ing in worst case to denial of service.
– Path diversion
Forging routing messages generated by legitimate nodes (e.g., temper-
ing the metric).
Consequences: Building suboptimal routes or route loops.
– Fabrication (reactive routing only)
Generating forged route replies upon the receipt of route requests; pre-
tending to have optimal routes to destinations.
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Consequences: Redirecting and eavesdropping on the corresponding
traffic. This leads to selective dropping of packets.
– IP address impersonation*
Faking the identity of legitimate nodes using IP spoofing. *: This
is not a routing attack but it is used as part of a compound routing
attack (see the blackhole attack).
Consequences: Generating and propagating corrupted information on
behalf of other nodes.
– Blackhole
This is a compound attack that combines path diversion & IP imper-
sonation. The attacker impersonates main destinations in the network
(e.g., mesh gateways) and propagates routing messages with higher se-
quence numbers and better metrics than the original destinations.
Consequences: Redirecting and eavesdropping on the traffic as well
as generating and propagating corrupted information. This leads to
selective dropping of packets, sabotage of the network, flight security
violation, and UAV hijacking.
5.2 PASER Secure Routing Goals
According to the IETF KARP group, it is not only important to provide secure
routing proposals but also to deliver deployable solutions (feasible and efficient),
see [Leb12]. Since the target network of PASER is a closed network, PASER
aims to meet the following three objectives in the order of priority:
1. Combating external attacks;
2. Dynamically excluding malicious nodes from the network;
3. Minimizing the harm of internal attackers until these have been excluded
from the network.
In other words, PASER seeks for establishing and maintaining accurate routes
between legitimate nodes. External malicious nodes should not be able to manip-
ulate the routing process or join the network. In case of nodes or key compromise,
these nodes should be rapidly excluded from the network, and the keys should
be dynamically refreshed. The detection of malicious behavior is not a part of
PASER. To implement this goal, a centralized approach running at the ground
station might be used. In this way, malicious behavior can be detected based on
the deviation of a UAV from its expected behavior and on the anomaly in its key
performance indicators. Decentralized detection approaches exist as well, such
as in [Bo¨k14]. Adopting the honeypot approach [Pro07], used in the botnet field,
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Figure 5.1: Overview of PASER’s hybrid security scheme.
could be also an attractive solution.
To achieve its secure routing objectives, PASER seeks to fulfill the following se-
curity goals, which are cryptographic goals and can thus be realized using cryp-
tographic techniques (for detailed information about cryptographic goals and
information security goals in general refer to [Men96]):
• Message authentication: Assuring the party that receives a message
that the party which sent the message is an authorized node, and that the
message has not been altered by unauthorized nodes during transport.
• Message freshness: Assuring the party that receives a message that the
message is fresh. That is, it has not been received before.
• Neighbor authentication: Assuring one party the identity of a second
party involved, and that the second is located in its transmission range.
• Origin authentication: Assuring the party that receives a message the
identity of the message originator.
• Dynamic key management: Providing a dynamic method to distribute
and revoke network keys, and to exclude nodes.
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5.3 PASER Building Blocks
The PASER approach is composed of three main operations, namely, node regis-
tration, route discovery, and route maintenance. These are based on the PASER
hybrid scheme and messages, which are illustrated in Figure 5.1. They are de-
fined as follows (see [Sbe12c] for a detailed description).
• Node registration: The registration process takes place during the network
setup and in case of a key refresh. Hereby, all nodes have to contact the
KDC in order to receive the appropriate network keys. A state diagram of
this process is illustrated in Figure 5.2. As the diagram shows, mesh gate-
way nodes directly contact the KDC because these have a reliable access
to it. Other nodes (i.e., routers and access points) first have to discover
a route towards a gateway in order to reach the KDC. As the diagram
illustrates, after finishing the registration process, a node (mesh gateway,
router, and access point) possesses the required symmetric network keys
to successfully operate in the network. Thus, the node does not need to
contact the KDC anymore to authenticate registered nodes moving in its
transmission range, as opposed to the IEEE 802.11s/i enterprise mode,
which involves the server in every authentication.
• Route discovery: The route discovery process in PASER has been adapted
from the revised version (v2) of AODV [Per13]. The route discovery takes
place when a node wants to send a packet towards a destination for which
it does not have a route. An example of this process is illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.3. As the figure shows, from a routing point of view, the new node
broadcasts a route request in the network. Intermediate nodes, which are
already registered and know the route, forward the route request in an
unicast way to the destination, they do not reply on behalf of it. Upon
receiving the request, the destination sends an unicast reply to the joining
node, and the route gets established. From a security point of view, new
non-trusted one-hop neighbors (e.g., S-W and S-Z) use the PASER asym-
metric scheme to secure the messages and to establish a trust relationship
(i.e, untrusted messages secured with asymmetric-key-based cryptographic
algorithms), while trusted one-hop neighbors (e.g., all other nodes but S)
mainly use the PASER symmetric scheme (i.e, trusted messages secured
with symmetric-key-based cryptographic algorithms). A state diagram of
the route discovery process is illustrated in Figure 5.4.
• Route maintenance: This process has been adapted from the NeighborHood
Discovery Protocol (NHPS) [Cla11]. It is illustrated in Figure 5.5. A
node detects a broken link in the following two cases (apart from specific
timeouts):
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Figure 5.2: State diagram of PASER’s registration process.
1. If it has not received a predefined number of trusted broadcast Hello
messages from a next-hop for a given route. TB-Hello messages are
periodically exchanged between one-hop neighbors. They allow the
detection of route changes even in case of no data transfer. Besides,
TB-Hello messages enable a proactive discovery of two-hop neighbors
since they incorporate a neighbor list. TB-Hello messages also include
position information enabling a permanent update of one-hop neigh-
bor positions, which is necessary for protection against the wormhole
attack.
2. If the node did not get an acknowledge for an unicast packet sent
to a one-hop neighbor, even after a predefined number of retransmis-
sions (typically seven retransmissions). This mechanism enables a fast
reaction of PASER on route breaks in case of active data transfer.
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Figure 5.3: Example of the route discovery in PASER during the registration of
a new mesh router or access point [Sbe12b].
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Figure 5.4: State diagram of PASER’s route discovery process.
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Figure 5.5: PASER’s route maintenance approach.
Next, the main security steps in PASER are elaborated. In each step, it is
indicated which of the PASER secure routing goals, defined in Section 5.2, are
fulfilled and how.
5.3.1 Generation of One-time Authentication Secrets
As a preliminary security step before joining the network, a node generates 2n
pseudo random secrets with n ∈ N. The construction of such a secret is depicted
in Figure 5.6 (bottom). It is l bit long, with l ∈ N and l > n. The least significant
(l − n) bits are random. The most significant n bits constitute an initialization
vector. The initialization vector is incremented by one for each subsequent secret.
After generating the secrets, the node computes the root element of a Merkle
tree [Mer79] using the secrets as leaf pre-images, as depicted in Figure 5.6 (top).
The secrets are later included (revealed) in PASER messages exchanged between
trusted neighbors to provide origin authentication. A secret is only used
once to ensure message freshness and to prevent time-based replay attacks.
The root element is used to validate a secret. It is exchanged during the trust
establishment between neighbors.
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Root:= hash (hΌ΍ || hΎΏ)
hΎΏ := hash (hΎ || hΏ)
hΎ := hash (Secret3) hΏ := hash (Secret4)
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hΌ := hash (Secret1) h΍ := hash (Secret2)
Figure 5.6: Construction of the one-time authentication secrets and the corre-
sponding Merkle tree in PASER [Sbe11b].
5.3.2 Registration of Mesh Nodes
The node registration process takes place when a node wants to join the network
or in case of a key refresh. Gateway nodes directly contact the KDC because these
have a reliable access to it. The process of a gateway’s registration is illustrated
in Figure 5.7 (top, left). It is based on the PASER asymmetric scheme. As the
figure shows, the gateway sends a signed key request, including a nonce and its
certificate. After verifying the freshness of the nonce, public key, and signature of
the gateway, the KDC replies with a signed key reply that includes the gateway’s
nonce, a certificate revocation list to report on compromised nodes, a signed ID
of the group key in use, and the symmetric group key encrypted with the public
key of the gateway. As a result, the gateway possesses the secret key required to
use the PASER symmetric scheme, and its is aware of the compromised nodes.
The following security goals are achieved during the registration of a gateway:
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Figure 5.7: PASER’s registration process of the mesh nodes at the KDC [Sbe15].
• Message authentication, and origin authentication: Due to the use
of digital signature;
• Message freshness: Due to the use of nonce;
• Dynamic key management: Due to the distribution of the encrypted
symmetric Group Network Key (GTK) as well as the Certificate Revocation
List (CRL).
The node registration process of a mesh router or a mesh access point is integrated
in the route discovery process as these nodes first have to find a route towards
a gateway in order to contact the KDC. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.7
(bottom). In this example, a mesh access point Y is one-hop far from a mesh
gateway G. As the figure shows, Y broadcasts a signed route request towards
a gateway announcing that it wants to contact the KDC (by setting a specific
flag). The route request of Y includes a nonce, its position, the root element of its
Merkle tree, the current value of the secret’s initialization vector reporting which
secrets haven been already used, and its certificate. After verifying the distance
to Y, its public key, and its signature, G forwards the registration request to the
KDC, which replies analogously as during the gateway’s registration but with
an additional key, the client key. This key is used by the mesh access point to
restrict the network access to the authorized clients. G forwards the encrypted
keys to Y. It also sends its position, its root element, its IV, and its certificate,
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and it signs the whole message. Upon receiving and verifying the message, Y
trusts G, and it confirms the receipt of the keys by sending an acknowledgment
to G secured with the GTK, among others.
Let originator be the node that generates a message and sender be the node
that sends the message, the following security goals are achieved during the
registration process of a mesh router or a mesh access point:
• Message authentication: Due to the digital signature of the sender;
• Message freshness: Due to the nonce of the originator;
• Neighbor authentication: Due to the digital signature and position
information of the sender. Only those who are located in the carrier sense
range are considered as one-hop neighbors;
• Origin authentication: Due to the digital signature of the originator
applied on non-changeable fields in the message, e.g., the nonce;
• Dynamic key management: Due to the distribution of encrypted sym-
metric network keys (GTK/CTK) as well as the certificate revocation list
(CRL).
5.3.3 Secure Communication Between Non-Trusted Neighbors
To secure routing messages between non-trusted registered one-hop neighbors,
asymmetric-key cryptography is mainly used, and a three-way handshake is run,
after which the one-hop neighbors trust each other. Figure 5.8 (left) illustrates
an example of such a communication between a mesh node S and a mesh node
Y. In this example, S is a registered node that has just moved in the proximity
of Y, and it is looking for a route towards G. As the figure shows, the three-way
handshake between S and Y is similar to that of Y and G during the registration
step, but the KDC is not involved, and the number of the GTK is included in
each message as both nodes need to ensure that they are using the same key.
During this step, the following security goals are fulfilled (for the same reasons
as in the registration step of a mesh router or a mesh access point): Message
authentication, message freshness, neighbor authentication, and origin
authentication.
5.3.4 Secure Communication Between Trusted Neighbors
To secure routing messages between trusted one-hop neighbors (e.g., Y and G
after the registration), the PASER symmetric scheme is applied, as illustrated
in the route discovery example of Figure 5.8 (right). An overview of this step is
depicted in Figure 5.9. Here, the following security goals are achieved:
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Figure 5.8: PASER’s trust establishment between new neighbors.
• Message authentication: Due to a keyed hash function MAC based on
the group transient key, which is only known to the authorized nodes.
• Message freshness & neighbor authentication: Due to the one-time
authentication secrets. A sending node (Y) discloses a secret (e.g., Secret1
in Figure 5.1), and sends it along with the corresponding authentication
path (e.g., h2 and h34) and the routing message to the next-hop (G), as
illustrated in Figure 5.9. The authentication path of a secret consists of
all siblings of the secret’s corresponding leaf on the path between that leaf
and the root. To verify the disclosed secret, a receiver needs to compute
the potential values of the secret’s ancestors by iteratively using of the
hash function. A secret is authenticated and accepted as correct if and
only if the computed root value is equal to the already known root value of
the node. That is, neighbor G, already knowing the IV and root element
of Y, verifies if the secret is fresh (IVSecret1 > IVY ). It computes the
root of the secret it has received and verifies if it matches the root of Y
(Root(Secret1, h2, h34) = RootY ). If true, G can trust that the message has
been sent by Y. Consequently, G ensures that the message has been sent
by a one-hop neighbor since G only possess the root elements of one-hop
neighbors.
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Figure 5.9: Symmetric scheme for secure communication between trusted one-
hop neighbors in PASER [Sbe15].
• Origin authentication: Due to the forwarding of digital signature of the
message originator in case of route requests or replies, and due to one-time
authentication secrets in case of one-hop messages such as TB-Hello, as the
origin is the one-hop neighbor in that case.
5.3.5 Dynamic Key Management
The dynamic distribution of the group/client transient keys (GTK/CTK) during
the network setup (i.e., node registration) was shown in Figure 5.7. Upon receiv-
ing the GTK during the network setup, message originators always include (and
sign) the number of the GTK in each PASER message (cf. Figure 5.8 and Fig-
ure 5.9). This number is verified at each node that processes the message. In case
of a key or node compromise, the certificate of the compromised node is black-
listed, and a key re-generation process is triggered at the KDC, as depicted in
Figure 5.10. Consequently, a new Key-To-Use mark, (GTKNrOld + 1)SignKDC ,
is flooded in the network. Upon receiving the new mark, each node resets its
routing table and re-registers itself at the KDC. The node then receives the new
keys and an updated Certificate Revocation List (CRL), i.e., the node gets in-
formed about the compromised node. If a legitimate node has not received the
reset message due to interference or channel propagation error, it detects from
the higher key number in use that a key refreshment has occurred. Its neighbors
even proof that by using the new Key-To-Use mark, originated and signed by the
KDC, see Figure 5.10. Due to the Key-To-Use mark, an attacker who compro-
mises a node, cannot denial the service of its neighbors by just increasing the key
number of its messages. Besides, due to the digital signature of the KDC and
the GTK counter, message authentication, message freshness, and origin
authentication are guaranteed during the refreshment of the keys.
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Figure 5.10: Example of a dynamic key refreshment request in PASER.
5.4 Time Costs of the PASER Cryptographic Operations
As a first step towards a thorough performance evaluation of PASER, the time
costs of the PASER cryptographic operations are measured on the Roboard
RB110 (x86, 1 GHz, 256 MByte DRAM, see Sub-section 4.3.2 for the detailed
description of the node). The evaluated asymmetric cryptographic operations
are RSA digital signature (using 1500 Byte random input) and RSA encryp-
tion/decryption (one operation). The key size used is 1024 bit. Even though
published work in the early 2000s estimated that a 1024 bit RSA key can be
broken in a year by an attack machine costing significantly less than 109 dollars
(see [Ber14a] and the references therein), and even though the work in [Ber14a]
shows that the attack time and cost can be reduced, this key size is still used in
this research for the following reasons: a) RSA is applied in PASER to provide
a real-time security of the routing messages. In this context, long term security
is not a concern. b) It is striven for minimal time costs of the cryptographic
operations.
The evaluated operations of the PASER symmetric scheme are HMAC (using
1500 Byte random input), the generation of the one-time secrets of the Merkle
tree, and the verification of a secret. The cryptographic hash function used is
SHA-256 (i.e., SHA-2 the successor of SHA-1). The secret size is set to 256 bit
with an initialization vector of 32 bit. All operations are implemented using the
C language and the OpenSSL library. Ten repetitions for each measurement
are performed using ftrace. The average time cost of HMAC is 0.141 ms. The
average time costs of the remaining operations are depicted in Figure 5.11 (the
confidence intervals are omitted as the standard deviations are negligible).
Figure 5.11 (left) shows the time costs of the PASER asymmetric operations.
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mental) [Sbe12b].
The figure depicts that decrypting and signing have by far a higher cost than
encryption and verification (approximately 27 ms). This is caused by the length
of the private exponent/key used in decryption and signature, which needs to
have a similar length as the RSA modulus (1024 bit). In contrast, the public
key used in encryption and verification is very short, e.g., 17 bit. This makes
the use of the expensive operations, decryption and signature, for each message
by each node inefficient, and it raises the need for a symmetric scheme.
The average time costs of the PASER one-time authentication scheme are pro-
vided in Figure 5.11 (middle and right). Let ttreeGeneration and tverification de-
note these costs, i.e., generation of the Merkle tree and secret verification, they
can be estimated as follows:
ttreenGeneration = (n− 1) · (tsec) + 2 · (n− 1) · thash + tseci + thashi
tverification = log(n) · thash + thashi
(5.1)
Here n is the number of secrets, and tseci and thashi are the initial costs of a
secret generation and a hash operation, respectively. The initial costs occur when
the operations’ instructions and data have not been loaded in the processor cache
yet. The average value of these costs are thashi = 81 µs and tseci = 2510 µs.
The average costs of successive calls of these operations are thash = 6.35 µs and
tsec = 55 µs.
Figure 5.11 (middle and right) depicts the estimated time costs according to
Equation 5.1 as well as the real costs on the mesh node. As the figure shows, the
equation provides a nearly perfect estimation of the costs. Figure 5.11 (middle)
illustrates that the time cost of the generation of the Merkle tree to secure 65536
PASER messages is almost 4 s. This generation, however, occurs only at network
setup, or after all the secrets are used up. In the former case, the 4 s are definitely
less than the time required to deploy the mesh nodes in UAV-WMN (after turning
them on). In the latter case, the regeneration of the tree might occur seamless
when the processor is idle. In case of multi-core processors, it can be also run in
parallel. That is, these 4 s should be negligible in practice.
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A more relevant impact have the results in Figure 5.11 (right). This figure depicts
the time of the secret verification operation, which is run upon the receipt of any
routing message secured with the PASER symmetric scheme. As the figure shows,
this time is very lightweight, it is less than 200 µs by a tree consisting of 65536
secrets. Consequently, the time cost of the PASER symmetric scheme is less than
341 µs in that case. That is, it is more than 75 times faster than the asymmetric
scheme, and this is a gain achieved at each hop by each message.
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This chapter covers the modular implementation design of PASER in OMNeT++
and its cross-layer implementation in Linux. Particular highlights are the inte-
gration of the PASER protocol in the official INETMANET framework of OM-
NeT++ and the attestation of the feasibility of PASER in practice.
Publications. Parts of this chapter have been presented in [Sbe13a], [Sbe13b],
and [Sbe14b].
6.1 Implementation in INETMANET-OMNeT++
This section gives an overview of the implementation code of PASER in the IN-
ETMANET framework of the network simulator OMNeT++. Especially, the
modular design of this implementation and splitting OMNeT++ specific code
from the rest of the code are noteworthy.
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6.1.1 Goals of the PASER Implementation in Simulation
Bearing in mind that the final target beyond the simulation of PASER is its
deployment in real life scenarios, the PASER implementation in OMNeT++ have
had to fulfill the following goals in the order of priority:
1. Performance evaluation of the protocol and design optimization if neces-
sary;
2. Verification of the protocol robustness against well-known attacks and de-
sign optimization if necessary;
3. Providing a portable code to Linux and to other simulation tools than
OMNeT++;
4. Contributing a reference easy-to-adapt implementation of a secure routing
protocol in simulation.
6.1.2 The Big Picture of the PASER Implementation in Simulation
To achieve the envisaged goals in Sub-section 6.1.1, the PASER C++ code in
OMNeT++ is divided into sub-modules as depicted in Figure 6.2, where each sub-
module is responsible for a specific task. This modular design allows low-effort
protocol optimizations, as only the corresponding modules need to be changed.
Moreover, OMNeT++ specific code is mainly kept in the ’Socket’ sub-modules,
which enables a straightforward porting of the rest of the code to Linux and to
other simulation tools than OMNeT++. As Figure 6.2 shows, the PASER code
in simulation is mainly composed of:
• PASER Logic
– Route Discovery: It is a set of functions that manage a node regis-
tration at the KDC and handle a route discovery.
– Route Maintenance: It provides functions to keep routes up-to-
date. It manages several PASER timers and the link layer feedback.
– Timer Management: It manages all PASER timers.
– Socket: it includes the handleMessage function that is called upon
receipt of in/outcoming messages, i.e., it is the interface to the outside
world.
• PASER Data Structures and Support Library
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Figure 6.1: The big picture of the PASER implementation in OMNeT++
[Sbe13b].
– Cryptographic Operations: It handles all security related oper-
ations. This sub-module depends on the external library OpenSSL
[SSL].
– Message Structure: It comprises the classes of all the PASER mes-
sages, which are illustrated in Figure 5.1 (bottom) in Chapter 5.
– Message Buffer: It manages a buffer of all data packets that must
be forwarded to an unknown destination.
– Message Processing: It provides functions to process all PASER
messages.
– Configuration: It includes a parser of the PASER configuration pa-
rameters in the NED file. These include the delays of the PASER
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operations in practice, see Figure 5.11 in Chapter 5. It also includes
additional PASER configuration parameters for developers.
– Routing and Neighbor Tables: It manages the PASER tables.
• Key Distribution Center Module
This module handles the key management in PASER. Nodes contact this
module in order to get the required keys to access and operate in the
network.
The implementation of PASER has been recently integrated in the INETMANET
framework as the first implementation of a secure routing protocol in OMNeT++,
see [INE13]. This implementation is used in the next chapter to evaluate PASER
in various UAV-WMN scenarios.
6.2 Implementation in Linux
The PASER implementation in Linux is cross-layer, and it is composed of the
routing logic in the Linux user space and a novel generic framework in the Linux
kernel space, called route-o-matic. Figure 6.2 gives a big picture of the PASER
C/C++ language-based implementation in Linux.
6.2.1 Routing Logic
The heart of the routing logic is the Scheduler (see Figure 6.2, middle). It is
mainly responsible for the following tasks:
• Monitoring incoming messages from the PASER kernel module at the
Netlink Client.
• Watching incoming messages from PASER peer nodes at the PASER
Gate (UDP socket).
• Monitoring the replies of a key distribution center at the KDC Client
(TCP socket).
• Watching the Timer Management, waiting for route timeouts to occur.
• Triggering route request for unknown destinations at the Route Discov-
ery component.
• Ordering the Route Maintenance component to delete or refresh exist-
ing routes.
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Figure 6.2: Big picture of the PASER implementation in Linux.
The protocol logic relies on a PASER library, which offers support for messages’
processing, and maintenance of routing and neighbor tables. The PASER logic
also depends on the OpenSSL library [SSL] to perform its cryptographic opera-
tions. It also uses the GPSd Application Programming Interface (API) [GPS] to
read the geographic positions of nodes.
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While most of the routing logic components were ported from the PASER code
in OMNeT++ (see Section 6.1), the main challenge in implementing PASER in
Linux was the development of a kernel module, for which deep knowledge of Linux
network internals were required. Here, the novel route-o-matic framework has
been proposed, which is not specific to PASER, but it is designed to be used by
any IP-based reactive routing protocol to ease its implementation.
6.2.2 Generic Kernel Framework: ROUTE-O-MATIC
This section outlines the implementation design and performance evaluation of
route-o-matic (see Figure 6.2, bottom), a comprehensive framework for IP-
based reactive (mesh) routing in Linux. This framework is used to implement
PASER. It provides a set of necessary but not natively supported services and
interfaces for the development of IP-based reactive (mesh) routing protocols in
Linux.
6.2.2.1 The Need for route-o-matic
Reactive routing logic such as that of PASER mainly relies on two core features
of the underlying operating system:
1. A mechanism which notifies the routing logic in case a route to an unknown
destination is needed;
2. A buffer which temporarily saves the packets of the unknown destination
while the route discovery is performed and re-injects those after establishing
the route.
The network subsystem of the Linux operating system, which is the default plat-
form for the implementation of wireless mesh networks, lacks of support for both
features.
Kawadia et al. discussed the challenges of developing IP-based reactive MANET
routing protocols in [Kaw03]. They presented a framework implementation
termed Ad-hoc Support Library (ASL). Their framework consists of a shared
user-space library and a kernel module for Linux 2.4. Several routing protocols
such as AODV-UIUC were implemented using ASL. Unfortunately, ASL is no
longer supported in up-to-date Linux kernels (newest version is > 3.4.4). Chak-
eres et al. also examined in [Cha05a] different design strategies of AODV im-
plementation on older Linux. Well-maintained kernel components used in their
approach, e.g., Netfilter hook, have been adopted in route-o-matic. Other com-
ponents got outdated. Thorup gives in [Tho07] an in-depth presentation of the
design, implementation, and evaluation of DYMO-AU. His work has in common
with the previous approaches that both the routing logic and the decision maker,
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e.g., whether to start a route discovery or not, are mostly implemented in user
space. That is, all incoming/outgoing packets must be processed in user space,
causing a huge number of unnecessary transitions between kernel and user space.
Apart from that, the aforementioned implementations used different components
and interfaces to realize the two core routing features. The lack of a common
interface led to the current situation, where all these implementations do not run
on the recent Linux kernel versions. This has burdened the development of new
reactive protocols, during which the same challenges must be faced again, and
the developer is required to have a deep understanding of the system’s network
internals, which increases the implementation and maintenance complexity.
To ease the development of IP-based reactive (mesh) routing protocols in Linux,
route-o-matic is proposed in this thesis. It provides an open source generic
framework and a simple API for reactive routing logics. The framework is based
on well-maintained core kernel components. Its main novelty lies in the simplic-
ity of its design while providing all required functionalities based on an accu-
rate exploitation and an efficient interconnection of relevant kernel components.
route-o-matic retains the decision maker in the Linux kernel while offering
a lightweight notification for user space routing logics. Additionally, the frame-
work incorporates a link layer feedback support, which reports every transmission
failure in order to accelerate the detection of broken links.
6.2.2.2 Design Space Exploration of route-o-matic
route-o-matic is meant to process every IP packet, it has to detect broken links,
and must interact with the routing logic in time critical applications. Thereby,
the most important goal by the design of route-o-matic is to keep its delay
minimal. Figure 6.2 (bottom) shows in a dark green color all components of
route-o-matic, including their internal and external interaction. These compo-
nents are designed as follows.
• Destination Whitelist: route-o-matic’s decision on whether a packet
needs to be queued or not is based on a single bit of information per desti-
nation, namely, if a valid route exists or not. This information is returned
by looking up that destination in the Destination Whitelist. The latter
is implemented as a flat table holding all destinations with valid routes.
No further information about the route itself is stored in that list, such as
which egress device or intermediate node (next-hop) to use. The forward-
ing part is left to the kernel. In real-world use cases, a mesh router’s route
table typically consists of a handful of entries: a couple of neighbor routers
in the same subnet and one default gateway (i.e., < 128 entries). With
these dimensions in mind, the corresponding Whitelist-lookup complexity
of O(n) is low.
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• Packet Monitor: The Packet Monitor is responsible for examining all
network traffic. For each IP packet, its destination address is looked up in
the Destination Whitelist. In case of a match, the packet is handed over to
the kernel for further processing. Otherwise, the packet is forwarded to the
Queue Manager which is among others responsible for notifying the user
space library librom, i.e., the routing logic about the unknown destination.
Several traffic monitoring strategies exist for Linux [Cha05a]. route-o-
matic uses the kernel Netfilter hooks for this purpose. In contrast to the
other strategies, Netfilter provides a good trade-off between performance,
maintenance, and portability.
• Queue Manager: A core feature of route-o-matic is the ability to buffer
packets until a route to their destination is established—instead of directly
rejecting a connection attempt. Netfilter provides for this purpose the
ip queue service, which stores the packets in user space. However, copying
each packet to user space just for buffering and re-injecting them afterwards
to kernel space creates an expensive processing overhead. Since route-o-
matic is designed to work on resource constrained embedded systems, and
the time costs of packet processing are very critical, packet buffering using
this framework should solely occurs inside the kernel. Hence, the Queue
Manager adopts the built-in kernel data structure kfifo, which has also been
used in DYMO-AU [Tho07].
Upon receiving the first packet for an unknown destination, the Queue Man-
ager is first responsible to trigger a RREQ (Netlink route request message),
which is sent to the user space routing logic. Afterwards, a distinction is
made between private and public traffic as follows:
– If the unknown destination is a private address, a separate queue
is created to hold all received packets for that destination. After
finding the route, all corresponding buffered packets are re-injected to
the network subsystem in order to proceed their transmission. The
queue buffer is used in a non-persistent way. That is, it is created
when the first packet is received and destroyed after all packets are
released. To efficiently manage several queues, these are organized
in a double-linked list. To minimize the size of queues, a queue only
holds references to the buffered packets. The memory management of
those packets is handled by the kernel.
– In contrast to private network traffic, all packets with public destina-
tions share one queue. They all depend on the default gateway route,
and once the latter is established, all of them get released. This shared
queue is designed to be persistent due to the high probability of its uti-
lization. Thus, this queue is created upon loading the route-o-matic
module, and it remains available until unloading the route-o-matic.
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Table 6.1: Selected message types of the route-o-matic Netlink protocol
[Sbe13a].
route-o-matic → Routing Logic
Message Type Action
RREQ Request a route to a specific destination
RERR Report a broken route
Routing Logic → route-o-matic
Message Type Action
RTADD Add an entry to the Destination Whitelist and
release all queued packets for a specific destination
RTDEL Delete an entry from the Destination Whitelist
RTDMP Print out the Destination Whitelist
SETGW Set the default gateway route as valid
QREL Release queued packets for a specific destination
QDMP Show the current queues and their capacities
• Netlink Server: Linux provides several mechanisms for the communi-
cation between the kernel and user space, e.g., system calls, ioctl, shared
memory or the socket based Netlink protocol family [JS03]. In route-o-
matic, the latter one has been used for two reasons. First, Netlink does
not only support data transfer in both directions, but it also allows both
sides to initiate a communication session. This feature is necessary to send
RREQ notifications from the kernel to user space, instead of implement-
ing inefficient polling mechanisms. Second, Netlink provides a certain de-
gree of flexibility with its concept of user-defined commands and attributes.
Netlink commands represent message types while the attributes correspond
to the payload. With respect to route-o-matic, a command could be a
RREQ and its attribute would be the requested IP address. Table 6.1 spec-
ifies selected supported message types in current route-o-matic version.
Using these messages, the user space component librom, i.e., the routing
logic can access all the services the kernel part offers.
The Netlink protocol family only supports 32 protocols, among others,
Generic Netlink [GEN09]. To circumvent this limitation, the latter serves
as a general purpose multiplexer. route-o-matic uses Generic Netlink to
avoid conflict with any officially registered Netlink protocol in the future.
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• Link Layer Feedback: To accelerate the detection of broken links/routes,
route-o-matic offers a Link Layer Feedback (LLF) to a routing logic.
Without this service, reactive routing protocols usually use periodic hello
messages with a typical interval of 1 s to keep the neighbor links up-to-date.
That is, in worst case, they need more than 1 s to detect a broken link. By
using the LLF, however, the driver immediately reports each failed trans-
mission of a frame. Nonetheless, in the used Linux kernel version 3.4.4,
there is no generic driver-independent interface to subscribe for such a
transmission error notification. Thereby, in this version of route-o-matic,
the Atheros ath9k WLAN driver was extended by only a few code lines as
a temporarily solution to offer this feature. Choosing a specific WLAN
device driver generally contradicts with the portability goal. Nevertheless,
selecting Atheros as a reference, which is a common driver for most embed-
ded devices’ WLAN interfaces, should minimize this portability issue. Since
many different wireless activities around the Linux kernel have been consol-
idated on the Linux Wireless site [LIN], the authors also expect significant
development towards an official, driver-independent LLF interface. The ex-
tension of the WLAN driver allows route-o-matic to register a callback
function, which is invoked every time a frame transmission for a given des-
tination fails. In that case, the LLF component of route-o-matic deletes
this address from the Destination Whitelist and sends a RERR (Netlink
route error message) to the user space.
• route-o-matic User Space Library (librom): It provides an easy-to-
use API to a user space routing logic. librom endorses a set of simple
functions that meets the basic need of a routing logic. It handles all Netlink
communication with the underlying system. It depends on the user-friendly
library libnl [LIB]. It uses the NETLINK ROUTE protocol to directly
access the Linux routing subsystem and to maintain its routing table. This
makes librom as simple to use as other C libraries.
6.2.3 Performance Evaluation of ROUTE-O-MATIC
The route-o-matic implementation is evaluated in two steps: First, its main
functionality is validated as a proof of concept. Second, the performance of
route-o-matic with respect to delay/runtime is investigated. Here, the kernel
processing time without route-o-matic is first measured as a reference. After-
wards, the runtime of the framework’s main operations are subject to several
evaluation scenarios.
Proof of Concept and Evaluation Setup. All tests and evaluations were per-
formed using the reference mesh unit Roboard RB110 (see Sub-section 4.3.2).
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Figure 6.3: Network setup for the proof of concept and evaluation of route-o-
matic.
Two mesh nodes were connected via an IEEE 802.11g wireless ad-hoc network,
as illustrated in Figure 6.3. The wireless network was dedicated to the mea-
surements, i.e., it was not used for any control purposes. To control the mesh
units, a wired Fast Ethernet link was used. Here, each mesh unit was connected
to a separate subnetwork. One mesh unit, meshunit01, was equipped with
route-o-matic, and it was subject to all measurements. The second mesh unit,
meshunit02, was used as a remote station replying to ICMP echo requests as
well as acting as iperf server. A third node, meshclient, was used to evalu-
ate the forwarding mechanisms of route-o-matic. ftrace was used for a high
runtime precision analysis level. It is a built-in kernel debugging feature which
allows to trace every function call with minimal overhead [Bir09]. On top of
that, the preemption model of the operating system was deactivated (no forced
preemptions) to keep the number of context switches minimal.
6.2.3.1 Proof of Concept
The general functionality of route-o-matic was validated by locally sending
generated packets as well as by forwarding incoming packets.
First, the average Round-Trip Time (RTT) for hundert ICMP packets from
meshunit01 to meshunit02 was determined using ping, without route-o-matic
being loaded. This average RTT of 1.61 ms was used as a general reference time.
Afterwards, route-o-matic was loaded on meshunit01 and the previous mea-
surement was repeated. Figure 6.4 depicts the output of ping during this measure-
ment. The figure sheds light on the expected queuing effect of route-o-matic.
After loading the framework between the 6th and 7th packet, and since the Desti-
nation Whitelist was still empty, all the packets got queued until the route to the
destination was found. This route entry was manually triggered after 5 s, which
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MESHUNIT01:˜# ping MESHUNIT02
[...]
64 bytes from 192.168.33.1: icmp_req=5 ttl=64 time=1.94 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.33.1: icmp_req=6 ttl=64 time=1.57 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.33.1: icmp_req=7 ttl=64 time=4906 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.33.1: icmp_req=8 ttl=64 time=3896 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.33.1: icmp_req=9 ttl=64 time=2896 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.33.1: icmp_req=10 ttl=64 time=1896 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.33.1: icmp_req=11 ttl=64 time=897 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.33.1: icmp_req=12 ttl=64 time=1.79 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.33.1: icmp_req=13 ttl=64 time=1.59 ms
[...]
Figure 6.4: Proof of concept of the queue functionality [Sbe13a].
justifies the RTT increase from 1.57 ms to 4906 ms by the 7th packet. That is,
this delay was the time the packet spent in the queue.
The aforementioned procedure was repeated for forwarded packets instead of
locally generated ones. In this case, meshunit01 received packets from mesh-
client destined to meshunit02. Both tests in this scenario (i.e., without and
with route-o-matic) behaved analogous to the previous scenario but with slightly
larger RTTs caused by the extra hop delay. In other words, with respect to
route-o-matic, it does not make a difference whether the mesh node running
this framework is a source or a forwarder.
6.2.3.2 Scenario I: Reference UDP Packet Processing Time
The evaluation scenarios of route-o-matic are outlined in Table 6.2. The goal
of the first scenario was to determine the pure kernel processing time of a UDP
packet without the route-o-matic module. This processing time was used af-
terwards as a reference time to evaluate the overhead of route-o-matic. To
measure the pure kernel processing time, the runtime of the kernel function
inet_sendmsg for locally generated UDP packets was evaluated. This time covers
the processing of the packet at the transport, the network, and the link layer,
see Figure 6.5.
Results: An average inet_sendmsg runtime of 138.89 µs was measured. Compared
to the ping RTT of 1.61 ms, the kernel processing of a single UDP takes less than
10 %.
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Table 6.2: Evaluation scenarios of route-o-matic [Sbe13a].
Scenario Goal Parameters Values
I Reference
processing
time
#UDP packets 1000
Data rate [Mbit/s] 2
II Route table’s
lookup delay
Runs 10 x 10s
Data rate [Mbit/s] 0.256, 2, 8
Route table entries 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32,
64, 128, 256, 512,
1024, 2048
III Queue delay Runs 100
Data rate [Mbit/s] 2
Queue size [#packets] 1, 256, 512, 1024,
2048, 4096
IV Netlink delay Runs 100
Data rate [MBit/s] 2
Application Layer 
Transport Layer 
Network Layer 
Link Layer 
 sys_write() { 
  vfs_write() { 
    do_sync_write() { 
      sock_aio_write() { 
        inet_sendmsg() { 
 
          udp_sendmsg() { 
            udp_send_skb() { 
 
              ip_send_skb() { 
                ip_local_out() { 
                  ip_output() { 
                    ip_finish_output() { 
  
                      neigh_resolve_output() { 
                        dev_queue_xmit() { 
                          sch_direct_xmit() { 
                            dev_hard_start_xmit() { 
                              ieee80211_subif_start_xmit() { 
                                ieee80211_xmit() { 
                                  ieee80211_tx() { 
                                    __ieee80211_tx() { 
                                      ath9k_tx() { 
                                        ath_tx_start() { 
                                          ath_tx_send_normal() { 
                                            ath_tx_txqaddbuf() { 
                                              ath9k_hw_txstart() { 
                                                ath9k_iowrite32(); 
System Call (by iperf UPD socket) 
Transmission 
Figure 6.5: Linux kernel traversal of an UDP packet.
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6.2.3.3 Scenario II: Destination Whitelist Lookup Delay
This scenario is similar to Scenario I, except that route-o-matic was now loaded
into the kernel of meshunit01. An entry for meshunit02 is added to the Des-
tination Whitelist of route-o-matic (i.e., all packets reach their destination in
both directions, like in Scenario I). With route-o-matic running, this scenario
represents a state in which a valid route for a destination exists, thus, only the
Packet Monitor of route-o-matic is mainly involved, and the goal is to inves-
tigate its delay (i.e., the delay of the Hook function including the Destination
Whitelist lookup function). Here, the entry for meshunit02 was located last in
the Destination Whitelist in order to evaluate the worst case (which is an itera-
tion over all table entries), variable Destination Whitelist sizes were considered,
and different UDP traffic loads were sent from meshunit01 to meshunit02, as
illustrated in Table 6.2.
Results: The results of this experiment are depicted in Figure 6.6. The figure
shows that the delay for looking up the first entry in the Destination Whitelist is
only around 2.5 µs (in case of a traffic load of 2 Mbit/s). As the figure shows, this
lookup time represents the main delay of the whole route-o-matic processing
time in this scenario (i.e., the delay of Netfilter hook), which is around 3 µs.
For up to 128 table entries, the total delay remains below 5.5 µs. This is an
overhead of less than 5 % compared to the kernel’s processing time determined
in Scenario I (138.89 µs).
The lookup runtime of Destination Whitelist sizes larger than 128 clearly shows
an expected behavior: the delay grows linearly with increasing table size, since
the table lookup implementation has a linear complexity O(n), where n is the
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number of table entries. Those large table sizes, however, are perceived to have
no relevance in real-world UAV-WMN.
Figure 6.6 also depicts that the influence of the traffic load on route-o-matic
is to a large extent negligible. Noteworthy is the decreasing delay by higher data
rates. This behavior is explained by the CPU’s caching mechanisms. The higher
the data rate is, the higher is the probability that the instructions used for the
packet processing are located in the CPU cache. This accelerates the time of
fetching these instructions and thereby slightly reduces their runtime.
To sum up, the packet processing overhead of route-o-matic in this scenario
(Netfilter hook) mainly depends on the table lookup time. In real-world scenarios
(e.g., UAV-WMN in emergency operations), where the Destination Whitelist size
is usually lower than 128, the delay of route-o-matic is less than 5 % compared
to the kernel’s total processing time of a UDP packet. Thus, the requirement of
minimal time overhead is evidently fulfilled.
6.2.3.4 Scenario III: Queue Delay
In this scenario, route-o-matic was investigated in case there is no route for a
target destination. Four different processing stages were analyzed:
1. In the first stage, route-o-matic received the first packet for a destination,
which was not listed in its Destination Whitelist. Hence, a RREQ message
was sent by the Queue Manager to librom, and a queue for that particular
destination was created. Finally, the packet was added to this new queue.
2. In the second stage, more packets for the unkown destination were received
by route-o-matic, thus, the Queue Manager enqueued those packets.
3. In the third stage, the queue was full, thereby, the Queue Manager dropped
new incoming packets.
4. In the fourth and last stage, route-o-matic received a RTADD message
from librom. This triggered the re-injection of all queued packets.
Results of the first three stages: In the first three stages, UDP packets
destined to meshunit02 were generated on meshunit01. For each non-routable
packet, the Netfilter hook invokes the Queue Manager by calling its main function
queue_handler. The latter calls both functions, check_and_send_rreq and enqueue_packet.
The runtime of these operations is illustrated in Figure 6.7. The route-o-matic
processing time of the first packet with an unknown destination (the total Net-
filter hook function runtime) is around 120 µs. This runtime is tolerable since it
represents the time of sending out a RREQ (Netlink route request message) and
creating the queue, which occurs only once per destination. More relevant are
the costs of the next stage. These reflect the delay of processing the remaining
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Figure 6.7: Queue delay [Sbe13a].
packets for the unknown destination. This delay is critical the higher the data
rates are, since route-o-matic must keep up with those rates. As Figure 6.7
shows, in the second stage, the overall route-o-matic delay is less than 50 µs,
allowing theoretically to process 20,000 packets per second. This corresponds
to 235.2 Mbit/s by a packet size of 1470 Byte. The results of the second stage
also reflect the decrease of the time cost of check_and_send_rreq, since in this stage
a RREQ was already triggered. Also the runtime of enqueue_packet decreases
around 50 %, because the queue was also already created. Once the queue was
full route-o-matic entered the third stage. Here, the processing time decreases
even more. The whole process of checking if the queue is full and then dropping
the packet (done by enqueue_packet) needs less than 5 µs.
Once again Figure 6.7 sheds the light on the efficiency of route-o-matic in case
a route exists (3 µs), which is highlighted by the red dashed line.
Results of the fourth stage: To determine the time needed to re-inject all
packets of a full queue in the fourth stage, an extra series of measurements were
performed. The queue size was set to different values ranging from 1 to 4096
packets. Figure 6.8 shows the total amount of time needed to release all packets
of a full queue upon the receipt of a RTADD message (i.e., the costs of route_add
including the release of the packets from the queue, release_queue_for_destination).
For a default queue size of 512 packets, the whole queue is released in less than
10 ms. This corresponds to a release time of 20 µs per packet. This cost per
packet slightly decreases by higher number of queued packets. It gets less than
10 µs by releasing 4096 packets. Bearing in mind that an average RTT is 1.61
ms, these results emphasize the efficiency of route-o-matic.
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6.2.3.5 Scenario IV: Netlink Delay
In this scenario, the delay of the Netlink communication between the route-o-
matic kernel module and its user space library librom was analyzed — There are
outgoing (RREQ and RERR) and incoming messages (RTADD and RTDEL).
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Results: Figure 6.9 depicts the function call graphs of those messages as well
as their delay.
• Outgoing Netlink Messages: Trreq sent and Trerr sent represent the av-
erage times for sending out a RREQ and RERR Netlink messages, respec-
tively. In case of RREQ (Trreq sent), it takes route-o-matic around 90 µs
from getting invoked by the Netfilter hook until the transmission function
netlink_broadcast finishes. A RERR message indicating a transmission fail-
ure detection is even faster. In nearly half the time, after a delay of around
55 µs (Trerr sent), a RERR notification is sent out by route-o-matic to
the Netlink bus.
• Incoming Netlink Messages: Trtadd and Trtdel denote the average delays
for the invocation of the functions add_route and delete_route, after which,
the requested action is performed. In both cases, each Netlink message
takes less than 40 µs from entering the kernel space through sys_socketcall
until the corresponding route-o-matic Netlink packet handler (rom_rtadd
or rom_rtdel) is invoked. Afterwards, the Netlink message payload is inter-
preted and the corresponding command is triggered. In case of a RTDEL
message, the route_delete function is called. In case of RTADD, first the
queue is released and then add_route is called. As a result, Trtadd (50 µs) is
slightly higher than Trtdel (42 µs).
Last but not least, all the route-o-matic services but the LLF were also success-
fully tested on the Gumstix Overo Fire COM (ARM Cortex-A8 CPU: OMAP
3503 running at 600 MHz with 512 MByte DRAM). Here, the runtime of the in-
coming and outgoing messages but the RERR, which depends on the LLF, were
analyzed. The results showed proportional but slightly higher costs of those mes-
sages: Trreq sent = 122.92 µs, Trtadd = 61.01 µs, and Trtdel = 48.24 µs. This is
justified by the lower frequency of Gumstix-ARM.
Those tests have manifested that route-o-matic is to a large extent architecture-
independent and, once again, it has been attested that the delay of this framework
is very low.
6.2.3.6 Summary
route-o-matic consists of six different components: Packet Monitor, Destina-
tion Whitelist, Queue Manager, Netlink Server and Link Layer Feedback form
the route-o-matic kernel module, while route-o-matic user space library li-
brom provides a simple API for user space routing logics. The route-o-matic
implementation was evaluated on the reference mesh unit Roboard RB110 to
appraise its time overhead. The results show that route-o-matic adds an over-
head of less than 5.5 µs to the processing time of each routable packet in case
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of relevant Destination Whitelist table sizes (< 128 entries). Compared to the
normal kernel processing time, this is only an increase of less than 5 %. Queuing
a non-routable packet takes less than 50 µs on average, once a queue is created
for a destination. A RREQ notification to the user space has an average delay
of around 90 µs until it is sent out. The Link Layer Feedback-triggered RERR
notifications take only 60 µs on average. This is by far lower than using hello
messages to detect broken routes, which impose in most cases a delay higher than
1 s. Commands from the routing logic for adding and deleting a destination can
be processed within 50 µs. Putting all these measurements in the context of
common network delays, for instance typical packet round-trip times (1.61 ms
on average), the overhead of route-o-matic is negligible.
6.2.4 Validation of the Feasibility of PASER
The goal of the PASER implementation in practice is mainly twofold:
1. Proving the feasibility of PASER and providing a reference implementation,
which is a major missing aspect of the secure routing proposals in the
literature, as none of them has a running implementation in practice;
2. Demonstrating the benefits of PASER in comparison to the IEEE 802.11
i/s security frameworks.
The PASER experimental code is open source, and it is available on the official
website www.paser.info. The feasibility of the protocol and its benefits have been
presented in different events and international conferences. These include, but
are not limited to, the Vodafone innovation days [Sbe14a], this author’s research
work on the security and routing in wireless mesh networks [Sbe14b], includ-
ing the experimental security analysis of the wormhole and blackhole attacks
in Section 7.2, and the early demonstrator of the SecInCoRe research project
[Kuh15, SEC]. Next, the first occasion is covered in more detail.
Secure Routing and Dynamic Key Distribution using PASER at the Vodafone
Innovation Days. PASER was successfully demonstrated at the Vodafone inno-
vation days on 4th, 5th, and 13th November 2014 at the Vodafone Campus in
Du¨sseldorf, Germany. Two showcases were presented using the network setup
illustrated in Figure 6.10.
Showcase 1: In this showcase, a process-oriented, ad-hoc, secure, and reliable
emergency wireless mesh network was deployed using the intelligent hose
couplings presented in [Wol12] and the PASER protocol. A rescue fighter,
wearing WLAN-capable camera glasses (see Figure 6.10, left), transmitted
in real time a video from the incident scene to the decision maker in the
105
6 Implementation of PASER in Simulation and in Practice
Laptop  
(Camera Destination) 
HOTSPOT 2 HOTSPOT 1          
(Mesh Gateway) 
LTE-TDD 
IEEE 802.11i – WPA2 Secure Routing Framework – PASER Virtual Private Network – VPN 
LTE-TDD WLAN WLAN Mesh TETRA DMO 
Group Key 
Management 
Server 
Secure TETRA 
Gateway 
 
Management 
GUI 
TETRA Device 
Smartphone 1 Smartphone 2 
Camera 
Glasses 
Source: http://www.liquidimageco.com 
Legend 
Figure 6.10: Network setup at the Vodafone innovation days.
control room (i.e., to the laptop in Figure 6.10, right). The video was sent
over the PASER-based WLAN mesh network to the WLAN mesh gateway,
which forwarded it over LTE-Time Division Duplex (LTE-TDD) to the
decision maker. The WMN was deployed in periods of four hours, and the
video streamed seamless. This emphasizes the feasibility of PASER and its
possibility to run reliably for relatively long durations, e.g., in UAV-WMN.
Showcase 2: In this showcase, the dynamic refreshment of the WMN keys using
PASER was demonstrated. As proposed in [Sbe11a], a QR-coded WLAN
access key was pushed via the secure Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA)
network to the rescue teams. Volunteers brought their own device (smart
phones in Figure 6.10), scanned the QR-code, and got access to the network.
Using novel solutions (e.g., trusted smart phone applications and a TETRA-
IP API), a secure TETRA-IP chat group was established. In this way, the
volunteers could offer better support to rescue fighters for an improved
management of the crisis.
At the network side, the PASER protocol was used to distribute the same
key to the mesh access point (i.e., the CTK in Chapter 5). If a volunteer
should be excluded from the network, or the key should be periodically
refreshed due to security reasons, it was demonstrated how a new QR-
coded key was pushed via TETRA to the rescue teams, in the meantime,
the key was distributed on-the-fly via PASER to all WLAN mesh access
points. The successful demonstration of this showcase proves that PASER
has solved the interdependency cycle between secure routing and symmetric
key distribution, which is a major asset in comparison to related works.
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In this chapter, the impact of the blackhole and wormhole attacks on the perfor-
mance of WMNs in practice is analyzed. Afterwards, a security comparison of
PASER and the three alternate solutions, HWMPS, BATMANS, and ARAN, is
given. The results show that PASER is more resilient to routing attacks than its
counterparts in UAV-WMN.
Publications. Parts of this chapter have been presented in [Sbe14b] and
[Sbe15].
7.1 Experimental Analysis of the Blackhole and Wormhole
Attacks
In this section, an experimental testbed of the blackhole and wormhole attacks is
set up, and the robustness of PASER against both attacks in comparison to the
non-secure routing protocols HWMP and BATMAN combined with the security
frameworks of IEEE 802.11s/i (i.e., HWMPS and BATMANS) is analyzed. It
is investigated whether these solutions are suitable to be deployed in security-
critical scenarios, such as UAV-WMN.
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Figure 7.1: Experimental testbed of the wormhole and blackhole attacks
[Sbe14b].
7.1.1 Experimental Blackhole Attack
The blackhole attack was implemented in an experimental testbed consisting of
a static chain of five mesh nodes and an attacker node, as depicted in Figure
7.1 (top). In a blackhole attack, assuming the attacker has compromised a node
or a key, the attacker impersonates the destinations (in general, the gateways in
WMNs). Implementing the attack is quite straightforward as the attacker only
needs to set up the same IP address as the destination, and the routing protocol
will take care of the rest. In case of MAC-based protocols such as HWMPS,
ARP spoofing is also required. The latter can be carried out with a simple ping
command. Unfortunately, not only direct neighbors are affected by the blackhole
attack but also other nodes located outside the transmission range of the attacker
because the routing protocol will disseminate the fake identity of the attacker
throughout the whole network. As a result, the attacker can redirect the traffic
and sabotage the network. In UAV-WMN, the attacker might also propagate
fake information to hijack the UAVs.
In this experiment, the Roboard RB110 mesh node was used, on which HWMPS
and BATMANS were installed (see Section 4.3.2) and PASER was implemented.
The network was operated according to IEEE 802.11n using a 40 MHz frequency
bandwidth. The source, mesh node 1, sent a 3.5 Mbit/s constant bit rate UDP
traffic to the destination, mesh node 5. The attacker impersonated mesh node 5
and aimed to sabotage the network. Five repetitions were run for each protocol.
Selected results are depicted in Figure 7.2. As the figure shows, in less than one
minute after starting the attack, the non-secure routing protocols combined with
the IEEE 802.11 security frameworks, HWMPS and BATMANS, were get caught
in the attacker’s trap. That is, the IEEE 802.11 security frameworks are not able
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Figure 7.2: Impact of the blackhole attack on the PDR in PASER, HWMPS, and
BATMANS in the experimental testbed [Sbe14b].
to mitigate the attack. In case the attack is carried out, the only way the network
operator can react on it is to collect all nodes, reconfigure them, and to set up the
network again. In contrast, in case of the secure routing protocol PASER, due to
its dynamic key management scheme and its security features, the compromised
node was revoked, and the network keys were dynamically refreshed. Thereby,
the performance of the network is not affected by this attack in case of PASER,
as depicted in Figure 7.2.
7.1.2 Experimental Wormhole Attack
To carry out the wormhole attack, two malicious nodes directly connected with
each other (e.g., using LAN or directional antennas) are placed at the incident
scene, as depicted in Figure 7.1 (bottom). These nodes transparently forward
routing messages between distant nodes (i.e., from one area of the network to
another) faster than the legitimate nodes. This causes affected nodes located
in the different areas to believe they are neighbors. Consequently, they start
sending messages to each other via the wormhole tunnel instead of using the
legitimate relay nodes. As a result, the attacker can drop all the data packets
causing a sabotage of the network.
In contrast to the blackhole attack, the attacker in a wormhole attack does not
require network access. To implement the attack, the attacker just needs two
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Figure 7.3: Impact of the wormhole attack on the PDR in PASER, HWMPS, and
BATMANS in the experimental testbed [Sbe14b].
interfaces per node: one is set in monitor mode to eavesdrop all the frames in
the proximity regardless of their destination, and one is set in ad-hoc or mesh
mode to automatically reply with an ACK frame to any unicast data frame sent
by the victim nodes. In this way, the victim nodes never detect that the network
is sabotaged. For instance, in the network in Figure 7.1 (bottom), when mesh
node 1 sends a data packet to mesh node 5, the attacker’s node in the proximity
of mesh node 1 drop the corresponding frame, yet it acknowledges its successful
receipt by sending back an acknowledge frame on behalf of mesh node 5. To
sabotage the network, the attacker only forwards routing messages to manipulate
the routing topology, and the attacker discards data packets. In case the IEEE
security frameworks are running, routing messages and UDP/TCP data packets
are both encrypted in data frames, thus, the attacker cannot decide based on
the content whether to forward the frame or not. However, as the size of routing
messages is typically < 500 Byte, the attacker can decide based on the size of the
frame whether to forward it or not (advanced attackers can also take the frame’s
frequency into consideration).
In this experiment, see Figure 7.1 (bottom), the attack was run on a static chain
of five nodes using the Roboard RB110, on which HWMPS and BATMANS were
installed (see Sub-section 4.3.2) and PASER was implemented. The network was
operated according to IEEE 802.11n and a 40 MHz frequency bandwidth. The
source, mesh node 1, sent a 3.5 Mbit/s constant bit rate UDP traffic to the
destination, mesh node 5. One attacker’s node was placed in the proximity of
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mesh node 1, the second attacker’s node was placed in the proximity of mesh node
5, and both nodes were configured appropriately to run the wormhole attack.
Five repetitions were run for each protocol. Selected results are depicted in
Figure 7.3. As the figure shows, non-secure routing protocols in combination
with the IEEE 802.11 security frameworks are prone to the wormhole attack.
How fast the wormhole is established depends on the routing protocol design
and metric. In case of BATMANS, the route is selected based on the number
of OGMs received within a sliding interval, thus, it takes a bit longer time than
HWMPS to use the wormhole tunnel. In the latter case, the success of the attack
is very fast, as HWMPS in practice sends a route request to refresh active routes
every four seconds. Only PASER is robust against the wormhole attack, due its
geographical leash mechanism and its security features.
7.2 Security Comparison
In this section, a security comparison between PASER and the following three
representative alternate solutions is given:
1. HWMPS: A combination of the security mechanisms of the IEEE 802.11s
mesh standard and the HWMP routing protocol, which is specified in the
mesh standard.
2. BATMANS: A combination of the IEEE 802.11i security mechanisms and
the BATMAN routing protocol, which is widely deployed in community
networks [BATc].
3. ARAN: The well-known, reactive, and secure routing protocol ARAN,
which is considered to date (see, e.g., [Pie14, Mah13]) as an exemplary
solution for secure routing in wireless multi-hop networks.
Table 7.1 illustrates a security comparison between PASER and its alternatives.
It provides a mapping between each attack of the attacker model presented in
Sub-section 5.1.2, the security goals that must be achieved to combat the attack,
and whether the considered solutions guarantee these goals. Table 7.2 gives an
overview of the mechanisms implemented by each solution to fulfill the security
goals. The information provided in both tables are based on the experimental
analysis in the previous section and on the works in [Sen13, Sgo13, Abu08].
As Table 7.1 shows, in case of an external attacker, all solutions protect against
internal and time-base replay attacks, as all solutions achieve message authentica-
tion and freshness. Only PASER, however, is able to fulfill neighbor authentica-
tion. Thus, only PASER protects against the position-based replay and wormhole
attacks. This fact is verified in the experimental analysis in Sub-section 7.1.2.
In case of an internal attacker, the IEEE 802.11s/i standards do not provide any
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Table 7.2: Comparison of security mechanisms [Sbe15].
Security Goals PASER ARAN IEEE
802.11s/i
Message authenti-
cation
Digital signature of
sender (untrusted neigh-
bors)
Digital sig-
nature of
sender
CCMP
HMAC (trusted neigh-
bors)
Message freshness Nonce (untrusted neigh-
bors)
Nonce CCMP
Nonce or one-time
authentication secrets
(trusted neighbors)
Neighbor authenti-
cation
Digital signature and
position information
of sender (untrusted
neighbors)
- -
One-time authentication
secrets and position
information of sender
(trusted neighbors)
Origin authentica-
tion
Digital signature of orig-
inator
Digital sig-
nature of
originator
-
Dynamic key man-
agement
Key management
scheme
Broadcast
of cer-
tificate’s
revocation
-
CCMP: Counter mode Cipher block chaining Message authentication code Protocol
protection, as the sole security credential used in their security frameworks (per-
sonal mode) is the pre-shared key. Once this key is compromised, the attacker
can successfully mount all internal attacks. In case of ARAN, digital signatures
are used to combat the fabrication attack, see Table 7.2. If the IP address is
bound to the public key, the digital signature also protects against the imperson-
ation and blackhole attacks. To further mitigate internal routing attacks, ARAN
implements a broadcasting mechanism of revoked certificates to exclude compro-
mised nodes. ARAN, however, does not address the case of transmission errors
of these revocation broadcast messages due to interference or channel errors.
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In comparison to ARAN, PASER mitigates the same internal attacks and offers
a more fail-safe dynamic key management scheme. PASER guarantees the detec-
tion of nodes or key revocation despite non-successful reception of a revocation
broadcast message. As long as any neighbor or any node along a requested route
between source and destination is aware of the revocation, a PASER node de-
tects it (see Section 5.3.5). In UAV-WMN, this is always the case as at least
the gateway at the ground station is aware of any revocation process, and this
gateway is a common destination for all the UAVs. In comparison to the IEEE
802.11s/i, PASER’s symmetric scheme offers two levels of security: even if the
attacker compromises the symmetric group transient key, the attacker will not be
able to impersonate a node or mount a blackhole attack as the attacker cannot
generate one-time authentication secrets on behalf of legitimated nodes.
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This chapter deals with the performance evaluation of PASER and three alter-
natives in realistic UAV-WMN scenarios. The following steps are taken:
• A theoretical and simulation-based analysis of the route discovery delay
of PASER and its alternatives is performed. This delay constitutes, along
with the message overhead of the protocols, for which asymptotic expres-
sions are provided, the main impact on the overall network performance.
• The performance of the protocols is evaluated in UAV-WMN-assisted net-
work provisioning and area exploration scenarios, among others. Here,
OMNeT++ and INETMANET, realistic mobility patterns of UAVs, and
an experimentally derived channel model of the air-to-air link between the
UAVs are used. Both the route discovery delay and the message overhead
of the protocols are taken into consideration to justify the results.
Publications. Parts of this chapter have been presented in [Sbe15].
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8.1 Analysis of the Route Discovery Delay
The route discovery delay is the time needed to find a route to an unknown
destination. It is composed of the time needed to transmit the required routing
messages, CostComm, and the time needed to process these messages, CostComp.
The definition of this delay is given in Equation 8.1, which is based on the
notations in Table 8.1.
DelayRD(D, I
∗)[s] = CostComm(D,I∗)[s] + CostComp(D)[s] (8.1)
Definition 2. Let the route discovery be the case where the sender does not have
or lost the routes to the next hop and the corresponding destination, and it needs
to (re)discover the latter provided that intermediate nodes have the route.
8.1.1 Lower Bound for the Communication Costs
A lower bound equation of CostComm to find that route is depicted in Table 8.2.
In this equation, it is assumed that the transmission of the routing messages is
always successful as the main goal is to compare the efficiency of the security
schemes of the protocols when the route length increases, and whether thereby
certain latency requirements are violated. Non-successful transmission of the
routing messages is dependent on the network topology, traffic load, mobility,
and channel characteristics, and it is less related to the security scheme used. It
leads to link layer retransmissions and route timeouts, which is investigated in
simulation.
As Table 8.2 shows, in case of the reactive protocols PASER and ARAN, in
contrast to HWMPS, intermediate nodes cannot reply on behalf of the destina-
tion due to security reasons. In this respect, PASER mainly relies on unicast
messages to contact the destination, while ARAN uses broadcast messages. In
case of the proactive protocol BATMANS, at least two periodic messages (called
OGMs) must be exchanged with the next hop to consider the link as valid. Only
then, OGMs of the destination received through that next hop are processed.
The transmission time of the unicast messages in the equations of Table 8.2 can
be calculated according to Sub-section 4.3.1. The transmission time of the broad-
cast messages can be analogously calculated taking into consideration the use of
basic PHY data rates (typically 1Mbit/s in case of IEEE 802.11g), and that
broadcast messages are not acknowledged. The message sizes needed to calcu-
late the transmission time are provided in Table 8.2 (bottom). Here, a Merkle
tree consisting of 214 secrets, a secret size of 32Byte, and a certificate size of
701Byte are assumed.
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Table 8.1: Notations used in the analysis of the route discovery delay [Sbe15].
Notation Description Notation Description
σ Estimated average
elapsed intervals
I∗ Interval of sending
periodic messages; *:
only in case of proac-
tive protocols
CostComm Communication
costs
MIC Message integrity
code
CostComp Computational costs Msg,MsgB ,
MsgU
All messages, broad-
cast messages, uni-
cast messages
D Diameter: number of
links on a route
SignGen/V er Generation / verifica-
tion of digital signa-
ture
Dec/Enc Decryption / encryp-
tion
TU Transmission time of
unicast frames
DelayRD Route discovery de-
lay
TB Transmission time of
broadcast frames
GuardB Uniform random
time (0, 0.005 s),
waited before the
transmission of
broadcast messages
TOp Computation time of
cryptographic opera-
tions
MACGen/V er Generation / verifi-
cation of keyed-hash
message authentica-
tion code
# Number of
8.1.2 Lower Bound for the Computational Costs
The equation of CostComp to find the route and the time costs of the cor-
responding cryptographic operations are depicted in Table 8.3. These costs
(see [Sbe14b, Sbe12b] for details about the implementation of the operations)
are experimentally measured using ftrace, as in [Sbe13a], on the Roboard RB110
embedded system. Table 8.3 emphasizes the efficiency of the PASER security
scheme as it illustrates that in case the route length increases, efficient MAC
operations (0.248 ms) are used, i.e., only these depend on D) while inexpensive
signature operations (28.595 ms) are applied in ARAN.
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Table 8.2: Calculation of lower bound of CostComm in Equation 8.1 [Sbe15].
CostComm(D, I
∗)[s] =
D+1∑
Node=1
(
#MsgB(Node)∑
i=1
(TB(SizeMsg)[s] +GuardB[s]) +
#MsgU(Node)∑
i=1
TU(SizeMsg)[s]) + σI
∗
[s]
Protocol Costs [s]
PASER (reac-
tive)
TBUB−RREQ + GuardB + (D − 1)TUTU−RREQ + (D −
1)TUTU−RREP
ARAN (reac-
tive)
TBRREQSender + GuardB + (D −
1) (TBRREQInter. + GuardB)
+ TURREPDestination + (D − 1) TURREPInter.
HWMPS (re-
active part)
TBPREQ + GuardB + TUPREP
BATMANS
(proactive)
1.75 I + (4 +D) TBOGM + (4 +D) GuardB
Message sizes of the protocols - Required to calculate TB and TU in
CostComm
Message Size [Byte] Message Size [Byte]
PASER
UB-RREQ 1066 UU-RREP 1090
TU-RREQ 714 TU-RREP 709
TU-RREP-ACK 538
ARAN
RREQSender 860 RREQIntermediate 1693
RREPDestination 852 RREPIntermediate 1685
HWMPS
PREQ: Path request 27 PREP: Path reply 27
BATMANS
OGM: Originator message 16
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Table 8.3: Calculation of lower bound of CostComp[s] in Equation 8.1 [Sbe15].
CostComp(D)[s] =
D+1∑
Node=1
#Msg(Node)∑
Msg=1
#Op(Msg)∑
Op=1
TOp[s]
Protocol Costs [s]
PASER (reac-
tive)
NonceGen + 2SignGen + SignV erf + (D−1)(MAC V erf +
MACGen) + SignV erf + SignGen + MACGen + (D −
1)(MAC V erf +MACGen) + MACV erf + SignV erf
ARAN (reac-
tive)
NonceGen + SignGen + (D − 1)SignGen + (2D −
3)SignV erf + 2SignV erf + SignGen + (D −
1)SignGen + (2D − 3)SignV erf + 2SignV erf
HWMPS (re-
active part)
2(Enc+MICAdd +Dec+MICV er)
BATMANS
(proactive)
(4 +D)(Enc+MICAdd +Dec+MICV er)
Average time costs of the cryptographic operations in CostComp -
Measured on the Roboard RB110 [ROB] (30 runs)
Cryptographic
operation
Time
[ms]
paser aran hwmps batmans
Signature genera-
tion
27.021 x x
Signature verifica-
tion
1.574 x x
Nonce generation 0.432 x x
MAC genera-
tion/verification
0.141 x
Encryption (hw) 0.089 x x
Decryption (hw) 0.072 x x
MIC genera-
tion/verification
(hw)
0.002 x x
hw: hardware accelerator
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8.1.3 Evaluation of the Route Discovery Delay
Using Table 8.2 and Table 8.3, the route discovery delay of the protocols can
be calculated according to Equation 8.1, and it can be determined whether their
security schemes are a limitation with respect to latency in large networks. This
delay is calculated for route lengths up to 19 links. The IEEE 802.11g technology
is considered. The PHY data rate is set to 11Mbit/s. The basic PHY data rate
is 1Mbit/s. The UDP and IP header sizes are 8 and 20Byte, respectively. The
MAC header size is 34Byte; in case of HWMPS, it is 38Byte. The MAC header
size is increased by 16Byte when the IEEE 802.11s/i security mechanisms are
used. The BATMANS’s OGM -interval is set to 0.5 s, according to the findings in
[Sbe14c]. The route discovery delay is also evaluated in OMNeT++ [Var08] and
its INETMANET framework. The goal of this simulation-based evaluation is
twofold: 1) to validate the derived equations in case of successful transmission of
routing messages, and 2) to investigate the impact of non-successful transmissions
on the route discovery delay. Here, 10% and 20% unsuccessful transmission rates,
i.e., Frame Error Rate (FER), are considered, respectively.
Figure 8.1 depicts the results of this analysis. As the figure shows, the equations’
results match the performance of the protocols in simulation. This attests the
validity of these equations. The results show only a slight increase of the route
discovery delay of PASER while the route length is multiplied, and the FER is
increased. This sheds light on two facts: First, the security scheme of PASER is
not a limitation with respect to latency in case of long routes, in contrast to that
of ARAN, see Figure 8.1 (top right) in case of 0% FER. A comparison of the
delay of both protocols given a route length of 19 links highlights the efficiency of
the security scheme of PASER, which is ten times faster than ARAN in that case.
Second, the route discovery mechanism of PASER, relying on unicast messages, is
robust against high FERs. In contrast, that of ARAN, which relies on broadcast
messages to wider propagate the route discovery information, is ineffective in
case of high FER. If the messages are not successfully received, they will not
be retransmitted, thereby, route timeouts occur, after which a new route request
must be started. Figure 8.1 (bottom, left) emphasizes the lightweight of HWMPS
—At the expense of the security level it can achieve, see Table 7.1 in Section 7.2.
Figure 8.1 (bottom, right) indicates that the delay in BATMANS is mainly caused
by the periodic message interval as σ intervals (σ ∈ R and σ > 1) must be waited
in order to have exchanged the necessary messages, and in case of high FER, these
message can get lost, leading to a considerable increase in the delay. On a final
note, while the results in Figure 8.1 are generated using IEEE 802.11g, the delay
of PASER decreases to more than 20% when using IEEE 802.11n/ac, given route
lengths higher than 5 links. That is, by using these recent technologies, PASER
is able to meet the multimedia latency requirement of 150ms [Abo03] even in
case of route lengths consisting of 19 links and a FER of 20%.
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Figure 8.1: Time for finding a route to a given destination (DelayRD) in theory
and in simulation [Sbe15].
8.2 Asymptotic Message Overhead
In this section, the message overhead of the routing protocols is estimated as a
function of limiting parameters with respect to the network performance, based
on the work in [Vie04]. These parameters are the network size N , the average
route length L, the average number of one-hop neighbors (node density) ∆, the
average number of active routes (traffic flows) per node α, and the mobility (link
breakage rate) µ. While the work in [Vie04] only focused on the overhead of
broadcast messages, an approximation of the overhead of unicast messages is
also provided in this research as PASER mainly relies on these messages. Let
hr be the hello rate (i.e., that of PASER) and tp the topology broadcast rate
(i.e., OGM rate in case of BATMANS and proactive PREQ rate of the root
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Table 8.4: Message overhead of the routing protocols [Sbe15].
Protocol Broadcast messages rate Unicast messages rate
PASER µ · α · L ·N + hr ·N Θ(∆ · µ · α · L
2 ·N)
ARAN µ · α · L ·N · (N − 1) Θ(µ · α · L2 ·N)
HWMPS µ · α · L ·N + tp ·N Θ(∆ · µ · α · L ·N)
BATMANS tp ·N
2 -
element in case of HWMPS), the message overhead of the routing protocols is
illustrated in Table 8.4. The table depicts the number of messages per second
or an asymptotic tight bound of this overhead. This information can be used
to support the analysis of the relative performance of the protocols in a certain
scenario, as done in Section 8.3. It can be also used to determine the scalability of
the protocols, using the method proposed in [San02]. For instance, let Ohd be the
overhead of the protocols and Tr the minimum amount of bandwidth required to
forward the traffic load in the network in case the routes were statically set. Let
Ψλi be the network scalability factor with respect to a parameter λi and ρ
Prot
λi
the routing protocol scalability factor, these terms are defined in Equation 8.2
[San02].
ρProtλi = limλi→∞
logOhdProt(λ1, λ2, ...)
log λi
, Ψλi = lim
λi→∞
log Tr(λ1, λ2, ...)
log λi
(8.2)
A protocol is considered scalable with respect to λi if ρ
Prot
λi
≤ Ψλi . Given a
constant ∆ in case of an increasing network size [San02, San01] and a constant
L, it is Tr(µ, α,N) = Θ(αN) —Increasing L without bounds would jeopardize
the performance of UAV-WMN, on which strict requirements are posed due to
critical real-time telemetry transmissions [Dan10]. Thus, Ψλµ = 0,Ψλα = 1,
and ΨλN = 1. Besides, in that case, Ohd
PASER = OhdHWMPS = Θ(µαN),
OhdARAN = Θ(µαN2) and OhdBATMANS = Θ(N2). That is, only PASER and
HWMPS are scalable with respect to the network size: ρPASERN = ρ
HWMPS
N =
1 = ΨN < ρ
ARAN
N = ρ
BATMANS
N = 2. All the protocols are scalable with
respect to the traffic load: ρBATMANSα = 0 < ρ
PASER
α = ρ
ARAN
α = ρ
HWMPS
α =
1 = Ψα. Only BATMANS is scalable with respect to mobility: ρ
BATMANS
µ =
0 = Ψµ < ρ
PASER
µ = ρ
ARAN
µ = ρ
HWMPS
µ = 1. Nevertheless, as the relative
mobility of low-altitude cooperative UAVs is limited due to their small size and
their communication aware mobility strategies (see Paragraph 8.3.4), the mobility
factor is not a major concern in practice. Much more relevant are the network
size and the traffic load, for which it has been shown that PASER is scalable.
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bility patterns [Sbe15].
8.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, a performance evaluation of the routing protocols in OMNeT++ is
presented. The corresponding topology and traffic models are first outlined. Sec-
ond, the realistic UAV mobility patterns used, some of which were demonstrated
in practice in [AIR, Roh10, Dan09], are elaborated. Third, an experimentally
derived channel model for air-to-air UAV-WMN links is explored. This channel
built the basis of the close to reality performance analysis done. Last, the results
of the performance evaluation are presented.
8.3.1 Topology Models
Three network topologies are considered, as illustrated in Figure 8.2. The first
is a grid topology, reflecting a generic synthetic scenario. This topology is used
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to analyze the impact of link breaks (mobility) and transmission errors on the
performance of the protocols. The second topology is mainly a chain of nodes,
representing network provisioning scenarios. It is used to analyze the impact of
the route length on the performance. The third topology is mainly a formation
of fully connected UAVs, as intended to be deployed in aerosol plume exploration
scenarios. It is used to analyze the impact of the node density on the performance.
Different network sizes are investigated, see Figure 8.2. For each network size,
the transmission range, number and duration of physical links of nodes differs.
The available transmission time between any neighbor pair strongly depends on
the channel model and mobility patterns used.
8.3.2 Traffic Models
Two types of traffic are considered, as depicted in Figure 8.2. First, broadcast
Constant Bit Rate (CBR) traffic is periodically exchanged between neighbor-
UAVs, e.g., telemetry data. Second, unicast CBR traffic is sent from all UAVs
towards the gateway (the ground station). Depending on the network size, the
data rates of both traffic types are adjusted so that the analyzed networks are
never congested in case of HWMP (i.e., without security). Hereby, the data rates
are set to the maximum value for which HWMP achieves 100% packet delivery
in the main topology of each scenario in case all nodes were static (i.e., in static
grid, static chain, and static fully connected network).
8.3.3 Channel Models
Two channel models are considered. The first is a large-scale model based on the
free space propagation loss. The second is a combination of the free space model
and a small-scale fading model that follows a Rician distribution. The free space
propagation loss can be expressed by Equation 8.3, with Gt and Gr being the
antenna gains, λ the wave length, d the distance between sender and receiver,
and γ0 the attenuation coefficient, see [Fri46].
L[dB] = 10 log10
(
1
GtGr
(
4pi
λ
)2
dγ0
)
(8.3)
The attenuation coefficient γ0 typically ranges between [2, 5], where γ0 = 2 is
used for free space (rural) environments, and γ0 = 5 is used for (urban) envi-
ronments with strong damping. Experimental validations, performed by Niklas
Goddemeier [God], of the air-to-air UAV-WMN link using two UAVs flying at
30m altitudes and several WLAN cards such as the DNMA-92 Atheros mini-PCI
card and the TP-Link TL-WN821N mini-USB-adapter provided matching results
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with the free space propagation loss for γ0 = 2.65. Therefore, this value is used
in this research. The frequency is set to 2.412GHz, the receiver sensitivity is
−91 dBm, the transmitting power is 20 dBm, and Gt = Gr = 1. Thus, according
to Equation 8.3, a node can sense the signal in a range of 473.8m. The Signal
to Noise plus Interference Ratio (SNIR) threshold is set to 4 dB. This means, in
case of −101 dBm thermal noise and 9 dB noise factor, as used in this research,
the maximum transmission range can be calculated as 365.1m.
The Rice distribution is defined according to Equation 8.4, with x ∈ R+, I0
being the modified Basel function of zero order and the first kind, and v and s
reflecting the strength of the dominant and non-dominant paths respectively, see
[Dur02].
pξ(x) =
x
s2
exp
(
−x2 − v2
2s2
)
I0
(xv
s2
)
(8.4)
Through experimental measurements, performed by Niklas Goddemeier [God],
using the hardware-in-the-loop UAV testbed [God12b], approximations of the
parameters v and s are determined. Figure 8.3 shows the Probability Density
Function (PDF) of x in case of different transmission power levels. Each distri-
bution represents the variation in the Received Signal Strength (RSS) measured
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Figure 8.3: Parameters identification of a Rician channel model for UAV-WMN—
derived from experiments [Sbe15].
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by the communication hardware (ranging from −45 dBm to −84 dBm). Based
on these results, an average distribution is derived, as depicted in Figure 8.3.
Finally, to obtain a realistic channel model, large-scale and small-scale fading
are combined according to Equation 8.5, with Ltotal being the total propagation
loss.
Ltotal[dB] = L[dB] − (pξ(x)−mean) (8.5)
8.3.4 Mobility Patterns
In the grid scenario, apart from forced position swaps, the nodes are static. The
positions of UAV(N−i) mod N and UAVi mod N are swapped each interval i, with
N being the number of UAVs in the network.
In contrast, in the network provisioning and the area exploration scenarios, the
nodes are considered to be moving in three-dimensional space using state-of-the-
art mobility algorithms [Wie14]. Each node represents a small-scale UAV flying
at altitudes up to 60m and a maximum speed of 20m/s. The UAVs’ mobility
behavior is composed of two components: microscopic mobility, which addresses
the mobility between the UAVs, and macroscopic mobility strategies, which spec-
ifies the locations to which the UAVs travel.
In the network provisioning scenario, the microscopic mobility is realized by
the Communication-Aware Potential Fields (CAPF) algorithm [Wie14, God11],
in which virtual potential forces (e.g., FRSS) are calculated based on commu-
nication performance indicators (e.g., RSS), cf. Figure 8.2. The macroscopic
location is inherently determined by the users on the ground. In order to extend
the coverage area of the UAVs by mean of relaying when the users move away,
a role-based connectivity management scheme (see [Wie14, God12a]) is imple-
mented to dynamically reassign the roles of the individual UAVs, based on link
monitoring. Both mobility patterns are implemented in the experimental UAV
testbed [God12b], which is utilized to generate the mobility traces that is used
in the performance evaluation. The impact of the mobility on the link breakage
rate µ in this scenario is depicted in Table 8.5. A link is considered non-reliable
or broken if its RSS value is below −83 dBm. As the table shows, the stability of
the links in case of 16 UAVs in a 3 km2 area is higher than that of 8 UAVs in a
2 km2 area because in the latter case the degree of connectivity and overlapping
transmission ranges is lower.
In the aerosol plume exploration scenario, the distributed dispersion detection
algorithm [Beh13] is implemented. The UAVs are used to detect the borderline
of an aerosol plume. At the same time, the UAVs maintains their communica-
tion links to exchange sensor and telemetry information. The values of µ in this
scenario are illustrated in Table 8.5. Although the swarm is coherent at all times,
frequent changes in the links’ quality occurs, due to the highly dynamic behavior
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Table 8.5: Link breakage rate in the network provisioning and area exploration
scenarios [Sbe15].
Scenario Network size Channel type Link breakage rate
µ [Hz]
Network pro-
visioning
8 UAVs Free Space 4.3 · 10−4
8 UAVs Rice 4.4 · 10−3
16 UAVs Rice 6.1 · 10−4
Area explo-
ration
8 UAVs Rice 5.9 · 10−3
16 UAVS Rice 3.2 · 10−3
of the UAVs. For instance in case of 8 UAVs, approximately one link is broken
every eleven seconds: 1
µ·#Links
= 1000
5.9·15
s. In this regard, the challenge of the
routing protocols is to optimally adapt to these changes to avoid packet drops
or long delays.
8.3.5 Simulation Results
In the following, the performance of the protocols is first analyzed in the syn-
thetic grid scenario. Afterwards, the UAV-WMN realistic scenarios (i.e., network
provisioning and area exploration) are considered. In all scenarios, the mobil-
ity, channel, and traffic models described in the previous sub-sections are used.
The protocols are configured according to Table 8.6, based on the findings in
[Sbe14c, Hiy13]. Here, two periodic intervals are considered, where the lowest in-
terval should lead to a better performance of the proactive protocol BATMANS
in highly dynamic topologies.
HWMPS is operated in the hybrid registration mode to always have the best
route from all nodes to the gateway (the ground station) and vice versa. The
simulation time of the grid scenario is 300 s. The simulation time of the network
provisioning and area exploration scenarios is 900 s. 30 runs are executed in each
case, and a confidence interval of 97.5% is used.
8.3.5.1 Results of the Abstract Grid Scenario
Figure 8.6 depicts the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) of the protocols in the grid
scenario. Both the route discovery time and the message overhead significantly
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Table 8.6: Relevant configurations of the routing protocols [Sbe15].
Parameter Protocol(s) Value [ s]
OGM-interval BATMANS 0.5, 1
Hello-interval PASER 2, 4
PREQ-interval HWMPS 2, 4
Purge-timeout BATMANS 5
Neighbor-hold-time PASER, ARAN, HWMPS 12
Route-hold-time PASER, ARAN, HWMPS 15
influence the performance in this scenario, cf. Figure 8.5 (top). HWMPS achieves
the best performance, followed by PASER, regardless of the periodic interval’s
configuration and the Position Swap Interval (PSI), see Figure 8.4. This is justi-
fied by the better composition of the delay and the overhead of both protocols:
It is shown in Section 8.1 that HWMPS and PASER have a more efficient and
robust route discovery process than ARAN and BATMANS, and in this scenario,
they also have a lower overhead as µ ≤ 14
8
· 1
300
Hz, α = 1, L = 1.5, N = 9,
and ∆ ≈ 4.3, refer to Table 8.4 for the definition of these parameters. Moreover,
Figure 8.4 depicts that in case of a Rician channel, the relative performance
of all the protocols but that of ARAN is nearly the same. Figure 8.5 shows
that the maximum PDR in that case is mainly below 80%. Due to fading, the
topology (i.e., hidden nodes), and the simulation configuration, many channel er-
rors occur in the Rician channel, which lead to retransmissions of unicast frames,
thereby, to more collisions and transmission errors. Here, the better performance
of HWMPS and PASER than BATMANS, in contrast to ARAN, attests the effi-
ciency of both protocols, as HWMPS, PASER and ARAN are traffic-aware (i.e.,
they implement a link layer feedback mechanism), while BATMANS is not.
8.3.5.2 Results of the Network Provisioning Scenario
In the network provisioning scenario, Figure 8.7 shows that PASER outperforms
HWMPS and ARAN. Besides, the performance of PASER gets better in the
longer chain of 16 UAVs in case of the Rician channel. As the route discov-
ery delay of PASER is higher than that of HWMPS (cf. Section 8.1), and it
increases the longer the chain is, the results in Figure 8.7 lead to two interpre-
tations: First, the overhead of PASER is lower than that of HWMPS in this
scenario. This holds as α = 1, ∆ ≈ 2, and µ <
tp
2(L−1)
. For instance, in case of
8 UAVs, L = 4, and µFreeSpace < µRice <
1
4·2·(4−1)
Hz, cf. Table 8.5. Second,
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Figure 8.6: PDR in the synthetic grid scenario of nine nodes [Sbe15].
the chain of 16 UAVs is more stable than that of 8 UAVs. This is true since
µ8−Rice > µ16−Rice (cf. Table 8.5), and the overhead of PASER in the latter
case is lower as
µ8−Rice
µ16−Rice
>
L216·16
L28·8
while α and ∆ are mainly the same. Apart
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from these observations, Figure 8.7 reflects that the longer the route is, and the
lower the relative mobility is (i.e., in case of 16 UAVs), the better is the per-
formance of the proactive protocol BATMANS. In that case, the probability of
route breaks in case of the reactive protocols is higher. This explains the use of
proactive protocols in large community networks.
8.3.5.3 Results of the Area Exploration Scenario
Due to the high node density in the area exploration scenario, it is the worst-case
scenario for PASER. In contrast to the other protocols, PASER fulfills the neigh-
bor authentication goal, and it uses, among others, hello messages to maintain
this goal. For instance, due to the position information in the hello messages,
when an authenticated one-hop source moves away, and a wormhole attack is
mounted at the new location, the destination would detect the attack upon re-
ceiving a hello message. Otherwise, the nodes would fall in the attacker’s trap
until the route get lost, due to collision or timeout. The size of the hello messages
is proportional to ∆ as these messages include information about the one-hop
neighbors. In this scenario ∆ ≈ N since all the nodes are most of the time
one-hop neighbors, D ≈ L = 1. Despite its hello messages overhead, Figure 8.8
shows that PASER can achieve a comparable performance to that of HWMPS
in this scenario, given the periodic interval is appropriately set. In contrast, the
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proactive protocol BATMANS fails to compete in this scenario, especially, at
high densities (i.e., 16 UAVs). As the value of µ is below 10−2Hz in this scenario
(cf. Table 8.5), the overhead of BATMAN is much higher than that of the other
protocols, regardless of the periodic interval’s configuration.
The results in this chapter demonstrate that PASER has —in the investigated sce-
narios (realistic UAV-WMN)— a comparable performance with the well-established,
none-secure routing protocol HWMP combined with the IEEE 802.11s security
mechanisms. It is also shown that the route discovery process of PASER is ef-
ficient and robust and that PASER is scalable with respect to network size and
traffic load.
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Conclusion
This thesis has given an account of the Position-Aware, Secure, and Efficient
Mesh Routing approach (PASER). The proposed approach aims to efficiently
secure the routing process in highly dynamic WMN in general, in UAV-WMN in
particular. To this end, it achieves the security goals: message authentication,
message freshness, neighbor authentication, origin authentication, and
dynamic key management. The novelty of PASER is threefold:
1. Hybrid security scheme: PASER implements a hybrid cryptosystem,
as opposed to the majority of the existing proposals for secure routing in
WMNs [Sbe15, Sen13, Sgo13]. Asymmetric cryptography is used for initial
mutual authentication and key exchange, after which symmetric cryptogra-
phy is applied to authenticate the routing messages. Noteworthy with this
respect are the two security levels of the symmetric scheme. The first level
is based on a group transient key using MAC. The second level is based on
one-time neighbor authentication tokens using a Merkle tree. Thereby, even
if the attacker compromises the group key and eavesdrops all the messages,
the attacker can neither impersonate a legitimate node nor fabricate rout-
ing messages as the attacker cannot generate new authentication tokens. In
contrast, when using the IEEE 802.11s/i security frameworks or symmetric
key-based secure routing protocols, once the attacker reveals the key, the
attacker can act as a legitimate node. It is shown in Chapter 5 that the
computational costs of the PASER symmetric scheme is less than 341µs on
a representative embedded system while RSA-1024 and EDCSA-160 take
longer than 26ms. This combination of values in PASER (security and
performance) is deemed to be necessary by the IETF KARP group [IETa]
to drive a broad deployment of a secure routing protocol.
2. In-band key management method: PASER incorporates an in-band
key management method to tackle the interdependency cycle problem be-
tween secure routing protocols and key distribution methods [Bob03]. For
instance, the majority of the existing proposals for secure routing in WMNs,
especially, symmetric-key-based ones and the key management method of
the IEEE 802.11s/i security frameworks suffer from this problem [Sbe15,
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Zha13b]. In contrast, PASER tackles this issue, allowing for a rapid re-
sponse to security breaches. This resolves a major issue in current deploy-
ments [Leb12].
3. Specificity to UAV-WMN: PASER exploits the specifics of UAV-WMN,
e.g., the network is operated by one organization, and there is a central
unit (the ground station), thus, it is appropriate to deploy a PKI and a
KDC. Besides, PASER combats a wide range of routing attacks as it aims
to fulfill all the secure routing requirements in UAV-WMN, which were
elicited from several research projects, such as [AIR, AVI]. In contrast,
the IEEE 802.11s/i and the majority of the existing proposals for secure
routing in WMNs are vulnerable to the wormhole or the blackhole attacks,
see [Sbe14b, Sen13, Sgo13, Abu08].
The main conclusions of this thesis can be summarized as follows.
• Validation of the WMN model in INETMANET-OMNeT++:
The WMN model in INETMANET-OMNeT++ has been validated based
on theoretical analysis and experimental measurements. It is shown that
different WMN routing philosophies and protocol parametrization lead to
similar performance results in simulation and in practice, i.e., to valid con-
clusions, if the simulated network is appropriately configured.
• Implementation of PASER in INETMANET-OMNeT++: A mod-
ular implementation of PASER is contributed to the INETMANET frame-
work of OMNeT++. This easy-to-adapt implementation has been recently
integrated in the official INETMANET framework as the first implementa-
tion of a secure routing protocol in OMNeT++, see [INE13].
• Design, implementation, and evaluation of the generic Linux ker-
nel framework ROUTE-O-MATIC: The route-o-matic framework
is proposed, and its implementation design and evaluation are discussed.
route-o-matic provides special features for reactive routing protocols for
which the current network subsystem of Linux is not designed. Reactive
routing logic mainly relies on two core features of the underlying operating
system:
1. A mechanism which notifies the routing logic in case a route to an
unknown destination is needed;
2. A buffer which temporarily saves the packets for the unknown destina-
tion while the route discovery is performed and re-injects those after
establishing the route.
The network subsystem of the Linux operating system, which is the de-
fault platform for the implementation of WMNs, lacks of support for both
134
features. route-o-matic enables these features, it is ready-to-use and pro-
vides a level of completeness to run any routing logic. route-o-matic
is evaluated in different scenarios to appraise its time overhead, which is
shown to be negligible. For instance, route-o-matic generally adds an
overhead of less than 5.5 µs to the processing time of a routable packet.
Compared to the Linux kernel processing time, this is only an increase of
less than 5 %. route-o-matic is used to implement PASER in Linux. Its
code is online available on www.paser.info.
• Implementation of PASER in practice: The feasibility of the PASER
approach and its benefits have been presented in different events and inter-
national conferences. These include, but are not limited to, the Vodafone
innovation days [Sbe14a], the research work on the security and routing in
wireless mesh networks [Sbe14b], and the early demonstrator of the SecIn-
CoRe research project [Kuh15, SEC]. The PASER experimental code is
open source, and it is available on the official website www.paser.info. To
the best of the author’s knowledge, the PASER experimental implemen-
tation is the only online available up-to-date reference for a secure WMN
routing proposal.
• Experimental analysis of the blackhole and wormhole attacks:
The robustness of the PASER and the IEEE 802.11s/i against the blackhole
and wormhole attacks are investigated in a testbed. It is demonstrated that
the IEEE 802.11 security frameworks are not able to mitigate both attacks,
thus, these cannot be deployed in critical scenarios, e.g., in UAV-WMN. It is
concluded that using these security frameworks in the backbone of WMNs
is not as appropriate as their conventional use to secure the communication
between mesh access points and clients. In this regard, an efficient secure
routing protocol combined with a dynamic key management scheme are
inevitable to establish a reliable network, as experimentally shown using
PASER. It is also shown that PASER mitigates —in UAV-WMN— more
attacks than the well-known, secure routing protocol ARAN, and its key
management is more fail-safe than that of ARAN.
• Theoretical and simulation-based analysis of the route discovery
delay and the message overhead: The route discovery delay of PASER
and three alternatives is analyzed in theory and in simulation. Lower bound
equations of this delay are derived as it constitutes along with the message
overhead, for which asymptotic expressions are provided, the main impact
on the overall network performance. The results show that PASER has an
efficient and robust route discovery process, and it is scalable with respect
to network size and traffic load.
• Simulation-based performance evaluation in realistic UAV-WMN:
Using the network simulator OMNeT++, realistic mobility patterns of
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UAVs, and an experimentally derived channel model of the air-to-air link
between the UAVs, it is demonstrated that in UAV-WMN-assisted network
provisioning and area exploration scenarios PASER has a comparable per-
formance with that of the well-established, none-secure routing protocol
HWMP combined with the IEEE 802.11s security mechanisms.
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The work performed in this thesis can be extended in various directions. Investi-
gating the use of PASER in a broader range of application scenarios is one direc-
tion. Another compelling direction is the virtual localization of position-unaware
nodes. This enables a geographical leash-based mitigation of the wormhole at-
tack in scenarios where satellite services are not constantly available. A first
approach in this direction is proposed in the following. Besides, further ideas to
enhance the security of PASER and to optimize its performance as well as new
research avenues are discussed.
Publications. Parts of this chapter have been presented in [Sbe12a].
10.1 Virtual Localization Extension for Geographical Leashes
The secure wireless mesh routing protocol PASER, proposed in this thesis, uses
geographical leashes (satellite-based position information) to combat wormhole
attacks in outdoor scenarios with low obstacles, e.g., in UAV-WMN. In case
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of many obstacles or indoor scenarios, satellite services are however not avail-
able. Thereby, legitimate nodes cannot participate in the protocol, and they are
excluded from the network. This contradicts with the design goals of WMNs,
especially, ’ubiquitous access anywhere’. To address this issue, a novel Virtual
Localization Extension (VLX) for the localization and integration of position-
unaware nodes with the rest of the network is introduced in this section. The
use of VLX is not restricted to PASER, it is a generic extension for geograph-
ical leashes in scenarios in which nodes are not aware of their position (e.g.,
unmanned ground vehicles indoors).
10.1.1 Review of Countermeasures Against the Wormhole Attack
The necessity of countermeasures against the wormhole attack is beyond dispute
in the literature [Kha09]. To mitigate this attack, the authors in [Cap03] propose
the SECure Tracking Of node encounteRs (SECTOR) protocol. Their approach
is based on a special hardware, which sends 1-bit-RREQs that must be immedi-
ately answered by the corresponding receiver. Here, the messages do not enter
the CPU path, instead, they are processed with very low latency by the special
hardware. Attackers cannot easily imitate this behavior due to the delay im-
posed by the wormhole tunnel. This approach, however, requires the integration
of new hardware in the mesh nodes while yielding positive results only if the
challenge-messages do not collide. Otherwise, this approach could produce false
alarms. Thereby, the rate of profit by deploying it on a wide range of devices is
perceived to be low. Two other examples that fall into the category of the route
delay analysis are the Delay Per Hop Indication (DelPHI) [Chi06] and the Worm-
hole Attack Prevention (WAP) [Cho08] protocols. Both identify affected routes
by measuring either packet travel or round trip time per hop. Even though the
implementation of both approaches is straightforward and does not require extra
hardware, only balanced networks offer a good basis for such comparisons. In
networks with frequent topology changes or where the link quality often varies,
the aforementioned metrics rather produce false alarms.
Apart from that, the authors in [Kha05] propose the LiteWORP protocol. Here,
nodes have to be placed with largely overlapping reception ranges. Each node
has to be operated in promiscuous mode, so it can check if other nodes forward
packets as expected. As soon as anomalies with respect to packet delivery ratio or
delay are detected, nodes causing these anomalies are completely excluded from
any further communication. The requirement for overlapping reception ranges
in real life WMN applications is however not always guaranteed, especially, in
indoor scenarios. Besides, the overlapping reception ranges could yield to a high
interference ratio, thereby, to a deterioration in the network performance.
A different method to combat the wormhole attack is proposed in Castor [Gal10],
which aims to provide secure routing without the need for routing messages (see
138
10.1 Virtual Localization Extension for Geographical Leashes
Section 3.2). This approach is both simple and protects against the wormhole
attack. However, it produces a considerable overhead due to the header added
to each data packet and because of the acknowledgment message required from
each destination for each packet. In addition, it assumes that each pair of end
nodes either shares a symmetric key or they know the public key of each other.
This is, however, not straightforward in WMNs, as discussed in Section 3.2.
10.1.2 Review of Indoor Localization Schemes
Most existing localization schemes are based upon the following techniques [Lew12]:
Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA), Time of Arrival (ToA), Angle of Arrival
(AoA), Cell of Origin (CoO) / Cell-ID or Trilateration by RSS. All these tech-
niques but the last one are only feasible in specific scenarios. For instance, both
ToA and TDoA require tight clock synchronization. AoA is based on special an-
tenna arrays which are rarely incorporated in mobile nodes. The Cell-ID is only
feasible in networks with several stationary base stations. In contrast, RSS values
are available in most situations and easily accessible in Linux-based operating
systems. Yet, these values are not always accurate, especially, in indoor scenarios.
Thereby, range-free localization techniques based on non-accurate RSS are of in-
terest in this research. The Approximate Point In Triangle Test (APIT) [He03]
falls into this category. For a given set of position-aware anchor nodes N and a
position-unaware node I, all
(
3
N
)
possible triangles are calculated to test whether
I is inside those triangles or not, based on a comparison of RSS. For each positive
test, the corresponding triangle is written into an APIT map. Finally, the center
of gravity is calculated for this map. Since individual tests are rather coarse,
this final step significantly increases the quality of the localization. Nevertheless,
this approach does not only require that anchor nodes are in the proximity of
I, but it also assumes that those nodes even surround I, which does not always
hold in mobile scenarios. Besides, this approach requires a higher anchor node
density than its counterpart, the Centroid algorithm [Bul00]. According to the
latter, the approximate position of the node I, P ′I is estimated by calculating the
centroid of the sum of the nodes in the adjacencies of I using Equation 10.1.
P ′I (x, y) =
N∑
j=1
Pj (x, y)
N
(10.1)
(x, y) are the coordinates, Pj is the position of the nodes in adjacencies, while N
is their total number. A more sophisticated approach in this context is to give
each point an individual weight that reflects the values of the RSS as described
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in [Blu07]. Thereby, the position of the node I is now given by Equation 10.2.
P ′I (x, y) =
N∑
j=1
(wIj · Pj (x, y))
N∑
j=1
wIj
(10.2)
wIj is the weight of the relation of nodes I and j. This approach is termed
Weighted Centroid Algorithm. It is robust against RSS fluctuations, and a mini-
mum of only one node is necessary for the algorithm to work properly. Neverthe-
less, a slight drawback of it is that trilateration only resides within the convex hull
spanned by the points Pj . While this is not a problem in scenarios with random
distribution of nodes with/without position information, it can heavily distort
the localization in networks where many nodes without position information are
physically isolated. This makes the approach vulnerable to the wormhole attack
since in that case it significantly modifies the topology of the network. However,
due to the many aforementioned advantages it endorses, this approach is partly
adopted in VLX.
10.1.3 Requirements and Goals for Virtual Localization
The VLX is designed with the following requirements in mind:
• Conservation of resources: Except for the gateway, batteries of mobile
nodes are limited in capacity and should not be consumed any further than
necessary. As a consequence, VLX overhead and usage of CPU should be
kept to a minimum.
• Changes of the existing security level: The existing security level of the
routing protocol should by no means be restricted. The VLX is an extension
to increase the security indoors. That is, all nodes with a valid position
information must adhere to the present mechanisms. Only nodes without
position information may deviate from this behavior.
• Mapping of the network topology: In order to keep use of geographical
leashes in case of obstacles or indoors, the virtual projection of the real
topology of the network must be as accurate as possible. Bearing this
in mind, two potential mistakes might occur. A node is considered as a
neighbor in the virtual world although it is not in the real world (alpha
error), or it is not a neighbor in the virtual world while it is in the real
world (beta error). For a proper protection against the wormhole attack,
the alpha error must never occur, while the beta error is not that critical,
nevertheless, it must be kept as low as possible.
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• Accuracy of the localization of nodes: Requirements for the accuracy of
the localization using VLX are rather low. The localization just has to be
accurate enough to ascertain the correctness of the topology. Apart from
that, accuracy is a secondary optimization problem.
Central Goal: The main goal for the design of the VLX is formally defined as
follows: For all nodes ni = {n1, n2, . . . , nN} in the direct adjacencies A of a node
I, the following must always be true:
niεAvirtual(I)⇒ niεAreal(I) for ∀t ≥ 0 (10.3)
The set of adjacent neighbors Avirtual is therefore a subset of the set of real
neighbors Areal, such that:
Avirtual(I) ⊆ Areal(I) for ∀t ≥ 0 (10.4)
As a result, the following must always hold:
∑
(ni|niεAvirtual(I)) ≤
∑
(ni|niεAreal(I)) for ∀t ≥ 0 (10.5)
10.1.4 The Virtual Localization Extension Approach
In WMNs running routing protocols such as PASER, where the nodes register
themselves at a central unit, e.g., the KDC, this unit knows about the positions
of all the nodes that are aware of their position information. This information is
used in VLX to localize a position-unaware node as well as to give it a hint on
which nodes to trust as one-hop neighbors.
While in most geographical leash-based mechanisms, a perfect unit circle [Cla90]
is an appropriate paradigm to determine one-hop neighbors, the assumed fixed
maximal transmission radius is not applicable in indoor environments. For this
reason, it is proposed in VLX to define the neighborhood/range of a node based
on the usage of an ellipse as a generalization of a circle. The ellipse brings a lot of
advantages over the standard circle while conserving the relevant characteristics
of the latter. Both have in common a geometric shape that forms a convex
boundary. Both can be shrunk and shifted. Thus, both are very useful to enclose
the one-hop neighbors scattered around a node. However, in contrast to the
circle, the ellipse might also be transformed so as to approximate a line. On
top of that, it might be rotated, offering in combination with the transformation
characteristic a great flexibility to selectively enclose one-hop neighbors in the
adjacencies. In fact, this is an indispensable feature for fulfilling the VLX goal
given in Equation 10.4.
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In its simplest form and without any rotation, the definition of an ellipse is very
lightweight. It is defined by only four scalars in the Cartesian plane, namely by
minor and major axis (amin, amaj), and coordinates (xc, yc) of a center point c.
The corresponding equation of the ellipse in the Cartesian plane is given by:
1
amaj
(x− xc)
2 +
1
amin
(y − yc)
2 = 1 (10.6)
In its sophisticated form, an ellipse, a conic section with arbitrary size, shift, and
rotation, is defined as the set of points Pni = (x, y) which satisfies the following
equation:
rx2 + sy2 + txy + ux+ vy + w = 0 (10.7)
For performance reasons, VLX exploits the center form representation [Ga¨r97] in
combination with the position shifting ∆ = (∆x/∆y) to define an ellipse. In this
case, only five scalars r, s, t,∆x, and ∆y are required. This paradigm reduces
the point-in-ellipse verification test to a small number of multiplications and
summations. Here, a given point Pni is located inside an ellipse defined by the
set of parameters M and the center point c if and only if the following holds:
(Pni − c)
TM(Pni − c)− 1 ≤ 0, with M ∈ ℜ
(2x2) =
(
r t
t s
)
(10.8)
To localize an indoor node I using VLX, the following five steps are taken:
• Step 1: One-hop neighbors append the RSS values of I’s RREQ packets
to those packets.
• Step 2: Upon receiving those packets, the central unit (i.e., gateway or
KDC) derives the network propagation direction towards I.
• Step 3: The central unit runs Algorithm 1 to virtually localize I.
• Step 4: The central unit runs Algorithm 2 to generate the ellipse, which
represents the neighborhood/range of I.
• Step 5: The central unit appends the virtual position of I and its ellipse
to each route reply message addressed to that node.
To ease the understanding of these steps, the example given in Figure 10.1 is
used. In this example, an indoor node I wants to join the network. Thereby, it
triggers a registration at a gateway.
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Figure 10.1: Overview of the main steps to virtually localize a node using VLX
[Sbe12a].
Step 1: Integration of RSS Values in RREQ Packets. When running secure
mesh protocols such as PASER, a node wanting to join the network typically
starts a registration process at the KDC, mainly to grant access to the network.
This node broadcasts a route request towards a gateway to reach the KDC. This
process is illustrated in Figure 10.1 (top, left). I broadcasts a RREQ message
looking for a gateway. While RREQ messages typically must include the position
information of a node, by deploying VLX, those messages are extended by one
flag, which position-unaware nodes set to indicate that they have not yet gotten
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valid localization data. Upon receiving such RREQ messages, one-hop neighbors
forward the RSS values of these messages to the next-hop towards the gateway.
From this stage, the message processing and forwarding logic did not change.
That is, any node beyond one-hop distance forwards these messages as usual.
Step 2: Calculation of Network Propagation Direction. The direction in which
the network propagated to reach I is calculated at the central unit (i.e., KDC or
gateway). It is derived from the position of all one-hop neighbors that forwarded
RREQ messages of I to the gateway. This direction is calculated by averaging
the vectors between the gateway and those neighbors. That is, the basic propa-
gation is obtained by summing the normalized vectors from the position of the
gateway PGW to the position of I’s one-hop neighbors, Pni, e.g., Pn1 and Pn2
in Figure 10.1 (top, right). Thus, the basic propagation
−−→
BPI towards a node I
with niεAvirtual(I) is given by:
−−→
BPI =
−−−−−→
PGWPn1∥∥∥−−−−−→PGWPn1∥∥∥ +
−−−−−→
PGWPn2∥∥∥−−−−−→PGWPn2∥∥∥ + · · ·+
−−−−−−−−→
PGWPnmax∥∥∥−−−−−−−−→PGWPnmax∥∥∥ (10.9)
Step 3: Virtual Localization of Position-Unaware Nodes. The localization of
a position-unaware node I is carried out at the central unit as specified in Al-
gorithm 1. Hereby, two mechanisms are mainly used. In scenarios where the
position-unaware node has at least three position-aware one-hop neighbors, the
Weighted Centroid Algorithm (WCA) is used. In scenarios where the position-
unaware node has less than three position-aware neighbors, a novel approach
based on the combination of RSS lateration and the cosine similarity is applied.
The reason for incorporating this approach in VLX lies in the high topology mis-
matches/collisions caused by the WCA in the aforementioned case. Laterations
of the received RSS values are used to calculate all intersections i of the circles
with the center set to the one-hop neighbors’ positions and the radius chosen
as a reciprocal of the corresponding RSS values, as illustrated in Figure 10.1
(bottom, left). In that case, because of RSS fluctuations and imperfect channel
characteristics, it is likely to have more than one perfect intersection. This is
where the novel cosine similarity approach comes into play. This approach is
adopted from the text analysis field where it is used to analyze the analogy of
vocabulary. As for VLX, the cosine of the angles between the basic propagation
−−→
BPI towards a node I and the vectors between the gateway and the intersection
points
−−−−→
PGWPi is calculated. Hence, the definition of the cosine similarity in this
context is given by the equation:
cos(θ) =
A ·B
‖A‖‖B‖
=
∑n
i=1Ai ·Bi√∑n
i=1 (Ai)
2 ·
√∑n
i=1 (Bi)
2
(10.10)
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Algorithm 1 Localization of a position-unaware node I (run by a central unit)
Input: Map of RSS values
Output: Virtual coordinates P ′I = (x, y)
list N ← get all N entries in RSS map with position information
if
∑
N = 0 then
list N ← get all N entries in RSS map
else if
∑
N = 1 then
−−→
BP ← calculate normalized Basic Propagation
dist ← estimated distance ⊲ based on f( 1RSS )
P ′I ← Pni + (
−−→
BP · dist)
else if
∑
N = 2 then
−−→
BP ← calculate normalized Basic Propagation
dist1/2 ← estimated distance ⊲ based on f(
1
RSS1/2
)
get all intersections i1/i2 ⊲
∑
inε0..2
if
∑
i = 1 then
P ′I ← Pi1
else if
∑
i = 2 then
get cosineSimilarity for all
−−−→
PnPi
P ′I ← Pi
∣
∣ Pi with MAX cosineSimilarity
else
call Weighted Centroid Algorithm (WCA):
P ′I = (Pn1 · RSS1 + Pn2 · RSS2)/
∑
RSSn
end if
else ⊲
∑
N ≥ 3
call Weighted Centroid Algorithm (WCA)
end if
where n is the dimension of the vector space. The codomain of the cosine simi-
larity W = [−1, 1] either indicates an exact match of the angle (1), orthogonality
(0), diametrically aligned angles (−1), or values in between. In VLX, the intersec-
tion point with the highest cosine value is chosen as an appropriate position for
the indoor node. Figure 10.1 (bottom, left) depicts an example of this approach.
Step 4: Calculation of the Enveloping Ellipse. RREQ messages are received
by the central unit (gateway or KDC) time-discretely. That is, the number of
available one-hop neighbors of a position-unaware node I and their correspond-
ing RSS values continuously increases. From the time the first value is available,
the central unit calculates both the estimated position and the corresponding
ellipse for I and answers the request by a RREP message including this infor-
mation. Hereby, the central unit updates those information by each incoming
request/outgoing reply. To achieve the goal in Equation 10.4, only the one-hop
neighbors from which the central unit already received a RREQ must be located
in the ellipse of I. This is rarely given by an ellipse centered at the virtually
localized position P ′I . In most cases, a shifting of the ellipse is necessary to guar-
antee the topology’s integrity without disproportional costs. Figure 10.1 (bottom,
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Algorithm 2 Calculation of an enveloping ellipse (run by a central unit)
Input: Position of nodes ni in Areal(I)
Output: Ellipse parameter set r, s, t,∆x,∆y for Avirtual(I)
N ←
∑
entries e ∈ RSS map
runNumber ← 0
ellipseIsColliding ← true
while ellipseIsColliding do
availableRSSEntries a ← N - runNumber
runNumber ← runNumber + 1
ellipse set r, s, t,∆x,∆y ← call calculateEllipse(top a, entries e)
⊲ VLX checks
−−−−−→
Pn1Pn3 − α ·
−−−−−→
Pn2Pn3 6= ~0 ∀α ∈ ℜ
⊲ and ensures ≥ 3 linearly independent positions
ellipseIsColliding ← call checkForCollision(r, s, t,∆x,∆y, e)
⊲ for ∀ entries e | e ∈ routing table ∧ e /∈ RSS map
end while
right) gives an example of such a scenario. Here, the center of the ellipse is shifted
by ∆. That is ∆ = (∆x/∆y) is added to the node’s virtual position P ′I = (xI , yI)
to get the ellipse’s center point c = (xc/yc). Algorithm 2 specifies all the steps a
central unit undergoes to compute the ellipse. The basic idea of this algorithm
is to recalculate the ellipse as long as the point-in-ellipse verification test is posi-
tive for any node ni which is not in the direct proximity Avirtual(I), but whose
position Pni is inside the ellipse of I. That is, this node collides with the ellipse
area. In this case, the ellipse is altered to exclude that node. The algorithm en-
sures that the central goal for protecting the network topology from aberrations
is always fulfilled. Despite its simplicity, the algorithm is an important pillar of
the entire concept.
Step 5: Transmission of Virtual Position and Information about Adjacencies (El-
lipse). Instead of transmitting real position information, a position-aware node
I sends its virtual position P ′I = (xI , yI) and information about its adjacencies
using the set of parameters that define its ellipse, namely, r, s, t,∆x,∆y. The
node receives this information during the registration phase from the replies it
gets from the KDC or the gateway.
10.1.5 Selected Performance Results
The proposed VLX approach was integrated in PASER and evaluated in simula-
tion in different indoor/outdoor scenarios and with different nodes constellations,
see [Sbe12a]. The results showed that VLX has negligible to no side effect in
scenarios where position information are available. In scenarios where position
information are not available, VLX enables legitimate position-unaware nodes to
access the network. It provides nearly the same level of security as geographical
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Figure 10.2: Network setup to evaluate the VLX ratio sensitivity of position-
unaware to position-aware nodes [Sbe12a].
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Figure 10.3: Results of the ratio sensitivity of position-unaware to position-aware
nodes using PASER with VLX [Sbe12a].
leashes in outdoor scenarios with no obstacles, it has a light overhead, and it is
not sensitive to low ratios of position-aware to position-unaware nodes, as illus-
trated in Figure 10.3. Here, the performance of PASER with VLX is evaluated
by simulating an increasing number of nodes without position information in a
network of ten nodes under wormhole attack, using the simulation configurations
of Table 10.1. Nodes were increasingly set to work without position information
from the left-hand side to the right-hand side, as depicted in Figure 10.2. At the
beginning, the ratio of position-unaware to position-aware nodes was set to 1/9.
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Table 10.1: Relevant simulation configurations [Sbe12a].
parameter Value Parameter Value
Simulation tool OMNeT++ Simulation time [s] 625
Channel model Free-Space Mac layer 802.11a
Mobility pattern Static Traffic model CBR-UDP
Number of simulations 10 Packet size [Byte] 512
Number of traffic flows 3 Data rate [kbit/s] 512
Afterwards, the number of nodes without position information was successively
increased by two to finally end at an opposite ratio of 9/1 position-unaware to
position-aware nodes with only the gateway having position information (which
is typically true in most real-life scenarios). As Figure 10.3 shows, it is apparent
that the PDR remains nearly constant in average regardless of the considered ra-
tio. The mean values differ by less than 1 %. In other words, this figure reveals
that VLX is suitable for critical scenarios with bad satellite-service. The pro-
tection remains active throughout the whole network lifetime so that wormhole
links are always avoided.
10.1.6 Open Issues
While VLX is very effective in case the mesh nodes are static and the wormhole
attack is mounted after deploying the network, it is perceived that this approach
is ineffective in case the wormhole attack is active before setting up the network.
In the latter case, the information received at the gateway are corrupted, and this
leads to wrong conclusions (corrupted virtual positions). Provided a satisfactory
number of nodes that are not affected by the wormhole attack, this issue can be
solved using statistical means to detect the corrupted information. A remaining
issue is however the use of VLX in mobile scenarios, which are not considered in
the VLX design. This is an interesting challenge for future work, especially, with
respect to latency as a new virtual positions must be frequently calculated.
10.2 Further Directions for Future Research
• Formal security analysis of PASER using model checking tools: In
addition to PASER, a profusion of secure routing protocols have been pro-
posed in the literature to establish reliable routes in MANET and WMNs,
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see [Abu08]. However, in most of these proposals, non-exhaustive methods
are used to evaluate their security, see [Sen13, Sgo13, And07]. This is also
the case in PASER, even though, visual inspection, simulations, and exper-
iments are used to be as exhaustive as possible. Non-exhaustive security
verification methods could lead to a false sense of security since many of
these ’secure’ protocols are later shown to be vulnerable. Note also that
exhaustive methods could also lead to wrong conclusions, as in the case
of Ariadne [Hu05], where provable security (exhaustive method) is used
to prove the security of the protocol, yet, the protocol is shown later to
have several security flaws, [Bur09]. Nevertheless, using exhaustive security
verification methods, the security goals are fulfilled with higher probabil-
ity. Apart from that, the implementations of secure routing protocols are
mostly not validated to strictly match the design. This leads to security
flaws even if the protocol design is secure. Thereby, in future work, ef-
forts could be devoted to use automated model checking tools (exhaustive
method), for instance the COMPLeTe framework [Gro¨13], to verify the se-
curity of both the design and implementation of secure routing protocols,
such as that PASER.
• Trajectory-Aware Routing in UAV-WMN: The mobility of UAV
mesh nodes in UAV-WMN can be predicted to a large extent, either be-
cause the trajectory is predefined or because the UAVs implement a well-
known mobility strategy, e.g., potential fields [Wie14, God11]. Thereby,
mobility-based link breaks and even link deteriorations can be anticipated.
By extending UAV-WMN routing protocols to be trajectory-aware and to
implement early actions, e.g., switch-before-break, route failures could be
avoided, and the performance could be optimized. PASER, which is already
supports the exchange of position information between neighbors, builds a
suitable basis for such a future work.
• Physical layer-based key management instead of PKI: The main
security overhead of PASER is caused by the digital signature operations
(processing delay) and the exchange of certificates (transmission delay) to
establish trust between new one-hop neighbors, after which the efficient
PASER symmetric scheme is used. This overhead could be removed if
it were possible to implement another scheme to establish the trust. A
paradigm that is arising with this respect is physical layer security, see
[Gol11] and the references therein. Here, a secret-key is generated between
one-hop neighbors, without pre-shared knowledge, based on channel char-
acteristics that only both parties can measure. Even though the feasibility
and robustness of this approach in practice has not been proven yet, it is
a compelling avenue for future work.
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• Integrating the PASER security scheme in IEEE 802.11s: It is
shown in this thesis that the IEEE 802.11s does not provide sufficient secu-
rity in WMN backbones. An interesting future direction in this respect is
to extend the IEEE 802.11s to include the PASER security scheme, since
both PASER and HWMP (the routing protocol specified in IEEE 802.11s)
have their routes in AODV. As a first step towards achieving this goal, sim-
ulation can be used. Here, the contributed simulation model of the IEEE
802.11s/i to the official INETMANET framework of OMNeT++ builds a
good foundation, see [Neh14].
• Design of a robust and interference-free channel access in WMNs:
One of the main reasons of routing instabilities in WMNs is interference
due to CSMA/CA, see [Ng07]. This in one hand leads to performance
deterioration. On the other hand, it burdens the deployment of WMNs in
several applications, e.g., the Command and Non-Payload Communication
(CNPC) link of UAVs in practice, as this link should ensure that the UAVs
can always be remotely piloted and their position is known. That is, the
use of WMNs in this case is restricted to the payload link of UAVs [FAA].
To address this problem, robust and interference-free channel access needs
to be designed for WMNs. A first approach is proposed in [Hie08]. Further
work in this respect could strongly impact the breakthrough of WMNs.
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Cryptography derives from the Greek word kruptos, which means hidden. It
is defined as the art and science of secret writing [Sch95], where encryption
is the process of transforming plaintext into ciphertext, and decryption is the
reverse process. The cryptographic algorithm (i.e., mathematical function) used
for encryption and decryption is called a cipher. Modern cryptography follows
the Kerchkhoffs principle, which states that the security should definitely not rely
on the secrecy of the algorithm. Thus, modern ciphers are publicly known, yet
they are used in conjunction with keys, and these keys or part of them are kept
secret. The cryptographic algorithm, the keys, and all possible plaintexts and
ciphertexts build the cryptosystem. The security of the system mainly depends
on the strength of the cryptographic algorithm and the secrecy of the key.
A fundamental objective of cryptography is to address the following four security
goals [Men96]:
• Confidentiality: Keeping the content of information secret for all but
those authorized to access it, e.g., by encrypting the information.
• Integrity: Protecting the information against accidental or unauthorized
alteration. It should be possible for the receiver of information to detect
manipulation in transit.
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• Authentication: This goal can be applied to both the communicating
parties and the information. Thus, it covers two concepts: node authenti-
cation and message authentication. Node authentication is the ascertaining
of the identity of the communicating parties. Unauthorized parties should
not be able to masquerade as authorized ones. Message authentication
denotes origin (node) authentication and the integrity of the information.
• Non-repudiation. Preventing a party from denying previous commit-
ments or actions, making repudiation impossible if a dispute arises, e.g.,
ensuring that the originator of a message cannot deny the creation of the
message.
In the following, the common cryptographic algorithms used to achieve these
goals are briefly described. They are typically divided into two classes: symmetric-
key and public-key algorithms. Table 3.1 depicts an overview of the main char-
acteristics of each class.
A.1 Symmetric-Key Cryptographic Algorithms
Symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms rely on a single key (or several keys
calculated from each other). For instance, in the case of ciphering, the same key
is mostly used for encryption and decryption, thus, the cipher is appropriately
called a symmetric cipher. Symmetric-key cryptosystems have been used for
4000 years [Sim82]. Thereby, they are also termed conventional cryptosystems.
They are characterized by being fast, and they rely on relatively short keys to
provide long term security. However, they have an inherent problem, which is
the distribution of the key to both the sender and the receiver.
Symmetric-key cryptographic techniques are in widespread use, especially to pro-
vide mutual authentication as well as data confidentiality and integrity [Paa09].
A.1.1 Symmetric Ciphers
Let p be the plaintext, c the ciphertext, e the encryption key, d the decryption
key, and K the key space, i.e, {e1, d1, ..., en, dn} ∈ K with n ∈ N. A cipher is
called symmetric if for each key pair (e, d), it is possible to calculate d knowing
only e, and vice versa [Men96].
The encryption and decryption functions E and D of a symmetric cipher are
defined as follows.
• Encryption: c = Ee(p);
• Decryption: p = Dd(c).
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Both functions have the property that Dd(Ee(p)) = p. In most practical systems
(e.g., WLAN), the same key is used, i.e., e = d. Encryption and decryption are
then inverse operations. Symmetric ciphers are generally categorized as being
either stream ciphers or block ciphers.
Stream Cipher. The same function is used for encryption and decryption, and is
applied to each bit individually. Let pi, ci, and ei be the i
th bits of the plaintext,
ciphertext, and encryption key, respectively. Let ⊕ denote an XOR operation,
i.e., an addition modulo 2. The encryption and decryption operations of a stream
cipher are defined as follows.
• Encryption: ci = Eei(pi) ≡ pi ⊕ ei;
• Decryption: pi = Eei(ci) ≡ ci ⊕ ei.
Stream ciphers are in general faster than block ciphers [Zha05, Tra10]. The
generation of a pseudorandom key poses however a major challenge in practice.
Well-known examples of stream ciphers are the A5/1 in GSM, RC4 in WLAN
(WEP and WPA), and SNOW 3G in LTE. The A5/1 and RC4 are already broken,
the SNOW 3G not yet.
Block Cipher. A block cipher splits the plaintext into blocks having a fixed
bit length. The whole block is encrypted at a time using the same key, and a
ciphertext block of the same length as the plaintext block is generated. Here,
the encryption of each bit in the plaintext block depends on every other bit in
the same block. The vast majority of network-based symmetric cryptographic
applications use block ciphers, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[Tra11]. AES is used in the Internet Protocol security (IPsec), Transport Layer
Security (TLS), in addition to being the mandatory encryption algorithm for US
government applications. It is also used in WLAN and LTE. It was standardized
by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001 after
a five-year selection process. AES has been intensively studied and no attacks
have been found that are better than the brute-force attack (testing all possible
keys), against which AES provides long-term security [Paa09]. AES has a block
length of 128 bits. In order to encrypt plaintexts of arbitrary length (i.e., to
operate as a stream cipher), several modes of operation for block ciphers such
as the CounTeR mode (CTR) have been standardized [CTR80]. For instance,
the CTR mode is applied to AES in WLANs. To encrypt a plaintext p in the
CTR mode, p is split into n 128-bit blocks pb1 , ..., pbn , and n 128-bit counters
are generated cnt1, ..., cntn. Here, cnti = intial value || counter valuei, and the
counter value is typically incremented by one for each subsequent counter. The
cipher text c is the concatenation of the encrypted blocks cb1 , ..., cbn , and an
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adequate way to recover cnti. The encryption and decryption operations in this
mode are defined as follows.
• Encryption: cbi ≡ pbi ⊕ Ek(cnti);
• Decryption: pbi ≡ cbi ⊕ Ek(cnti).
A.1.2 Symmetric Message Authentication Algorithms
Message authentication algorithms ensure message integrity and the origin au-
thentication of the message. While unkeyed techniques, such as cryptographic
hash functions, are used to provide message integrity, symmetric-key techniques,
such as Message Authentication Code (MACs), also called keyed hash function,
are widely used to provide message authentication.
Cryptographic Hash Functions (unkeyed technique). Hash functions are in gen-
eral compressing methods. They map bit strings of arbitrary finite length to bit
strings of fixed length (e.g., n bits with n ∈ N). That is, a hash function H is
defined as H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, and its output is called a message digest. Since
the message space of H’s input is larger than that of its output, collisions are un-
avoidable. A cryptographic hash function aims at making finding such collisions
computationally infeasible (i.e., no method is significantly more efficient than
brute-force). More specifically, a cryptographic hash function is characterized by
the following security properties:
• Preimage resistance (one-way property): Given a hash output o, it is com-
putationally infeasible to find any input i such that H(i) = o.
• Second preimage resistance (weak collision resistance): Given an input i
and the corresponding hash output H(i) = o, it is computationally infeasi-
ble to find a second input i
′
such that H(i
′
) = H(i) = o.
• Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find any distinct
input pairs i 6= i
′
such that H(i
′
) = H(i).
An example of a cryptographic hash function that has been widely used in prac-
tice is the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) function. For instance, the deriva-
tion of the master key in WLAN from a pre-shared password is based on SHA-1.
This function generates an output of 160 bit length from an input of maximum
length of 2160 bit. In 2005, theoretical attacks on SHA-1 were discovered [Wan05].
This drove the NIST to initiate a public competition to standardize a new crypto-
graphic algorithm, called SHA3. In 2013, the SHA-3 standard was published.
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Message Authentication Codes. Amessage authentication code function,MAC,
is a keyed cryptographic hash function. It achieves message integrity and origin
authentication based on a symmetric secret key k, i.e., MACk(i) = o. Only
those who have knowledge of the key can successfully generate and verify the
MAC digest. A MAC function has the security properties of a cryptographic
hash function. In addition, a MAC function has to fulfill the key non-recovery
property. That is, it needs to preclude the recovery of the secret key: it should
be computationally infeasible to reveal the key, even given that the attacker has
several MAC input–output pairs that used that key.
A common approach to realize a MAC function is to use a cryptographic hash
function with two inputs, the message and the key. A well-known MAC function
that implements this approach is HMAC. It comprises an inner and outer hash,
and it is defined as follows:
HMAC(i) := H(k||padding1||H(k||padding2||i))
HMAC based on the cryptographic hash function SHA-1 is widely deployed. For
instance, it is used in WLAN for key derivations, it is also implemented in both
the IPsec protocol suite and the TLS protocol.
A.2 Public-Key Cryptographic Algorithms
The rise of public key cryptography started in the late 1970s based on the seminal
papers in [Dif76] and [Mer78]. Public key cryptography complements symmetric-
key cryptography to solve the key distribution problem and to achieve the security
goal of non-repudiation. In contrast to symmetric-key cryptography, encryption
and decryption are not similar operations, and they are not based on the same
key (or several keys easily derived from each other). In public-key cryptography,
a pair of keys is used, and it is computationally infeasible to compute one key
based on the knowledge of the other key. Thus, revealing one of the keys does not
compromise the security of the system. Typically, one key is kept private (e.g.,
the decryption key) while the other is public (e.g., the encryption key). That is
why it is called public-key cryptography or asymmetric-key cryptography.
Public-key algorithms are computationally intensive, i.e., they are mainly based
on exponentiation operations in Galois fields, and they employ relatively long
key sizes (exponents). One of the most established public key algorithms is the
RSA algorithm [Riv78]. It was invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1977
and was patented in the USA until 2000 [Adl83]. RSA can be used for ciphering
and digital signatures.
155
A Brief Introduction to Cryptography
A.2.1 RSA Ciphering
The RSA ciphering algorithm is a block cipher in which the plaintext and the
ciphertext are integers between 0 and n − 1, where n ∈ N must have a size of
at least 3072 bit to achieve long term security [Paa09]. The public key in RSA
is Kpub := (n, e), and the private key is Kpr := (p, q, d). Let mod denote the
modulo operation, Zφ(n) the integer ring from 0 to φ(n)−1, and gcd the greatest
common divisor. The RSA keys are generated as follows:
1. Choose two sufficiently large distinct primes p and q (having approximately
the same size);
2. Compute n = p · q;
3. Compute φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q − 1);
4. Choose a random value e with 0 < e < φ(n), with gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1
→ e having an inverse in Zφ(n);
5. Compute d, the inverse of e: d ≡ e−1mod φ(n).
The encryption and decryption operations in RSA are defined as follows, with pbi
and cbi being the i
th block of the plaintext p and the ciphertext c, respectively.
• Encryption: cbi ≡ p
e
bi
mod n;
• Decryption: pbi ≡ c
d
bi
mod n ≡ (pebi)
dmod n ≡ p
ed modφ(n)
bi
mod n ≡ pbi .
The security of RSA ciphering is based on the factoring problem, i.e., finding the
prime factors of a positive integer n. The complexity of this problem is believed
to be hard. The problem of revealing d from (e, n) is computationally equivalent
to the problem of factoring n. The problem of computing pbi from cbi is believed
to be computationally equivalent to factoring n.
RSA ciphering is typically used for the secure transport of symmetric keys
[Paa09].
A.2.2 RSA Digital Signature
Digital signatures provide message authentication and non-repudiation of the
message origin. If a dispute arises regarding the originator of the signed message,
a third party can verify the identity of the originator without requiring access to
the originator’s secret information. Digital signatures are usually appended to
the message; they follow a hash and sign paradigm to optimize their performance.
First a cryptographic hash function is applied to the message, and then the
fixed-size digest value is signed. Only the owner of the private key is able to
generate the signature. The RSA digital signature operations are similar to RSA
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ciphering, with signing resembling decryption. Let m denote the message and
sig the signature. The RSA signature and verification operations are defined as
follows.
• Sign: sig ≡ H(m)dmod n;
• Verify: H(m) ≡ sigemod n ≡ (H(m)e)dmod n ≡ H(m)ed modφ(n)mod n ≡
H(m).
Typically, for the sake of efficiency, a small public key exponent is chosen, in
most cases e ∈ {3, 17, 65537}, while d, the private key exponent, has similar size
to n. As a result, RSA encryption and verification operations are relatively fast,
while decryption and signature are computationally expensive.
A.2.3 Asymmetric Key Distribution
When using the RSA cipher or any other public-key ciphering scheme, the public
keys need to be authenticated, otherwise, an attacker might impersonate the
public key of the intended sender or receiver. A common approach to achieve
this goal is to use certificates supported by a trusted certification authority (i.e.,
a third party). This approach was introduced in 1978 in [Koh78]. A certificate
binds the public key of a party with the identity of that party, and it includes
other attributes such as a validity time period and a digital signature of the
Certification Authority (CA), or a certification path rooted in the trusted CA.
That is, the basic form of a certificate cert is defined as follows.
cert := (kpub, ID, V alidity)sigkprivCA
Certificates are based on the X.509 ITU standard, they are static, i.e., they need
to be re-issued if changes are required. The set of equipment, involved parties,
and procedures needed to manage certificates is called the PKI. Using certificates,
nodes can securely distribute their public key over insecure channels. Afterwards,
the nodes can run a key transport protocol or a key agreement protocol to es-
tablish secret symmetric session keys. In the former case, one party generates
the secret key and uses, e.g., RSA encryption to send this key encrypted to the
other party. In the latter case, the key is derived based on the public and private
keys of both parties as well as some exchanged information by running, e.g., the
Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange protocol [Paa09]. In this case, both parties control
the key value.
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Brief Introduction to OMNeT++
OMNeT++ stands for ‘Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++’. It is a
general-purpose tool for discrete event simulations, which is used to simulate a
wide range of applications, including communication networks, queuing systems,
and business processes [Var08]. In recent years, it has become a very popu-
lar network simulator in academia [Kok08, AQ08], and its commercial version,
OMNEST, is used by reputable companies such as Cisco, QUALCOMM, and
Alcatel-Lucent [OMN].
The implementation of simulation models in OMNeT++ follows a hierarchical
architecture. Figure B.1 gives a top-down overview of this architecture. It is
based on nested modules of the following three types:
1. Simple module: At the lowest level of the module hierarchy, simple modules
are defined using an easy-to-learn text-based NEtwork Descriptor language
(NED) and a C++ implementation. The NED file contains the description
of the module in terms of parameters and gates. It offers a friendly user
interface allowing of editing the module without needing to recompile the
model. The NED file of a simple module is always associated with a C++
file that initializes the module during runtime based on the NED parame-
ters. C++ files implement the functionality and the messages of the module.
Examples of a simple module are a UDP application or a routing protocol.
2. Compound module: At the second level of the module hierarchy, compound
modules are put together from simple modules. The depth of the module
nesting is not limited. That is, compound modules might be also com-
bined to build a more complex compound module. The modules communi-
cate with each other by exchanging messages over their connections (also
known as channels). To construct a compound module, and to define its
configuration parameters and its connections, only the NED language is
used. Examples of a compound module are wired or wireless routers which
include, among others, a routing protocol module, a routing table module,
and an interface table module.
3. System module: To build the network, system module, at the top level
of the module hierarchy, the appropriate NED files of the corresponding
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submodules are imported into a larger NED file, and the parameters for all
the submodules are set appropriately.
C++ File
(Behaviour Specification)
o Module Initialization
o Message Processing
o Etc.
NED File
(Text-based Module Description)
o Parameters (e.g., Corresponding
C++ File and Settings)
o Gates (e.g., Inputs and Outputs)
Simple Module
Connections
(e.g., Delay and Data Rate)
o Parameters (e.g., Layout, Label, Configuration of Submodules, 
Connections, and Gates)
o Gates
o l
Compound Module (NED File)
Simple ModuleSimple Module
o Parameters (e.g., Layout, Label, Configuration of
Submodules, and Connections)
o l
System Module (NED File)
Simple 
Module
Simple 
Module
Simple 
Module
Compound Module 
Compound Module 
o Number of Networks
o Parameterization of Networks
o Simulation Time
o Number of Runs
o Random Generators Initialization
o Etc.
ini File
(Simulation Configuration)
Figure B.1: Overview of OMNeT++ hierarchical architecture.
Upon defining the network, an ini file containing general settings is used to
execute the simulation.
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Overview of Modeling WLAN Mesh Networks in
INETMANET
An insight on the implementation of WMNs in INETMANET is given in Figure
C.1. These are typically modeled as follows.
• The network is composed of several nodes, a channel control module, and
a configurator module, see Figure C.1 (top). The nodes represent mobile
WLAN mesh backbone nodes. The channel control module is used to han-
dle wireless channel characteristics, e.g., received signal power, interference,
and fading. To this end, it always traces the positions of the nodes. The
configurator is used to configure the IP and MAC addresses of the nodes.
• The nodes are composed of several modules that implement the relevant
components of the TCP/IP stack, see Figure C.1 (bottom-right).
– At the link layer, several interfaces are defined that model, among
others, IEEE 802.11a, IEEE 802.11b, IEEE 802.11g, IEEE 802.11s,
and Ethernet. Each interface consists of at least three submodules: a
PHY module, a MAC module, and a management module, see Figure
C.1 (bottom-right).
MAC-based routing (e.g., HWMP) is typically simulated as part of
the management module, see [AQ09]. Channel models (e.g., air-to-air
link of UAVs) are integrated in the PHY module.
– At the Internet layer, the node implements the IP stack, which in-
cludes the IP protocol, ICMP, IGMP, ARP, and others. Besides, a
routing manager module is implemented at this layer.
IP-based routing protocols (e.g., OLSR) are typically simulated as
part of the routing manger module, see [AQ08].
– At the transport layer, INETMANET provides mature implementa-
tions of TCP, UDP, SCTP, and other protocols. At the application
layer, various traffic types exist, such as HTTP, VoIP, and CBR ap-
plications.
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Figure C.1: Generic model of a wireless mesh backbone node in INETMANET.
– Apart from the modules that implement the protocol logic of TCP/IP
layers, the node has a routing table, an interface table, a mobility mod-
ule, and a notification board. The routing and interface tables have
a similar structure and functionality to that of Unix-based operat-
ing systems. The mobility module can be used to implement specific
mobility patterns (e.g., mobility of UAV swarms). The notification
board is used to exchange cross-layer notifications between different
modules. For instance, the MAC module of the WLAN interface at
the link layer uses notifications to report a transmission error to the
routing protocol.
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D.6 Supervision of Student Theses
1. Majuran Rajakanthan, Leistungsbewertung von Routingprotokollen und Sicher-
heitslo¨sungen fu¨r Wireless Mesh Netze anhand diverser Szenarien in OM-
NeT++, Bachelor Thesis, June 2014.
2. Jan Schro¨der, Theoretical and Simulation-Based Performance Analysis of
Secure Mesh Routing Protocols in OMNeT++ and ns-3, Bachelor Thesis,
June 2014.
3. Mohamad Nehme, Leistungsbewertung und Sicherheitsanalyse von
HWMP/IEEE802.11s in OMNeT++, Study Thesis, August 2013.
4. Jonas Hinker, Erweiterung des PASER-Protokolls zur Sicherung von Knoten
ohne GPS-Empfang vor Wormhole-Angriffe, Bachelor Thesis, July 2012.
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5. Carsten Vogel, Experimental Implementation of a Comprehensive Frame-
work for PASER, Study Thesis, June 2012.
6. Eugen Paul, Simulative Leistungsbewertung des WMN-Routingprotokolls
PASER, Master Thesis, May 2012.
7. Daniel Merget, Improving the IKEv2 Protocol Robustness in Error-Prone
Channels, Bachelor Thesis, November 2011 —Joint work with Rohde &
Schwarz.
8. Lorenzo Benet Gonzalez, Leistungsbewertung des AODV-Routingprotokolls
in einem Wireless-Mesh-Netz wa¨hrend eines Wormhole-Angriffs in OM-
NeT++, Study Thesis, September 2011.
9. Giuseppe Tabbi, Konzept und Analyse eines rollen- und zertifikatbasierten
Single Sign-On, Study Thesis, September 2010 —Joint work with Dr.-Ing.
Thang Tran.
D.7 Mentoring of Seminars
1. Wen Cui, Marcus Hafercamp, Sebastian Schellhase and Benjamin Sliwa,
Enabling Next Generation Airborne Communications, September 2014 —
Joint work with Dipl.-Inf. Daniel Behnke and Dipl.-Inf. Maike Kuhnert.
2. Thierry Itondo, Lionel Cedric Noukahoua, Oussama Renuli, Daniel Swien-
tek and Carsten Vogel, Security and Performance of Wireless Mesh Net-
works, June 2011.
3. Huy Cao Tri Do, Claudia Gross, Christian Kay, Gia Vinh Luong, Giuseppe
Tabbi and Anton Tripolez, Security of Routing Protocols in Wireless Mesh
Networks, December 2010 —Joint work with Dr.-Ing. Thang Tran.
D.8 Teaching
• Co-supervision of a practical course dealing with simulation of communica-
tion networks in winter term 2013/2014
• Support of a lecture on networked mobile robot systems in winter term
2013/2014
• Support of a lecture on model-based dimensioning of communication sys-
tems in winter term 2013/2014
• Support of a lecture on communication networks in winter term 2012/2013
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List of Acronyms
MACs Message Authentication Code.
AARF Adaptive Auto Rate Fallback.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard.
AMPE Authenticated Mesh Peering Exchange protocol.
ANUM Authentication Neighbor Update Message.
AoA Angle of Arrival.
AODV Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector protocol.
API Application Programming Interface.
APIT Approximate Point In Triangle Test.
ARAN Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks.
ARF Auto Rate Fallback.
ASL Ad-hoc Support Library.
BATMAN Better Approach To Mobile Ad-hoc Networking.
CA Certification Authority.
CAPF Communication-Aware Potential Fields.
CASTOR Continuously Adapting Secure Topology-Oblivious Routing.
CBR Constant Bit Rate.
CCMP Cipher block Chaining Message authentication code Protocol.
CNI Communication Networks Institute.
CNPC Command and Non-Payload Communication.
CoO Cell of Origin.
CRL Certificate Revocation List.
CSMA/CA Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance.
CTK Clien Transient Key.
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List of Acronyms
CTR CounTeR mode.
CTS Clear-To-Send.
DBPSK Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying.
DCF Distributed Coordination Function.
DelPHI Delay Per Hop Indication.
DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum.
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm.
EDCA Enhanced Distributed Channel Access.
ETX Expected Transmission Count.
GTK Group Network Key.
HWMP Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol.
IBC Identity Based Cryptography.
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force.
IPsec Internet Protocol security.
KDC Key Distribution Center.
LLF Link Layer Feedback.
LQ Link Quality.
LTE Long Term Evolution.
LTE-TDD LTE-Time Division Duplex.
MAC Medium Access Control.
MANETs Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks.
MCCA Mesh Coordination Controlled Channel Access.
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List of Acronyms
MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output.
MPRs MultiPoint Relays.
NED NEtwork Descriptor language.
NHPS NeighborHood Discovery Protocol.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NLQ Neighbour Link Quality.
NSA National Security Agency.
OGMs OriGinator messages.
OLSR Optimized Link State Routing.
PASER Position-Aware, Secure, and Efficient mesh Routing.
PDF Probability Density Function.
PDR Packet Delivery Ratio.
PKI Public key Infrastructure.
PREP Path RESponse.
PREQ Path REQuest mechanism.
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator.
PSI Position Swap Interval.
QoS Quality Of Service.
RANN Root ANNouncement.
RAOLSR Radio Aware OLSR.
RC4 Rivest Cipher 4.
RERR Route ERRor.
RM Radio Metric.
RREP Route REPly.
RREQ Route REQuest.
RSN Robust Secure Network.
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List of Acronyms
RSS Received Signal Strength.
RTS Request-To-Send.
RTT Round-Trip Time.
SAE Simultaneous Authentication of Equals.
SAODV Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector.
SEAD Secure Efficient Ad-hoc Distance vector.
SEAODV Security Enhanced AODV.
SECTOR SECure Tracking Of node encounteRs.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm.
SHWMP Secure HWMP.
SNIR Signal to Noise plus Interference Ratio.
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio.
SOLSR Secure Optimized Link State Routing.
SWMP Secure Wireless Mesh Protocol.
TC Topology Control.
TDoA Time Difference of Arrival.
TETRA Terrestrial Trunked Radio.
TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol.
TLS Transport Layer Security.
ToA Time of Arrival.
UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
VLX Virtual Localization Extension.
WAP Wormhole Attack Prevention.
WCA Weighted Centroid Algorithm.
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy.
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network.
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List of Acronyms
WMN WLAN Mesh Network.
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access.
WPA2 Wi-Fi Protected Access 2.
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